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The Lisbon Winter School for the Study of 
Communication is a response to two troubling 
conditions of the contemporary moment: Firstly, it 
recognizes that doctoral students researching the 
challenges posed by contemporary phenomena 
in media and communication need new fora to 
foster discussion in real time of ideas and theories 
that may help them grasp more fully rapidly 
changing realities. Secondly, it aims to facilitate 
global discussions at a time marked by political 
and cultural polarization and the resurgence of 
nationalisms that diminish claims to identity and 
otherness. 
As previously-stable political institutions are today 
being challenged by political actors who aim to 
transform the central structures of democratic 
societies, media scrutiny is being rejected  widely 
as a forum for discussing ideas with those who 
think differently. In these circumstances, scholars 
cannot afford the luxury of being detached from 
everyday life and the problems being faced by 
increasingly polarized and divided societies. 
Instead, they must play a role in the analysis of 
current events, problems and issues. The call to act 
is being felt worldwide by academics who believe 
that knowledge and dialogue should be the grounds 
for understanding current times. Given the central 
role played by communication technologies in 
framing the public debates about the choices we 
ought to make or avoid as a society, researchers 
in media and communication needs to engage in 
these discussions and promote safe havens for 
intellectual debates that can help understand the 
contemporary phenomena that are impacting our 
societies.
The establishment of the Lisbon Winter School for 
the Study of Communication speaks to this call to 
act in times of uncertainty amidst the rise of anti-
elitist and anti-science discourses. The School aims 
to contribute to the training of a new generation of 
media and communication scholars engaged with 
fostering a nuanced understanding of contemporary 
phenomena and their link to political, cultural, social 
and economic contexts. Functioning as a global 
intellectual hub, the Lisbon Winter School is set 
to take place annually, bringing together different 
groups of researchers delve into what is more 
and less understood and/or recognized about an 
enigmatic and emergent topic of current concern.
Organized by the Research Center for 
Communication and Culture (CECC) and hosted 
by the Faculty of Human Sciences at Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon, the Winter School for 
the Study of Communication follows the impulses 
that propelled the establishment of the Center for 
Media at Risk at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Annenberg School for Communication—launched 
in April of 2018 as a forum for scholars and 
practitioners to strategize about media at risk 
of political intimidation and to clarify possible 
mechanisms of resistance. The topic selected for 
the 1st edition – Media and Populism – speaks 
to the intellectual agenda we aim to pursue with 
the Winter School. Grounded on two focal points—
temporal immediacy and geographic variability—we 
hope to discuss the role played by the media while 
taking into account how contemporary phenomena 
can assume different characteristics in different 
geographical and cultural locations. We also aim to 
track how distinct issues, events and personalities 
that emerge in one region might have ties to others 
that appear unrelated. Contemporary populism 
reflects these two focal points. While it has 
emerged all over the globe, namely in three of the 
most populous countries in the world, it assumes 
different local characteristics and is marked by 
networks of collaboration that operate worldwide. 
The participation of Nigel Farage in the US 
presidential campaign of 2016 is only one example 
of the repertoire of connections that currently tie 
international populist movements together.
In its 1st edition the Lisbon Winter School hosted 
30 graduate students and post-doctoral researchers 
from 19 countries. In addition to the organizing 
committee – Nelson Ribeiro, Barbie Zelizer, Francis 
Lee and Risto Kunelius - additional scholars 
delivered lectures on the topic of populism and the 
media, including Ruth Wodak, Rolien Hoyng, Karin 
Wahl-Jorgensen, Sarah Banet-Weiser and Silvio 
Waisbord. All keynotes are published in this volume, 
made possible through a collaboration between the 
Center for Media at Risk (www.ascmediarisk.org) at 
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the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School 
for Communication and the Research Center for 
Communication and Culture (www.fch.lisboa.ucp.
pt/cecc) at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
We share this volume in hopes that doing so 
may help instill better understanding of current 
conditions related to media and populism 
worldwide. We hope that it will offset—even if in a 
small fashion—the recurrent character of so many 
of today’s troubling developments. By fostering 
the ongoing discussion of similar and divergent 
experiences in multiple locations, we hope to help 
develop the critical skills of a new generation of 
media and communication researchers, on whose 
efforts the future of the field rests.
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Populism is on the rise in numerous countries 
around the world. It has re-emerged in some 
countries and relied on existing power structures
in others. Its visibility and representation
has increased in some nations while swiftly and 
suddenly moving into the mainstream political 
environment in yet others. Populist discourse often 
involves a charismatic leader who is presented
as an embodiment of the people’s will in contrast
to elite or established institutions. Such a leader
is also presented as the only individual who can 
solve seemingly intractable problems that affect 
“the people.” Although populist movements have 
myriad characteristics which differ from one 
another based on contexts and cultures, all forms 
of populism involve some aspect of mediated 
communication.
The media amplify and circulate messages which 
inspire particular affective responses among 
members of the population. Leaders utilize
the media to create a shared community and an 
emotional bond between themselves and the 
people. The media have been co-opted to foster and 
perpetuate an “us versus them” discourse
and hate speech against formulations of the “other” 
at various points throughout history. Technological 
mechanisms for such dissemination have evolved 
over time although the onus of keeping an “us 
versus them” formulation visible in the media has 
remained a priority for populist politicians.
In recent years, however, neo-populist contemporary 
movements have operated in a cultural environment 
saturated with populist media (Waisbord, 2003)
and the emergence of rituals and practices that 
foster the prominence of populist discourses 
(Mazzoleni, 2003; Kramer, 2014). Thus, neo-
populism and the media have a symbiotic 
relationship in part because coverage of politics 
follows an entertainment model based on shock-
value, controversy and emotional rather
than rational discourse.
Despite this synergistic relationship between 
populism and the media, journalists and other 
media practitioners are often vulnerable to threats 
and attacks by populist politicians who aim
to use the media to extend their political power. 
As such, governmental actors attempt to reduce
the autonomy and legitimacy of journalists when 
the press acts in critical and inconvenient ways.
Drawing from this context, in which both right and 
left-wing populist movements make savvy use 
of the media while attacking their existence and 
practices, speakers at the first Lisbon Winter School 
on Media and Populism in January 2019 focused 
on the role of the media in populist formations. 
Scholars examined how populists and media 
practitioners interact, how populism
is represented in the media and how populists
use media to connect with supporters and 
marginalize individuals voicing political discontent 
in various countries and across different time 
periods. The threat posed to freedom of information 
by populist movements is central, but it is part
of a larger information ecosystem that raises 
critical questions about the capacity of the 
media writ large – journalism, documentary, 
Jennifer R. Henrichsen 
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entertainment, digital spaces – to wrestle with 
issues and problems that trouble the essence
of populist appeal.
This book provides a response to this challenge 
through its curated collection of keynote speeches 
delivered at the inaugural Lisbon Winter School
on Media and Populism, which was jointly 
organized by the Faculty of Human Sciences 
(Universidade Católica Portuguesa), the Annenberg 
School for Communication (University
of Pennsylvania), the Faculty of Communication 
Sciences (University of Tampere), and the School 
of Journalism and Communication (Chinese 
University of Hong Kong). The speeches transcribed 
for this collection aim to uncover what is familiar 
and distinctive about manifestations of populism 
around the globe by examining the phenomenon 
through a critical lens and across temporal
and mnemonic landscapes.
In her chapter, “Entering the ‘Post-Shame Era’”, Ruth 
Wodak traces the emergence of a post-shame 
era following the increase in populism, illiberal 
democracy and neo-authoritarianism in Europe. 
She argues that present-day society is living in a 
post-shame era characterized by anti-elitist rhetoric, 
symbolic politics, ‘digital demagogy’, ‘bad manners’ 
and anti-political sentiment. Populist politicians 
who have rejected liberal values of dialogue, 
agreed upon norms and established conventions 
associated with the European Union project have 
embraced these authoritarian characteristics and 
engaged in their “shameless normalization,” which 
is paving the way to illiberalism in previously strong 
democracies, including Austria, the United Kingdom, 
Italy and the Netherlands. Wodak calls on scholars 
and practitioners to develop new narratives, public 
spaces and communication modes and policies 
to ensure that the achievements of pluralistic 
and enlightenment liberal democracies are not 
shattered in this new era.
In contrast, in his essay “Idealizing History
and Controlling the Media: Common Patterns
in Populism and Authoritarianism,” Nelson Ribeiro 
examines the phenomenon of populism through
the lens of Umberto Eco’s (1995) concept of 
“eternal fascism,” or the idea that fascism
is a political game with numerous forms and is not 
a homogenous political doctrine. Through the case 
of the former Portuguese dictatorship, The New 
State, Ribeiro shows how contemporary populism, 
with its different democratic contexts and levels 
of repression, has similarities with authoritarian 
regimes during the interwar period and utilizes 
fascist elements to obtain and maintain power
and control.
Meanwhile, Francis Lee takes us across the 
ocean to Hong Kong to assess how we should 
understand the relationship between populism, the 
media (especially digital and social media) and the 
dynamics of contentious politics. In his chapter, 
“Populisms, Media and the Dynamics
of Contentious Politics,” Lee shows how inefficient 
governance and stagnant democratization led
to contentious politics in Hong Kong, which, in turn, 
contributed to the rise of populist localism and 
state-sponsored populism since 2010. Lee argues 
that the development of these populist discourses 
is emblematic of a process of contesting
and negotiating the repertoire of social movement 
discourses. He shows how social media
are a contributory condition for the rise of populism 
and that social media become part of the dynamics 
of populism by contributing to populism’s scale
and speed.
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Rolien Hoyng also assesses the intersections
of state power, populism and digital media but
in the context of Turkey and through the lens
of digital intimacy. In her article, “Digital Intimacy 
and its Metadata: Rethinking Populism,” 
Hoyng examines the relationship between the 
micropolitics of affect, state power and digital 
infrastructure. She assesses how digital intimacy 
reconfigures or displaces populism by examining 
the connectedness of human relations and the 
connectivity of algorithmic processing within 
social media. Using examples from social-media 
campaigns that occurred during regime change 
in Turkey as well as Turkey’s military mobilization 
in Syria and its deepening economic crisis, Hoyng 
challenges the notion that the crowd
is homogenous and scary because it undermines 
the notion of liberal and “rational” subjectivity. 
Instead, she argues that the crowd is dangerous as 
a result of its disconnections and erasures which 
are facilitated through digital media. Thus, she 
claims it is important to question in what ways
and to what extent affect and intimacy 
are technologically captured, exploited
and articulated into projects of authoritarianism
and othering.
In her essay, “Media and the Emotional Politics of 
Populism,” Karin Wahl-Jorgensen uses the case 
study of Donald Trump to examine the relationship 
between anger, populist politics and media 
coverage. Wahl-Jorgensen argues that Trump 
embodies “angry populism” or a rhetoric which aims 
for broad appeal through the strategic
and deliberate expression of anger. This form
of populism represents a shift in William Reddy’s 
(2001) concept of an “emotional regime” or a “set 
of normative emotions, and the official rituals, 
practices and emotives (emotion words) that 
express and inculcate them” which are perceived 
as essential for any stable political regime. Wahl-
Jorgensen observes that anger works for Trump 
and appears to be a resource for populist politics 
more generally. Anger also has a home with Trump’s 
supporters. This unspecified anger of Trump’s 
supporters, as shown through mediated discourse, 
suggests that anger is essential to their identity 
and worldviews and it reveals that Trump embodies 
a particular brand of exclusionary populism that 
depends upon performative anger in order to 
dramatize grievances. As such, Trump’s anger has 
provided an important mode of understanding his 
presidency and brand of populism. Wahl-Jorgensen 
argues that the emotional regime of angry populism 
is concerning because of the anger it embodies, the 
emotional climate it creates and the actions (such 
as hate crimes) that it facilitates. Thus, mediated 
anger in political life is a distinctive formation.
Yet it can continue to be contested as collective and 
political emotions are dynamic and ever-changing.
Meanwhile, Sarah Banet-Weiser shifts the 
conversation from angry populism to anger toward 
women as emblematized by a rise in popular 
misogyny. In her chapter, “Popular Feminism and 
Popular Misogyny,” she examines how and in what 
ways the rise of popular feminism has invited
a response and an intensification of popular 
misogyny, or the idea that women have taken 
something essential and important away from 
men and thus that men are the real victims. Banet-
Weiser argues that popular feminism
is characterized by confidence, competence, rage 
and shame, characteristics which are then taken 
up and distorted by misogynists who actively 
target women with them. Popular misogyny can be 
considered a type of populism because
it mobilizes a particular kind of networked 
movement and it is about a shared sense
of victimhood and a desire and a perceived right to 
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take things back. Both popular feminism
and popular misogyny are popular because they 
manifest in discourses and practices that are 
circulated in popular and commercial media, they 
have a condition of being liked or admired by like-
minded people, and the popular, following Stuart 
Hall, is a terrain of struggle where competing 
demands for power battle one another. Banet-
Weiser argues that popular misogyny is deeply 
connected with neoliberalism which operates
as a structuring force that is both popular
and networked and thus produces a populism that 
finds coherence and a shared sense of victimhood 
and which aims to recuperate and restore norms
of dominant masculinity, patriarchy and whiteness.
In their keynote speeches which concluded the 
conference,Zelizer and Silvio Waisbord took a 
critical look at contemporary journalism
and media practice and offered ways to improve 
on both in the future. In her essay, “Why Journalism 
Needs to Change,” Zelizer draws from Federico 
Finchelstein to argue that contemporary populism 
developed in the absence of fascist movements 
following WWII and amidst
the emergence of a bipolar world which pitted 
capitalism against communism and the West 
against the East. In this black and white world, 
populism percolated and morphed into whatever 
was necessary to fill the in-between space. 
Populism also took on the colors of fascism
to an extent to make democracy more authoritarian. 
The ensuing form of democracy thus depended 
on a charismatic leader, an apocalyptic view of the 
future, anti-elitism and anti-institutionalism,
and an anti-pluralist view of popular representation. 
Populism became a counterpoint to liberalism, the 
Enlightenment and an undercurrent of Cold War 
thinking.
The resultant contemporary authoritarian populism 
impacts and shapes democratic institutions, 
including journalism. Yet, rather than respond
to populism by critically dissecting it, many 
journalists and journalisms have facilitated
the conditions necessary for populism to flourish. 
This has occurred for a variety of reasons 
including journalism’s entrenchment in a Cold War 
mindset, which has informed its binary thinking, 
its compliance and deference to the status quo, 
tendency toward simplification and its adherence
to long-standing conventions of objectivity, 
neutrality, impartiality and balance. Zelizer argues 
that journalists need to find and adopt
a less reactive, defensive, deferent, dichotomized, 
objective and impartial stance to more critically, 
thoroughly and effectively cover the rise of 
contemporary authoritarian populism. However, 
journalists by and large are not yet doing so. 
Instead, they continue to resist change and their 
non-reflective mindset continues to entrench and 
naturalize a non-critical and compliant response 
to authoritarian power dynamics that prevents 
journalists from being able to contest contemporary 
authoritarian trends. Zelizer calls on journalists
to better understand how authoritarianism
is invading the institutional landscape rather than 
shrinking from challenging it because they are 
worried about reduced access to sources, criticism 
from powerful figures, or because it may not 
contribute to the bottom line. According to Zelizer, 
journalists’ “deep memory of Cold War mindedness” 
may help ease occupational dissonance but it also 
results in a blindness to ideological inconsistences 
and an inability to see the dissolution of tenets
of liberal democracies.
Similarly, Silvio Waisbord argues for changes in 
the media landscape as well as in the academic 
environment. In his essay, “Ideas for Comparative 
Studies of Populism, Media and Communication,” 
Waisbord calls on academics to not only focus
on the causes of populism but to figure out ways 
for societies to emerge from populist environments. 
Waisbord argues that this is best achieved through 
a rigorous comparative approach that examines 
the relationship between media and populism. 
Waisbord acknowledges that populism is difficult 
to define because it has amorphous conditions 
and characteristics, yet he notes that a consistent 
tenet of populism is that it pits one group against 
another (even though these groups may change). 
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Such an oppositional approach can swiftly devolve 
into treatment of the other as an enemy, which 
implicates implicates authoritarianism. Thus, 
Waisbord argues that populism sits at the edge
of democracy because it refuses to recognize 
diversity and can quickly devolve into antiliberal 
democracy which has no patience for critical 
thinking, critical journalism or critical opposition.
The essays in this volume traverse complicated 
manifestations of populism and the media, as they 
are inflected by different democratic and historical 
contexts. They reveal the ways in which populism 
simultaneously relies on and strives to undermine 
the media and populism’s continued power
to divide and demonize people into “us versus 
them” categories. The authors underscore the 
complexity of populisms and the mediated 
discourses associated with them and they 
also point to the need for urgent and in-depth 
understandings of the phenomenon as it rises 
in power and frequency across many countries 
around the world. Their calls for urgent changes 
in journalistic practice and academic focus 
are important to heed if citizens want to help 
ensure that liberal democracies survive in these 
increasingly populist and authoritarian times.
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On 17 July 2018, former US president Barack 
Obama was invited to give the Nelson Mandela 
Annual Lecture in Johannesburg. In his speech,
he warned that:
“A politics of fear and resentment and retrenchment 
began to appear, and that kind of politics is now 
on the move … I am not being alarmist, I am 
simply stating the facts. … Strongman politics are 
ascendant suddenly, whereby elections and some 
pretence of democracy are maintained – the form 
of it – but those in power seek to undermine every 
institution or norm that gives democracy meaning.”
Obviously, Obama did not use the terms ‘illiberal 
democracy’, ‘neo-authoritarianism’ or ‘populism’ 
(or other terms which currently dominate social-
science scholarship and media reporting), but he 
certainly put his finger on the drastic socio-political 
changes that have been taking place globally, 
including in EU member states, specifically since 
the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 (Rheindorf and 
Wodak, 2018).
Indeed, as a study on ‘Fear not values’ conducted by 
de Vries and Hoffman (2016) in eight EU member 
states illustrates, over 50% of the voters for
far-right parties viewed globalisation as the major 
threat in the future.Moreover, 53% of those who 
fear globalisation perceive migration as the major 
global challenge, and 54% display anti-foreigner 
sentiments. In a similar vein, political scientist Ivan 
Krastev concludes in his widely acknowledged 
essay Europadämmerung (2017: 48–49) that the 
‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 might eventually lead to the 
destruction of the EU.
INTRODUCTION
Although many politicians at EU and national levels, 
as well as other prominent public intellectuals, are 
explicitly warning against the European and global 
drift towards more (ethno-)nationalism, illiberal de-
mocracies and authoritarianism – and thus against 
violations of human rights, international treaties 
and EU norms and values (for example, Otmar 
Karas, Emanuel Macron, and Jürgen Habermas) – 
official responses on the part of the EU have been 
slow and follow complex, institutionally defined 
procedures (Article 7 of the European Treaty). Along 
these lines, Grabbe and Lehne (2017b: 8) state that:
“EU actors must therefore explain why they have
to protect core EU standards and make it clear that 
steps will be taken against any government that 
undermines EU law. Strong statements from other 
Central European governments would be particular-
ly helpful. The EU can also counter claims of double 
standards by getting tougher on bad behaviour by 
member states across the board, particularly
on corruption and misuse of public funds.”
Due to space restrictions, I will have to neglect 
the institutional struggles on the EU level and the 
various attempts to negotiate with Hungary and 
Poland, but those have been covered extensively 
by Uitz (2015), Kerski (2018), and Möllers and 
Schneider (2018). Uitz (2015: 293–295) also 
provides compelling evidence for the impossibility 
of drawing on the agreed-upon conventions
of dialoguing, negotiating and compromising,
if one of the partners in these interactions does not 
want to comply with the established rules
of such language games (Wodak, 2015a, 2017): 
this precludes ‘productive dialogue’ (Utiz, 2015: 
294). The Hungarian and Polish governments seem 
convinced that these conventions do not apply to 
them and are driven ‘by the urge
to establish exceptions, in the spirit of 
constitutional parochialism’ (Utiz, 2015: 296). 
In other words, context-dependent discursive 
strategies of blame avoidance, denial, Manichean 
division, victim-perpetrator reversal and eristic 
argumentation dominate official communication, 
accompanied by ever increasing nationalism, 
chauvinism and nativism.
STUDY ON ‘FEAR NOT VALUES’ CONDUCTED BY 
DE VRIES AND HOFFMAN (2016)
50% of the voters for far-right 
parties viewed globalisation as the 
major threat in the future
53%  of those who fear 
globalisation perceive migration as 
the major global challenge
54%  display anti-foreigner 
sentiments 
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In this vein, I claim that this kind of rejection 
of dialogue relates to a ‘post-shame era’ rather 
than, as many scholars believe, merely to a ‘post-
truth era’ (for example, Scheff, 2000; Hahl et al, 
2018): anti-elitist and anti-pluralist/exclusionary 
rhetoric, symbolic politics (such as focusing on the 
‘headscarves’ of Muslim women while neglecting 
complex socioeconomic issues associated with 
migration and integration), ‘digital demagogy’, 
‘bad manners’ and ‘anti-politics’ support the non-
complying behaviours of powerful politicians 
that frequently resonate as ‘authentic’ with the 
core followers of these politicians, their parties or 
governments. Instead of discussing and providing 
solutions for major socio-political problems such
as globally rising inequality and youth 
unemployment, and the consequences of climate 
change for migration politics, refugees and 
migrants serve as the scapegoat and simplistic 
explanation for all woes. Against this background, 
‘anti-politics’ is defined as a specific attitude and 
related discourse which systematically undermine 
democratic institutions (Diehl, 2017: 28–29). 
The state itself, the entire political system,
is challenged, like in reality TV: shamelessness, 
humiliation of other participants, defamation, 
lies and ad hominem attacks dominate. Indeed, 
such shameless behaviour could be observed, 
for example, in several TV debates during the 
presidential election campaign in Austria in 2016, 
employed by the far-right populist candidate (for 
the Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), Norbert Hofer 
(Wodak, 2017). Mastropaolo (2000: 36) mentions 
similar patterns of scandalisation, ‘politicotainment’ 
and the decay of democratic procedures in Italian 
politics in the 1990s (Wodak, 2011).
In this paper, I trace the trajectory of the Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP) in its transformation into the 
‘New People’s Party’ under Chancellor Sebastian 
Kurz, recently entering a coalition government with 
the populist extreme-right FPÖ. This allows me to 
identify the many small and large changes that 
Austria has undergone on the way from
a constitutional liberal democracy since 1945
to a potentially Orbánesque illiberal democracy, 
thus indicating some limits of the liberal democratic 
European project envisioned by the founding 
fathers. This, I argue, must be recognised as
a process of ‘normalisation’ – the normalisation
of far-right ideologies in both content and 
form. This process can also be observed in the 
Netherlands, where Geert Wilders’ Party for 
Freedom (PVV) has exerted much influence on the 
mainstream, labelled the ‘Geert Wilders-effect’. 
Thus, specific patterns and stages of the Austrian 
trajectory can most probably be generalised
to other EU member states. In this context,
I will also discuss some constitutive discursive 
strategies of the post-shame era, the adaptation 
and integration of illiberalism and authoritarianism 
into formerly liberal democratic regimes. First, 
however, I shall briefly define the relevant concepts 
mentioned above and necessarily restrict myself
to briefly elaborating on ‘populism’, 
‘authoritarianism/ neo-authoritarianism’
and ‘illiberal democracy/managed democracy’.
DEFINING RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
POPULISM
There is no consensus as to whether ‘far-right 
populism/populist right-wing extremism’ is
an ideology (thin or thick; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: 
5), a philosophy (Priester, 2007: 9), a specific media 
phenomenon (Pajnik and Sauer, 2017), a strategic 
option for right-wing extremists like the strategies 
used by the Nazi Party in the 1930s and 1940s 
(Salzborn, 2018) or a specific political style (Moffitt, 
2017; Brubaker, 2017: 3) that manifests mainly in 
performance and communication.
In their frequently cited approach, Mudde and 
Kaltwasser (2017: 9–12) emphasise three 
parameters of populism: first, the opposition 
between ‘the people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’; second, 
a grounding in the volonté générale of the people; 
third, its character as a thin ideology, because
it does not constitute a coherent structure of beliefs 
but assembles contradictory ideologemes in an 
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• CONSERVATIVISM/HISTORICAL 
REVISIONISM: Far-right populist 
parties usually represent conservative 
values (emphasising family values) 
and insist on preserving the status 
quo or a return to former, ‘better’ times. 
The aim of protecting the homeland also builds on 
a shared narrative of the past in which ‘we’ are either 
heroes or victims of evil (a conspiracy, enemiesof 
the fatherland, and so on). This transforms past 
suffering or defeat into stories of the successes
of the people or into stories of betrayal and 
treachery by others. Social welfare, in the 
concomitant welfare chauvinism, should only
be given to ‘true’ members of the ethnos.
Although not all far-right populist parties endorse 
all of the above, these – realised in specific 
combinations – can be generalised as typical 
ideologies of the far right. In all cases, such parties 
will advocate change, moving away from
an allegedly dangerous path – a looming crisis – 
that would lead straight to catastrophe.
eclectic fashion. As Mudde and Kaltwasser
do not restrict their definition to the populist far 
right, the notion of ‘the people’ refers to the people 
as both sovereign (demos) and the common 
people. Moreover, it can refer to the people
as ethnos. Furthermore, the notion of ‘the elite’
is differentiated into elites with (cultural, economic 
or social) power and elites defined on purely ethnic 
grounds. Finally, the volonté générale is equated 
with the general will of the people in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s sense.
This rather general definition must be specified – 
four dimensions are crucial in the context of recent 
political developments in the EU (Wodak, 2015a: 
20–22, 25–33):
• NATIONALISM/NATIVISM/ANTI-
PLURALISM: Far-right populist parties 
stipulate a seemingly homogenous 
ethnos, a populum or Volk, which can 
be arbitrarily defined – often in nativist 
(blood-related) terms. Such parties value 
the homeland or Heimat, which seems to require 
protection from dangerous invaders. In this way, 
threat scenarios are constructed – the homeland
or the ‘we’ is threatened by ‘others’: strangers within 
and/or outside society.
 • ANTI-ELITISM: Such parties share 
an anti-elitist and anti-intellectual 
attitude (‘arrogance of ignorance’; 
Wodak, 2015a) related to strong 
EU scepticism. According to these 
parties, democracy should essentially
be reduced to the majoritarian principe, that is, the 
rule of the (arbitrarily defined) ‘true people’.
 • AUTHORITARIANISM: A saviour,
a charismatic leader is worshipped, 
alternating between the role
of Robin Hood (protecting the welfare 
state, supporting the ‘simple folk’) 
and the ‘strict father’ (Lakoff, 2004). 
Such charismatic leaders require a hierarchically 
structured party and government to guarantee 
‘law and order’ and ‘security’.
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
The distinction between ‘liberal/constitutional 
democracies’ and ‘illiberal democracies’ is not new. 
The salient criterion for the existence of a liberal 
democracy is constitutionalism in the sense of 
checks and balances designed to protect the state 
and its society from the accumulation of power 
and the abuse of office. According to Zakaria 
(1997: 23–24), who coined the term, illiberal 
democracies are increasing around the world and 
are increasingly limiting the freedoms
of the people they represent (such as civil liberties 
of speech or religion). Nevertheless, the term 
‘illiberal democracy’ remains a contested concept 
(see Krastev, 2006).
Since its public use in 2014 by Hungarian Prime 
Minster Victor Orbán, leader of the far-right/
nationalistic-conservative party Fidesz, ‘illiberal 
democracy’ has entered everyday discourse 
in Europe and has been appropriated by some 
politicians as a positive model to be followed; and 
as a political system to be vehemently opposed 
by others. In his speech on 30 July 2014, Orbán 
maintained that: the new state that we are 
15
Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, 
a nonliberal state. It does not reject the 
fundamental principles of liberalism such as 
freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not 
make this ideology the central element
of state organization, but instead includes
a different, special, national approach.
Here, Orbán defines ‘illiberal democracy’
as rejecting tolerance for minorities while 
supporting strong forms of majoritarianism. He 
emphasises his belief in nationalism (Hungary’s 
uniqueness vis-à-vis the EU and the other 27 EU 
member states) and exceptionalism. The Hungarian 
Constitution, which was revised and accepted 
by the Hungarian Parliament on 25 April 2011, 
reflects Fidesz’s illiberal values by, for example, 
cutting the freedom of the press, reforming the 
electoral system in unfair ways, and challenging 
and undermining the independence of justice 
(Uitz, 2015: 285–288; Grabbe and Lehne, 2017a). 
In Poland, similar developments are taking place 
under the nationalistic-conservative government 
of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and its leader 
Jarosław Kaczyński (Grabbe and Lehne, 2017b; 
Kerski, 2018). Of course, gerrymandering and using 
the resources of the state on a very large scale
to ensure a sweeping full-majority victory would 
not necessarily imply fraudulent elections in a 
formal sense, but the boundaries of legality are 
shamelessly pushed as far as possible (Uitz, 2015). 
Indeed, Sutowski (2018: 17–18) labels the new 
Polish way as ‘neo-authoritarianism’.
Thus, liberal democracies cannot be defined solely 
by the fact that elections are formally held;
as Möllers and Schneider (2018: 7–9) maintain, the 
protection of oppositional parties and movements, 
freedom of opinion and the press, fair elections 
and independence of the judicial system must 
be guaranteed. Therefore, the authors argue that 
potential future majorities must be protected: 
the opposition must retain the institutional 
opportunities to win majorities in a future election 
(pp 89–90). This specific criterion is necessary,
the authors argue, to prevent the rise of an 
authoritarian system.
(NEO-)AUTHORITARIANISM
Fuchs (2018: 56–58) defines right-wing/neo-
authoritarianism by drawing on the traditions of the 
Frankfurt School (specifically Franz Neumann and 
T.W. Adorno) along four similar dimensions, namely: 
Nationalism, Friend/Enemy-Scheme, Authoritarian 
Leadership and Patriarchy and Militarism. 
Two elements stand out in Fuchs’ conceptual 
framework: political fetishism of the nation
‘to deflect attention from class contradictions and 
power inequalities’; moreover, ‘leader fetishism 
is used as a political organization principle that 
often extends to the organization of the capitalist 
economy, culture and everyday life’ (p 56). Secondly, 
Fuchs emphasises the glorification of the soldier 
and warrior; indeed violence, imperialism and war 
are accepted ‘as appropriate ways for organizing 
social relations’ (p 57). Fuchs’ neo-Marxist 
framework allows understanding the link between 
the neoliberal world order and the rise of illiberal 








30 July 2014 
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Mudde (2007: 22) also draws on the Frankfurt 
School but subscribes to a more socio-
psychological tradition: authoritarianism is defined 
as ‘a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient 
to and remain uncritical towards authoritative 
figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude
of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some 
moral authority’ (Adorno et al, 1969:228, ). 
However, Mudde also points to Juan Linz’s 
influential definition of authoritarianism as a form 
of government characterised by strong central 
power and limited individual freedoms. Following 
Linz (1964), four dimensions are emphasised as 
salient elements of an authoritarian government:
• limited political 
pluralism places 
constraints on political 
parties, interest groups 
and NGOs;
• legitimacy is largely 
dependent on emotions, 
on identification with 
the regime;
• suppression of the 
opposition; and,
• vague and non-
transparent definitions 
of the powers of the 
executive.
Obviously, these criteria overlap with the definitions 
of illiberal democracy mentioned above.
Furthermore, Levitsky and Way (2002) point
to another relevant concept: 
‘competitive authoritarianism’, which differs from 
so-called ‘façade’ electoral regimes (also labelled 
‘pseudo-democracies’, ‘virtual democracies’ 
and ‘electoral authoritarian’), that is regimes 
in which electoral institutions exist but yield 
no meaningful contestation of power (such as 
Egypt, Singapore and Uzbekistan in the 1990s). 
Competitive authoritarianism implies regimes that 
are democratic in appearance but authoritarian in 
nature; thus, democratic institutions exist
in form but not in substance, because the electoral, 
legislative, judicial, media and other institutions 
are so heavily skewed in favour of current power 
holders. Russia under President Vladimir Putin, 
the authors claim, would fall within the category 
of competitive authoritarianism. In a detailed 
comparative study of media systems, Becker 
(2004: 149) regards the Russian press under Putin 
as a neo-authoritarian media system. He argues 
that ‘state-owned media have limited autonomy, 
and appointments to key positions are linked 
to political loyalty. Access to the media may be 
open and private ownership may be tolerated, but 
other mechanisms are used to control messages.’ 
Economic and legal pressures are applied
to suppress freedom of opinion. The regime also 
uses or tolerates violence against opposition 
journalists and editors. In this way, self-censorship 
is reinforced.
As will be elaborated later, the Austrian government 
coalition between ÖVP and FPÖ has placed severe 
controls on information and is attempting
to intervene in the public state-owned media; this 
could certainly be regarded as a significant step
in the direction of an illiberal democracy and a neo-
authoritarian media system. Such developments 
clearly point to the limit of EUrope as envisioned 
and indeed as stipulated, for example, in the 
European Treaty of Lisbon 2008–09.
The Austrian ‘Freedom Party’ (Freiheitliche Partei 
THE TURQUOISE-BLUE GOVERNMENT
IN AUSTRIA, 2017–18
LOOKING BACK: THE RISE OF THE FPÖ
Österreichs, FPÖ) must be distinguished from other 
populist far-right parties in terms of its history and 
continuous ties to National Socialism, as well as 
its nativist, anti-immigrant, anti-pluralist and white-
supremacist ideology. Today, one might consider 
labelling the party as populist extreme-right, owing 
to some of its ideological characteristics, as well 
as its leading members who belong to German-
national duelling fraternities (see below).
17
Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
After Heinz-Christian (HC) Strache 
took control of the FPÖ in 2005, 
frontstage activities of the party saw 
a softening of extreme-right positions 
and an increase in the salient 
mobilisation of symbols of banal 
nationalism (Billig, 1995): displaying 
the Austrian flag, singing the national 
anthem and utilizing an abundance 
of other symbols of national pride. 
In many instances, the respective 
texts and performances feature 
Strache himself wielding these 
symbols (see Figure 1), portraying 
the FPÖ politicians as brave, strong 
and skilled mountaineers who have 
climbed to the very mountain top, and 
subsequently addressing their role as 
the saviours of ‘true Austrians’.
With Strache’s leadership came
Figure 1 | Harald Vilimsky (Party Secretary and MEP, Europe of Nations and Freedom Party), HC 
Strache, Johann Gudenus (Deputy-Mayor of Vienna; since 2018, MP and FPÖ whip) and Herbert 
Kickl (Party Secretary; since 2018, Minister for Interior Affairs) brandishing the Austrian flag at 
the Großglockner peak, Austria’s highest mountain (Strache, 2017)
a re-branding of the FPÖ as the 
‘Soziale Heimatpartei’, the Social 
Homeland Party (a label it shares 
with the extreme-right National 
Democratic Party of Germany, NPD). 
Further provocations relate to the use 
of religious imagery and symbols (for 
example, Strache carried a Christian 
cross during a demonstration against 
the building of a Mosque in Vienna; 
Wodak, 2015a: 140), as well as the 
redefining of religious concepts, such 
as Nächstenliebe (neighbourly love 
or charity) in nationalistic terms. The 
accompanying claims
to represent and ‘defend’ the Christian 
heritage of Austria in the face of an 
alleged ‘Islamic invasion’ have been 
protested, inter alia, by the Catholic 
Church. Indeed, the FPÖ’s ‘othering’ 
has come to focus strongly on Islam, 
cast as an ethnic other, medieval/
pre-modern/ barbaric and religious 
zealot/ fanatic or terrorist threat 
(Wodak, 2017: 116–117; Wodak
and Rheindorf, 2018).
The Austrian parliamentary elections 
2017 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
on 15 October 2017 exemplify the 
shameless normalisation of the 
previously far-right positionings
of the FPÖ. The ÖVP (now rebranded 
as ‘Ballot Sebastian Kurz –
The New People’s Party’, strategically 
changing colour from black
to turquoise) focused almost 
exclusively on migration issues 
(equating all refugees with so-
called ‘illegal migrants’). This new 
programme changed the agenda and 
structure of the ÖVP, which had been 
established immediately after the 
restoration of Austria’s independence 
in 1945 and has been represented 
in parliament ever since. The ÖVP 
has consistently been the strongest 
or second-strongest party; as such, 
it has led or at least been a partner 
in most of Austria’s governments 
(Grande et al, 2012: 52). Sebastian 
Kurz, who had strategically prepared 
to take over the ÖVP since mid-2016 
(as was disclosed by newspapers 
in June 2017), was elected as 
party leader on 1 July 2017, after 
his predecessor had resigned, and 
immediately changed the structure
of the ‘grand old party’: he surrounded 
himself with an 
extremely loyal team 
of mostly young male 
supporters and with 
politically inexperienced 
career-changers 
who are completely 
dependent on him. He 
employs a large team 
of spin doctors who 
cleverly manage his 
online presence and his 
campaign, apparently 
copying many elements 
of US election rallies 
(see Horaczek and 
Tóth, 2017; Hofer and 
Tóth, 2017). In this 
way, the party has 
become identified with 
his persona to the 
point where Kurz is the 
new ÖVP with a strict 
centralised, hierarchical 
structure.
Apart from proposing 
to dismantle the social 
18
Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
partnership (and thus one of the constitutive 
cornerstones of the Austrian social model)
and support employers’ organisations, the new ÖVP 
repeatedly promised to close the ‘Mediterranean 
route’ to migration; to reduce the legally fixed 
minimum welfare (for recognised refugees but 
also for other people in need); moreover, to reduce 
the upper limit for asylum applicants, in effect 
since 2016, from 35,000 to zero (although the 
number of new arrivals since 2015 has decreased 
dramatically). In so doing, Kurz adopted almost 
verbatim the programme of the FPÖ. It is thus fitting 
that the Green Party referred to Kurz during the 
2017 election campaign as ‘the better Strache’.
Fearmongering was the persuasive macro-strategy 
in the FPÖ’s and ÖVP’s election campaigns in 2017 
(Wodak, 2018a). They wilfully selected specific 
scapegoats as being responsible for the misery 
or threat identified: ‘illegal migrants’, Muslims and 
Islam, the Jewish philanthropist George Soros, 
NGOs, the EU and the media, as well as the previous 
coalition government, in which Kurz had served 
six years as minister for foreign affairs, and the 
integration of migrants. Both Strache and Kurz 
staged themselves as saviours of the ‘true Austrian 
people’ (see Figures 1 and 2), ready to ‘solve’ the 
alleged problems by, for instance, closing borders 
and deporting ‘illegal migrants’.
A new, positive narrative was created, which should 
raise hope, advertised as an unspecified change.
The stirring up of resentment by Kurz and 
Figure 2 | Poster with Sebastian Kurz: ‘Now or never! ÖVP, Ballot Sebastian 
Kurz, the new People’s Party. Movement for Austria!’ (personal photo)
Strache was successful at the election. The 
national-conservative ÖVP won a majority with 
31.5%. The FPÖ took third place with 26%. Due 
to the substantial overlap between the political 
programmes of the FPÖ and ÖVP, coalition 
talks began soon after. The new turquoise-blue 
government, albeit accompanied by loud protests, 
was inaugurated by President Van der Bellen on 18 
December 2017. During negotiations to form this 
government, President Alexander van der Bellen 
(in office since 26 January 2017) successfully 
prevented the Ministries of the Interior and Justice 
going to FPÖ officials as part of the coalition deal 
and pushed for the EU agenda to be relocated from 
the FPÖ-led Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to the Chancellery of Kurz. Despite all this, Van der 
Bellen did inaugurate the turquoise-blue coalition, 
notwithstanding frequent assurances to the 







The ÖVP’s adoption of a far-right, nationalist-
conservative agenda implies the normalisation
of a previously extreme-right, taboo agenda. It is 
thus not surprising that the European Council
on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) published an 
editorial on 6 July 2018 – after the beginning
of Austria’s EU presidency on 1 July 2018 – with 
the headline ‘Austria: When good countries go 
bad’, thus clearly indicating the limits of EUrope 
with respect to the officially accepted values of the 
European Treaty:
“Concerns centre on a set of inter-related issues:
the Austrian Government’s stance on asylum
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and migration; its closeness to the demagogic 
leaders of certain countries; its underlying anti-EU 
stance; its courtship with Russia.
The country’s ability to play the role of the 
Presidency is questioned because its obsessive and 
biased approach to migration and its love-in with 
the extremists may preclude the neutrality required. 
… while the threat from extremist-nationalists like 
the Freedom Party is clear …, the anti-migration, 
anti-Europe agenda becomes far more powerful 
through the conversion of mainstream leaders
and parties to the cause, along with their 
subsequent complicity in allowing institutional and 
political capture by the migration obsession of the 
bad company they decide to keep.”
In the following, I briefly point to some salient 
indicators for Austria’s move towards an illiberal 
democracy while focusing on the discursive and 
argumentative strategies accompanying new 
legislation.
FEARMONGERING: US AND THEM
The new Austrian government propagates an 
extremely restrictive immigration policy (Rheindorf 
and Wodak, 2018) and closed borders (even to 
Italy and South Tyrol), including the so-called 
Mediterranean route. Shamelessly, both the FPÖ 
and the new ÖVP are actively spreading rumours, 
strawman fallacies and erroneous reports about 
migrants and refugees – which all merge into
a single threat scenario consisting of an imagined 
‘invasion’ by so-called ‘illegal migrants’ (Wodak, 
2018b). To sidestep the obligations of the Geneva 
Refugee Convention and prevent further loss
of voters to the FPÖ, ÖVP politicians now define 
people who have been persecuted and are fleeing 
as ‘illegal migrants’ in their government programme. 
This implies that they are claiming to be refugees 
but are in fact travelling to rich European countries 
to live off welfare and benefits, and thereby 
endanger the prosperity of those countries. Such 
fallacies foment resentment and envy: why should 
foreigners gain access to benefits that take 
something away from ‘us’? Such exclusionary and 
xenophobic politics – sustained and implemented 
by the formerly Christian-social ÖVP – correspond 
to the welfare chauvinism of other far-right 
populists in Europe, such as the German Alternative 
for Germany (AfD), the Sweden Democrats or the 
Dutch PVV (Wodak, 2017, 2018a).
Euphemisms are used with the aim of making 
restrictive new migration policies acceptable: in 
a meeting of EU heads of state in Brussels on 28 
June 2018, Kurz and his allies Orbán and Matteo 
Salvini (LEGA, Italy’s Interior Minister) launched new 
terms, such as ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ 
instead of ‘camps’, to retain refugees in Northern 
Africa, thus preventing them from entering Europe. 
Moreover, facts about the plights of refugees are 
challenged and expert opinions neglected.
For example, on 22 June 2018, in an interview 
with the German weekly Die Zeit, editor-in-chief 
Giovanni Di Lorenzo asked Sebastian Kurz what 
he felt when confronted with videos and pictures 
of children who had been separated from their 
parents at the US–Mexico border. Kurz argued that 
these accounts may have been ‘fake news’: ‘I don’t 
want to speculate, but I have devoted myself a lot 
to migration. I know that frequently the mistake 
is being made, that something is represented 
differently than it is.’ As Hannah Arendt (1971) 
asserted long ago, politicians can quickly change 
facts into opinions that one can then oppose – 
quite shamelessly – with alternative viewpoints.
In this way, she argues, scholarly and factual 
evidence can be blunted and even negated.
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ANTISEMITISM/RACISM/HISTORICAL REVISIONISM
As Hans-Hennig Scharsach 
(2017) argues in his book Stille 
Machtergreifung [Quiet Coup], the 
FPÖ’s internal structures have 
changed significantly since HC 
Strache took over as leader in 2005, 
moving the party ever closer to the 
radical and extreme right: members 
of duelling fraternities, which make up 
only 0.4% of the Austrian population, 
have effectively taken over the FPÖ. 
FPÖ politicians such
as Strache, Norbert Hofer (Minister 
for Infrastructure), Johann Gudenus 
and Manfred Haimbuchner 
(vice-governor of Upper Austria) 
constitute the highest leadership 
body of the FPÖ. They all belong to 
duelling fraternities (Schlagende 
Burschenschaften; Rauscher, 
2017). Core characteristics 
of the extreme right, such as 
anti-liberalism, authoritarian 
leadership and subservience, a 
so-called Volksgemeinschaft (an 
ethnoculturally defined people), 
misogyny and racism apply to most 
duelling fraternities.
Immediately after the new 
government was formed on 18 
December 2017, numerous scandals 
related to antisemitic and revisionist 
documents disrupted the everyday 
agenda of the government: this 
included Facebook posts as well as 
songbooks containing Nazi-songs 
with explicitly antisemitic stereotypes 
which are typical of such extreme-
right duelling fraternities. Moreover, 
the FPÖ’s Herbert Kickl, now Interior 
Minister, proposed ‘to concentrate 
people who enter asylum procedures 
in one place, because it must be our 
common interest to reach
a corresponding result very, very 
quickly’.
Obviously, the phrase ‘to concentrate 
people’ invites associations with the 
Nazi term ‘concentration camp’. The 
centre-left broadsheet Der Standard 
maintains and continuously updates 
a list
of euphemistically labelled ‘singular 
events’ [Einzelfälle] of antisemitism 
and revisionism which have been 
occurring on an almost weekly basis 
and keep the FPÖ in the headlines. 
Conspiracy theories have become a 
salient strategy in this context. They 
draw on the traditional antisemitic 
world-conspiracy stereotype which 
also characterised and continues 
to characterize Nazi and fascist 
ideologies (Richardson, 2017). For 
example, Hungarian Prime Minister 
Victor Orbán published a list of 
200 so-called ‘Soros mercenaries’ 
(including scholars, journalists, 
intellectuals and NGOs, who allegedly 
supported the Jewish Hungarian-
American philanthropist) who are 
trying to help refugees in Hungary. 
Indeed, Soros has been demonised 
via such traditional antisemitic 
conspiracy stereotypes 
as the primary Feindbild 
of Hungary and, 
subsequently, also 





and divert from 
unpopular reforms 
implemented by the 
government and 
dominate the media. 
For example, Harald 
Waldhäusl, FPÖ 
councillor in Lower 
Austria, challenged the 
slaughtering of animals 
according
to Jewish and Muslim 
rites, and proposed 
monitoring and 
registering orthodox 
Jews who bought such 
meat – as was to be 
expected, this provoked 
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CHALLENGING PRESS FREEDOM
Figure 3 | Facebook post by HC Strache, 13 February 2018.
a media scandal and negative 
responses by the opposition and 
the Jewish community. Another 
highly emotional issue relates to 
the Muslim headscarf: for years, 
the FPÖ has been protesting ‘the 
headscarf’ as a symbol of female 
oppression (an example of the ‘right-
wing populist perpetuum mobile’; see 
Wodak, 2015a). The government has 
proposed forbidding the headscarf 
in kindergarten – although nobody 
knows how many, if any, three-year-
old Muslim girls are forced to wear 
a headscarf in kindergarten. On 24 
July 2018, an FPÖ village councillor 
was finally expelled from the party 
after he had labelled the 
French soccer team that 
had won the World Cup 
as ‘Congo-monkeys’ 
(Kongoaffen).
It is also part of the current government’s 
programme to ‘reform’ the media – which seems to 
be a euphemism for continuous and vicious attacks 
on established journalists and moderators. Figure 
3 exemplifies such attacks by the FPÖ via social 
media, using the rhetorical strategy
of ‘calculated ambivalence’. This strategy seeks to 
convey distinct messages to multiple audiences 
(the party’s extreme-right base and the public) 
while maintaining plausible deniability through 
ambiguity (Engel and Wodak, 2013). In this case, 
the meme posted by Strache (as Austrian Vice-
Chancellor) was headed by the label ‘satire!’ and 
a smiling emoticon. Showing the well-known and 
internationally renowned journalist and moderator 
of the main news show of the Austrian public 
broadcaster ORF in the background to the right, 
the text reads ‘There is a place where lies become 
news. That is the ORF. The best of Fake News, lies 
and propaganda, pseudo-culture and involuntary 
fees. Regional and international. On television, radio 
and the Facebook profile of Armin Wolf.’
Both Armin Wolf and the ORF have sued Strache
for libel and won. Strache had to apologise publicly 
and pay €10,000 to Armin Wolf, who donated 
this money to the Dokumentationsarchiv des 
Österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW), an NGO that 
documents neo-Nazi and extreme-right activities. 
Meanwhile, the FPÖ has continued to publicly 
campaign for the downsizing or privatisation of the 
ORF, while backchannel pressure on editors and 
journalists has been increased.
Kurz and his government have also implemented 
a strategy of ‘information management’ (labeled, 
message control). Each week, a specific topic 
is launched in a press conference and is then 
elaborated on for one week, until being replaced 
with a new agenda seven days later. In this way,
the media are kept busy and simultaneously 
distracted from other relevant news. Moreover, 
access to information is being severely restricted: 
government employees have been forbidden to 
speak with the press. Such rules come close to 
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CONCLUSIONS: ‘SHAMELESS 
NORMALISATION’ – PAVING THE WAY TO 
ILLIBERALISM
Investigative journalist Florian Klenk 
aptly illustrates the strategies
of distraction and silence employed 
by the coalition government when 
challenging the Austrian postwar 
liberal consensus and its open 
society. For example, the Austrian 
government has pushed a new law 
through parliament (without the 
conventionally agreed-upon period 
for seeking expert opinions) which 
raises maximum daily working hours 
from 8 to 12 and maximum weekly 
working hours from 40 to 60. They 
have sought to legitimise this by 
appeals to ‘flexibility’ – a neoliberal 
notion – thus destroying an extremely 
important pillar of Austria’s post-war 
democracy and ‘guaranteed workers’ 
rights. Raising the number of hours 
has predictably angered the electorate 
of the FPÖ. A first huge demonstration 
organised by the trade unions against 
this law took place on 30 June 2018. 
Specific populist measures such
as the retraction of the antismoking 
law, which would have taken effect 
on 1 May 2018 – a concession the 
ÖVP made to the FPÖ despite the 
abundance of scientific evidence 
for the raised mortality caused by 
cigarettes – have not sufficiently 
appeased the FPÖ’s core electorate. 
One could thus speculate that the 
government has strategically decided 
to please its electorate with ever-more 
restrictive migration policies, while 
implementing many ‘uncomfortable’ 
policies even though the numbers
of migrants and refugees have fallen 
drastically.
Interestingly, Chancellor Kurz 
usually remains silent when the 
FPÖ crosses a so-called ‘red line’, 
ignoring multiple requests for 
interviews or comment on false 
claims about ‘illegal migration’, 
revisionist or racist and antisemitic 
incidents, potential violations 
of human rights or attempted 
dismantling of the social welfare 
state. Moreover, the government 
does not take parliamentary enquiries 
posed by the opposition seriously, 
answering in vague and ambiguous 
terms. This blatant disregard 
forced even Wolfgang Sobotka, the 
ÖVP-nominated President of the 
Parliament, to reprimand Kurz and his 
ministers for not adequately fulfilling 
their parliamentary duties.
As already observed by Uitz (2015) 
regarding Orbán’s Hungary, dialogue 
with experts, the opposition and 
journalists also seems to be out 
of the question in Kurz’ Austria; 
consultations with the trade 
unions, NGOs and other important 
organisations are not granted; rational 
discussion is mostly substituted by 
symbolic politics, impoliteness, eristic 
argumentation or denial. Legislation 
that is not sufficiently well worded
is pushed through parliament; 
scientific empirical evidence is 
frequently neglected or ridiculed. 
It seems as if the ÖVP in its 
streamlined, strategically planned 
trajectory to power in the sense
of leading the new government 
has either ignored or 
quietly accepted the 
kind of non-democratic 
ideologues they have 
aligned themselves 






of constitutional order, 
such as freedom
of opinion, freedom 
of assembly, freedom 
of press and the 
independence of the 
legal system in illiberal 
democracies (Poland 
and Hungary) are not 
announced explicitly; 
they are made in 
small – seemingly 
unimportant – steps 
like the intervention into 
the Supreme Court in 
Poland, where replacing 
irremovable judges was 
implemented through a 
small, banal paragraph 
about the retirement 
age of judges, although 
the Constitution sets a 
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REFERENCES
fixed term for supreme court judges. 
In this case, some of the supreme 
court judges resisted, and thus this 
incident made international headlines. 
As Grabbe and Lehne (2017b: 3) 
argue, these changes imply ‘mind-
closing narratives’ which
are obviously ‘gaining force as 
formerly liberal politicians run after 
populists’.
Such a dynamic corresponds
to – what I have labelled elsewhere 
– ‘‘shameless normalisation’ (Wodak, 
2018a), to be observed not only in 
the Central and Eastern European 
countries but also in Austria, the 
UK, Italy and the Netherlands. The 
noncompliance with EUropean values 
and the yearning for exceptionalism 
vehemently challenge the European 
project; the rejection of all dialogue, 
agreed norms and established 
conventions seems to render 
negotiations impossible and
to pave the way for illiberalism and 
neo-authoritarianism. 
New narratives, new 
public spaces, new 
communication 
modes and – most 
importantly – new 
policies are urgently 
needed to protect 
the achievements 
of enlightenment 
and pluralistic liberal 
democracies.
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Since the election of Donald Trump back in 2016, 
there has been an impressive increase in the 
interest for literature on fascism with a large 
number of academic and also nonacademic books 
being published each year. While some of these 
books deal with interwar fascism, others have 
tried to establish parallels between contemporary 
nationalism and xenophobic discourses, and those 
used by fascist leaders in the interwar period. Some 
of those attempting to make sense of the rise of 
contemporary populism have considered that these 
leaders resort to communication techniques that 
resemble the rhetoric of the European dictators of 
the 1920s and the 1930s. Others, however, have 
underscored the importance of being very cautious 
before labeling contemporary discourses that 
have emerged in several democratic countries as 
“fascist.”
Furthermore, even though the election of Donald 
Trump has motivated a huge debate on how 
populism is changing the political landscape
in democratic countries, his xenophobic speeches 
against immigrants, his criticism of the elites and 
the galvanization of his supporters through the 
discourse of us against them is far from being 
unique in contemporary times, as we all know. 
Obvious parallels can be drawn with the ideals 
being promoted by many, such as Jair Bolsonaro or 
Viktor Orbán and the list would continue on and on.
These also include many far right movements in 
Germany, Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, 
Italy-- just to mention a few European countries 
where political parties with anti-immigrant and anti-
establishment discourses have managed
to gain traction by entering into government 
coalitions as is the case of Italy, for example, or 
gaining seats in parliament, which has been the 
case all over Europe.
 
The movements that have been labeled
as “populist” are having significant influence
on policy making, not only through their own voices, 
but in many countries also because they have the 
ability to impact the policies being proposed and 
implemented by more traditional and moderate 
political parties that are struggling to combat the far 
right by moving closer to their ideals.
One of the difficulties for those trying to counter 
populism is the fact that it is far from being
a homogeneous phenomenon and can indeed 
assume different forms. As Silvio Waisbord has 
underscored, “populism is an extremely elastic 
concept and has been used very lightly to describe 
a wide variety of political phenomena”, making 
it a concept “full of inconsistent definitions.” 
Acknowledging that one can meaningfully speak
of different degrees of populism, Jan-Werner Müller 
considers that populism is always against the elites 
and anti-pluralist. Populists claim that “ they, and 
they only, represent the people.” When running for 
office, they portray their political competitors
as part of the immoral corrupt elite, and when
in power they refuse to recognize any opposition
as being legitimate.
All those who do not support them are labeled
as “not being part of the people,” or at least the true 
people, and are instead presented as enemies that 
aim to undermine patriotic values. The discourse 
that we find in many different contemporary 
political movements, mostly on the right, resonates 
with authoritarian ideals from the 1920s and 1930s, 
opening a wide debate on the similarities and 
differences between the contemporary political 
landscape and the emergence of fascism in Europe 
in the interwar period.
While some scholars such as Jason Stanley have 
described what is happening in Hungary, Poland 
and the United States as “a rapid normalization 
of fascism,” which makes us able to tolerate what 
in the very recent past was non-tolerable, others 
have considered this to be an overreaction. Those 
who follow this second line of thought underscore 
that, besides not promoting world domination, 
contemporary populists function within democratic 
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regimes and therefore are distant 
from interwar fascisms.
Federico Finchelstein’s perspective on 
this is particularly enlightening.
In his view, today’s xenophobic, anti-
elitist and anti-pluralist movements 
are not a form of fascism, but instead, 
“an authoritarian form of democracy 
that emerged originally as a post 
war reformulation of fascism.” For 
Finchelstein, modern populism begins 
with the early Cold War post fascist 
contestation in Latin America, starting 
with the Perón regime in Argentina.
Despite the many connections 
between fascism and authoritarian 
forms of democracy, while the former 
aims to instate a dictatorship, modern 
populists have not destroyed--at least 
yet-- democracy, even though they 
do undermine the rule of law and the 
separation of powers. MÜeller, for 
instance, considers that populists test 
the limits of the democratic system 
by introducing changes in electoral 
laws, destabilizing the separation of 
powers and pressurizing the media.
Nevertheless, officially abolishing 
or suspending democracy is not on 
their agenda as this would cost them 
an enormous loss of international 
support. 
Even though populists have not 
transformed democracies into 
dictatorships, the connections that 
do exist between some of the tactics used by contemporary 
populists and fascism have raised major concerns about the 
authoritarian turn in contemporary politics.
Looking back, we should remember that both Mussolini and Hitler 
rose to power after leading populist movements, meaning that 
they were populists, and later on fascist. However, the point I wish 
to make is not that all populists will become fascists (at least if 
we understand fascism as leading to the end of democracy
and to the end of parliamentarianism). My argument is somewhat 
different.
[My argument is] That we can learn about contemporary populism 
by looking into what it has in common with authoritarian 
regimes from the interwar period and also by considering the 
characteristics of what the Italian intellectual Umberto Eco 
defined as “eternal fascism.” For Eco, fascism is far from being
a homogeneous political doctrine and it is instead a political 
game that can be played in many different forms.
Even though fascist regimes do not share all the same 
characteristics, Eco argues that fascism should be understood 
as an all-purpose term because one can eliminate from a fascist 
regime one or more features and it will still be recognizable
as fascist. Two examples would be the Spanish and Portuguese 
dictatorships that despite not being imperialistic were still fascist.
The same could be said about the Croatian Revolutionary 
Movement Ustashe, that was not a colonialist dictatorship,
but was, even so,  a fascist movement. Eco considers that while 
Nazism and Stalinism were regimes with complete political 
programs and strong ideological foundations, and therefore 
totalitarian, the same cannot be said about fascism. Eco says 
that, “Mussolini’s regime was based upon the idea of the 
charismatic leader, on corporatism, on the utopia of the Imperial 
Fate of Rome, on an imperialistic will to conquer new territories, 
on an exacerbated nationalism, on the ideal of an entire nation 
regimented in black shirts, on the rejection
of different philosophical and political ideas…” In short, a beehive 
of contradictions. 
For Eco, Mussolini did not have any philosophy. What he had was 
only rhetoric, which explains how he could have transitioned from 
transitioned from a militant atheist at the beginning to someone 
who signed the convention with the Church and from then on 
spoke frequently about God. According to Eco, Mussolini’s regime 
was marked by a fuzzy ideology with many contradictions. 
Furthermore, the concept of fascism is a label attached to 
different authoritarian movements that found a sort of archetype 
in Mussolini’s regime.
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• cult of tradition and the past
• rejection of modernism 
• rejection of criticism
• fear of difference
• cult of nationalism
• xenophobia
• machismo (meaning disdain for 
women and intolerance towards 
nonstandard sexual practices and 
orientations)
• appeal to a frustrated middle class
• idea of powerful enemies (some of 
which are said to be taking advantage 
of the real people, whomever those 
people are)
• Popular elitism
 (meaning that those who belong 
to the party or follow the leader are 
presented as being the best citizens)
• demonization of rotten 
parliamentary governments
• use of simple impoverished 
language
Despite their differences for Eco, all regimes that 
share the archetypal elements and values
of fascism are parts of what he has labeled “eternal 
fascism.” Some of these elements are:
Many of these elements can indeed be found
in today’s populist movements that therefore fit into 
what Eco defined as eternal fascism, in which the 
leader speaks in the name of the people.
For this to be possible, leaders tend to assume 
control over communication with their followers 
either by putting an end to free media or by using 
technologies that will allow them to bypass 
traditional gatekeepers. The obsession of many 
contemporary populist leaders with communicating 
directly with the people, or at least with those that 
follow them, encounters what I consider to be a 
clear parallel with Mussolini’s and Hitler’s obsession 
with radio obsession with radio, that allowed them 
to speak directly to the masses, promoting their 
ideas and instigating against all those who
are not aligned with the official agenda.
Both Mussolini and Hitler respected what Goebbels 
considered to be the golden rule of propaganda: 
the usage of a very simple language which allowed 
ideas being presented to be understood by all those 
who listened. This characteristic can also be found 
in contemporary populisms, which usually resort
to a black and white discourse, known since ancient 
times to be a very powerful propaganda technique.
Even if we do believe that today’s populist or 
eternal fascist movements will not degenerate into 
dictatorships because most countries have solid 
democratic institutions and structures that will 
prevent this from happening, it is worth looking 
back and discussing how authoritarian regimes 
fooled public opinion with concepts that are today 
prevalent in populist discourses. This is what
I intend to do in the next few minutes.
I’ll look at how the Portuguese dictatorship, known 
as New State, used different available media to 
promote its nationalistic, corporatist and colonial 
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First,a strict control over the media, both state and 
private owned. Second, the regime’s idealization 
of the past grounded in a utopian vision of the 
Portuguese discoveries of the 15th and 16th 
centuries.
Before looking at these two features, I will briefly 
present Salazar’s regime that ruled Portugal for 
more than 40 years. Contrary to most dictators
of his time, Salazar had a reserved personality 
which led him to avoid personal contact with the 
masses. While this characteristic clearly distanced 
him from Mussolini, Hitler and even Franco, Salazar 
was represented in the regime’s propaganda as the 
embodiment of the people’s will--the man who was 
putting an end to decades of chaos that had been 
brought by incompetent politicians.
If one focuses on Salazar’s distant relationship with 
the masses, he probably would not be classified as
a fascist leader. However, if one looks at how he 
was represented, he was given attributes that do 
place him very close to other fascist rulers, thus 
fitting into what Eco labeled as eternal fascism. 
Moreover, Salazar himself had no problem being 
labeled a fascist as he openly disclosed his 
admiration for Mussolini--a picture of whom he kept 
on his own desk during the 1930s.
In the official propaganda, Salazar was presented 
as embodying the will of the “real” people--those 
who were tired of being led by a political elite that 
was only interested in intrigue and its own wealth 
and not on the wellbeing of the people. Despite 
being a professor at the University of Coimbra, 
Salazar was always portrayed as a very simple man 
who lived a simple life and whose ideal of a great 
vacation was returning to his home village in the 
center of Portugal where people lived a modest life 
in the countryside. The propaganda presented him 
as a man who enjoyed this simple and rural life-
a life that was actually being lived by the majority
of the population at a time during which Portugal 
was mostly a rural country.
In a 1949 speech, Salazar actually thanked God for 
being poor, which enabled him to understand the 
humblest sectors of the Portuguese society. I quote 
him when he says, “I owe to the divine providence 
the grace of being poor. To earn the daily bread and 
to live the modest life to which I am  accustomed, 
I do not need to take part or belong to any network 
of business interests. I am an independent man. If 
I tenaciously defend the interests of the humblest 
and occupy my time with their claims, this is due 
to the merits and the imposition of my conscience 
as head of government.” In this sense he presented 
himself as the man who understood what people 
wanted and what they needed.
Before becoming head of government, Salazar had 
been a professor of political economy and finance 
at the University of Coimbra where he was awarded 
a PhD in law. Contrary to Mussolini and Hitler, his 
rise to power followed a period of agitation. Before 
leading the government, Salazar had been Minister 
of Finance since April 1928 under the military 
dictatorship that had put an end to the Republican 
regime two years before.
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Established in 1910, the Republican regime 
was marked by intense political instability, with 
governments lasting an average of only five 
months. It came to an end with a military coup that 
took place as a form of protest against the rule of 
the party, parliamentary inefficiency, governmental 
instability, the discrediting of institutions and 
social unrest. When Salazar assumed the post of 
Minister of Finance, the country was facing a severe 
financial crisis and had a huge external debt. In 
1928-29 thanks to huge tax increases and budget 
cuts,he managed to achieve a state surplus, which 
led him to be presented on several occasions as the 
savior of the fatherland.
As early as 1928, in an interview to the daily 
newspaper Diário de Notícias, Salazar presented 
himself as different from all other politicians 
who had preceded him. The major differences 
were: first, he told the truth, and second, he was 
concerned with concrete things that could easily 
be understood by the people. I will quote him again 
because it is interesting to think about how he 
wanted to be represented:
“I represent a policy of truth and 
sincerity opposed to a policy of lies 
and secrecy. I have always advocated 
that administrating a country is clear 
and simple, something that any 
good housewife can do. A modest 
administration that consists in 
spending well what one has and not 
spending more than the resources that 
we do have.” 
There’s a lot that we could say about this quote 
related to gender issues, but I will not go into that 
now.
The idea he aimed to convey was that he was 
doing something that the people could understand 
because he also understood what they wanted. In 
1932 Salazar proposed a new constitution through 
which he established a single party regime that 
became known as the New State. The constitution 
was approved via a referendum that took place 
in 1933, and it has become known for how 
referendums actually lead towards the end of any 
possibility for democracy.
The new constitution was being represented as the 
beginning of the reconstruction of the Portuguese 
nation that was said to have fallen into disgrace 
in the years that had followed the implementation 
of the Republic in 1910. According to the official 
propaganda, the country ought to be reconstructed 
piece by piece. 
In a propaganda poster of the 1934 election the 
symbols of the national flag are being put together, 
symbolizing the reconstruction of the country that 
would be operated by Salazar’s regime. Democratic 
institutions such as elections and parliament were 
maintained. These, however, did not perform any 
kind of representational activity. Only one party was 
allowed to operate in the country-the official party-
and the parliament’s powers were soon transferred 
to the government allowing Salazar to decide on all 
matters.
Censorship and the political police also played an 
important role in this context, silencing all critical 
voices. Salazar’s nationalistic and colonialist 
regime was represented as the only valid option 
to avoid going back to the troubling times of the 
Republic. Also in 1934, another image was used to 
illustrate the idea of a sunny future that was made 
possible after the outset of the regime, and that of 
course contrasted with what had existed under the 
Republican government that lasted until 1926, and 
that’s why the rainstorm hovers over on 1925.
Even though Salazar was not against the elites, like 
other contemporary dictators of his time, he was 
set to represent the will of the nation: someone 
who was working for the people. His low-key 
international policy allowed him to be one of the 
few dictators to keep hold of power in Western 
Europe after the end of World War II, which actually 
led Time magazine to label him as the “dean of 
[Europe’s] dictators” in an edition that came out in 
1946.
Now let’s look at Salazar’s relationship with the 
media and with history, looking first at the media. 
The fact that he did not engage in big rallies and he 
preferred his office to the streets, does not mean 
that he was not aware of the importance
of reaching the public and controlling those who 
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could speak to the population through the media.
In his own words, when it came to public opinion, 
there were only two options.
“Public opinion could be left  to its own devices or it 
could be properly directed.” 
Of course his choice was to direct, which led the 
regime to actively control the media and the news 
that reached the public. While most newspapers 
were run by private companies, those with the 
largest circulation had very strong economic ties 
with the state. Shortly after becoming head of 
government Salazar approved a list of newspapers 
in which official notices and advertising could be 
published. All the nonaligned papers were left out of 
this list. 
Of course with no advertising from the state, these 
were soon out of money and after that out
of print. Besides economic suffocation, censorship 
played a decisive role in Salazar’s media policy. 
The 1933 Constitution, allowed the approval of laws 
that aimed at avoiding what was labeled as “the 
perversion of public opinion.”
Salazar himself had spoken openly about the role 
of censorship in a series of interviews he gave 
in 1932. The dictator described the press as the 
spiritual food of the people, and thus it ought to be 
subject to scrutiny, as with all types of food. Asked 
by his interviewer about the possibility of abolishing 
censorship that had been established by the 
military, Salazar answered, “The facts are the facts, 
and it cannot be admitted that the numbers and the 
acts of the state are questioned.”
This idea, according to which the facts presented 
by the government were objective, means that there 
was no possibility for discussion or debate of what 
was being said and presented by the regime.
This line of thought was used to justify the 
continuation of censorship, which ironically Salazar 
had himself considered to be “defective” and “an 
unfair institution.” We think about authoritarian 
regimes as being filled with contradictions; you can 
actually find them all over the place.
The radio and the press were called to play
a significant part in promoting the dictatorship
and making a contribution to the continuation of the 
regime. For Salazar media should play 
a patriotic role, which meant giving visibility to the 
dictatorship’s achievements and to its ideology. 
Therefore, his policy towards the media was 
twofold.
Firstly, censorship ensured the invisibility of the 
topics and the events that did not fit in the regime’s 
agenda. Secondly, the media were urged to present 
Salazar and his government in a positive light, 
emphasizing all that had been achieved since the 
dictatorship had been instated. In order to ensure 
that the media did not give much attention to news 
that could somehow distract the people from the 
regime’s agenda, over the years the Secretariat 
for National Propaganda created propaganda 
events that would be given great relevance in both 
newspapers and radio broadcasts.
The period of World War II was particularly 
illustrative of this. During the war, several 
recommendations were issued by the censorship 
office for the press to moderate the attention
it was giving to war news. The aim of course was 
to guarantee that all papers reserved enough 
space, mostly on their front pages, for the news 
that exalted and promoted the New State. Even 
during the early stages of World War II, when of 
course there was a justified interest to know about 
what was happening in the war, the press tended to 
follow the regime’s recommendations of reserving a 
significant amount of its front pages for news that 
praise the government, and mostly giving visibility 
to its actions and transcribing excerpts of official 
speeches.
An example of this took place on September 13, 
1939 in the very early stages of the war. The two 
major daily newspapers occupied their first pages 
with the return of President Óscar Carmona from an 
official visit to the Portuguese African colonies and 
to South Africa. Diário de Notícias, the newspaper 
with the largest circulation, printed three photos 
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in which the president was seen with Salazar and 
other cabinet members and also was being greeted 
by crowds that had rushed to the docks to meet 
him.
The text reinforces this idea. It reads something 
like: “Many thousands of people cheered the head 
of state from Lisbon to Cascais. The president
of the republic was enthusiastically greeted by the 
crowds.” All the big events organized by the regime 
were what we would label as media events, that 
became known by the majority of the population 
through the media.
1940 offers many intriguing examples of this,
as it was a year of intense propaganda activity. The 
regime organized “the centennial celebrations,” 
designed to commemorate 800 years since 
Portugal’s foundation and 300 years of the 
restoration of independence after a 60 year period 
of occupation by the Spanish. It was a year
of intense nationalistic propaganda that celebrated 
the greatness of Portuguese history.
On several occasions, the news of the festivities 
occupied the whole front page of the main 
newspapers while the news on the war was 
relegated to the inside pages. This is Diário de 
Notícias’ front page on June 4, 1940. You can see 
that all the entire page is occupied by news on the 
centennial celebrations and only at the bottom 
is it possible to find a reference to the war, which 
reads “The bombing of Paris, page five.”
On June, 23, the day after the capitulation of 
France, the main story on the front pages was the 
inauguration of the exhibition of the Portuguese 
World in Lisbon. Besides illustrating one of the 
many occasions in which the press gave more 
visibility to domestic events than to a central 
development in the war, this example is even 
more significant because the newspapers gave 
less attention to the surrender of France to Nazi 
Germany than they did to an event that had not yet 
taken place.
The inauguration of the exhibition of the 
Portuguese World was only going to take place that 
afternoon. The papers were talking about what they 
were expecting would happen that day. Now, the 
fact is that Salazar neither gave regular interviews 
to the press nor was he a regular presence on the 
radio, which might make us think, “Well, maybe 
he’s not really a fascist somehow-his relations with 
the media actually distance him from what was 
happening in other fascist regimes.” Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that the New State did not use 
the media to promote its own agenda and ideology.
As Salazar himself stated in a speech delivered 
in 1940: “Politically, the only realities that exist 
are those that the public are aware of.” Therefore, 
controlling the media agenda was central for the 
dictatorship’s survival, using radio, the press and 
also other cultural industries to be in permanent 
contact with the public. In other words, I would 
say that even though at a glance, Salazar’s media 
policy might look distant from those implemented 
by other fascist regimes, using another lens as 
suggested by Eco, we can conclude that despite 
the techniques used to control the media being 
different from those used in Nazi Germany or Italy 
under Mussolini, the New State clearly had a fascist 
approach to the media.
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regime’s discourse along with colonialism. Portugal 
was presented as a nation that had once been 
a major power and had inherited an empire that 
it should preserve. One of the main lines of the 
regime’s propaganda was that Portugal was a big 
country that under Salazar’s direction would once 
again achieve glory.
The idea of Portugal as a big nation is very well 
illustrated by a propaganda map produced in 1934 
entitled “Portugal is Not a Small Coutry”, that is a 
symbol of the colonial that was also at the core of 
the regime.
So what was done here was very simple-- the 
Portuguese colonies were superimpose on the 
map of Europe just to illustrate that the Portuguese 
nation was larger than the entire continent.
For Portugal to be great again, it was necessary 
to go back to the nation’s true roots, values and 
traditions. And even though Salazar had a reserved 
personality, the Secretariat for National Propaganda 
produced several materials in which the leader 
was portrayed as representing the nation, the man 
who not only understood but defended Portuguese 
history and heritage.
One of the many examples of this is a map in which 
Salazar’s face is used to represent the Portuguese 
territory. In other contemporary dictatorships, at the 
time, it was also common for leaders
to be represented as medieval figures. We have all 
seen Hitler as a medieval knight. In Portugal
no such picture was produced by the regime’s 
official propaganda.  However, popular posters 
did circulate in the country in which Salazar was 
represented as Portugal’s first king. Even though 
this was not an official picture, it is representative of 
the regime’s mythology of Salazar as re-founder of 
the nation, and the one who would take it back
to its glorious past.
Along with the visuals, the same idea was conveyed 
on both print and broadcast media. In 1940 during 
the opening of the centennial celebrations the 
chairman of the state broadcaster announced 
that Salazar would deliver a speech via radio from 
Guimarães, which symbolically is said to be the 
hometown of the first Portuguese king. When he 
was introducing Salazar over the radio, he presented 
him like this: “In the house where the founder of the 
fatherland was born, the Voice of the re-founder 
of Portugal sounds with the highest and most 
impressive solemnity.”
Presenting Salazar as the re-founder of the country 
was a consequence of the past being a central 
value for the regime. Contrary to the years that had 
preceded the dictatorship and that were presented 
as chaotic, during which incompetent and corrupt 
elites had led the country, the future under Salazar 
was presented as being bright because he was a 
humble man. And second, he would bring back the 
true values of nationhood, thus allowing Portugal to 
once more be put on a path towards greatness.
The state broadcaster was particularly active
in promoting this idea by contrasting the 
dictatorship years with the political situation that 
existed before the military coup. Many talks that 




used as a central element for the affirmation and 
promotion of the regime. Salazar’s main mission 
as head of government was described by official 
propaganda as leading Portugal back to its 
glorious past. This was of course the time
of the discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries
in which Portugal had dominated the seas, 
controlling territories in Africa, in Asia and in the 
Americas.
The idealization of the past was at the core of the 
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its own history and tradition.
The regime’s propaganda apparatus promoted the 
idea of a national rebirth that was being achieved 
through stable political institutions and a balanced 
budget. Nationalism was of course central
to Salazar’s vision of a future. The regime’s motto 
was “all for the nation, nothing against the nation,” 
which was extensively used in propaganda 
materials. It soon became clear that Salazar 
himself represented the nation. Therefore, all those 
who were against him were also against the nation, 
and deserved to be treated as enemies.
In several speeches and other propaganda 
materials, Portugal’s 800 years of history were used 
to incite citizens to be vigilant about all those who 
thought differently and that could pose a threat
to the nation. This is just an example from the New 
Year speech delivered by the head of state
in 1940:
“We are in fact the heirs of a great 
tradition, who received an inestimable 
wealth made up of sacrifices, heroic 
gestures, discoveries and conquests of 
many generations. To the efforts of the 
generations who preceded us, we owe the 
existence and independence of the nation 
and the greatness of its history. It is now 
up to us to continue this glorious history 
with the sacrifice, and efforts that may 
well not be inferior, though expanded in 
many different endeavors.”
This nationalist discourse obviously also developed 
into xenophobic remarks that were made by several 
regime officials. In a speech in 1935, the Minister 
of Education exalted patriotic values, underscoring 
that the Portuguese people had achieved “ethnic 
purity that they should be proud of.” All these ideas 
were disseminated through the media, with radio 
playing a very central role because at the time
it reached the largest segments of the population.
This idealized view of the past and the nationalistic 
discourse can actually be found in most fascist 
regimes, namely in Italy where Mussolini promoted 
a utopian view of the Roman Empire. This idea
of going back in time and restoring the great nation 
that in actual fact never existed is a powerful idea. 
Just as it was central to the fascist regimes
in the 1930s, it seems to be also present in many 
contemporary populist movements that aim to lead 
people to believe that the greatness of the nation 
is directly connected to a system of closed borders 
and patriotic values.
In fascist regimes, and the Portuguese one was not 
an exception, nationalism is usually combined with 
the idea that the nation has to be defended from 
powerful forces that aim to destroy it. This leads 
the fascist discourse to resort to a very powerful 
propaganda technique that Ruth Wodak was talking 
about yesterday, the dissemination of fear.
The Nazi anti-Semitic discourse is an obvious 
example, while contemporary fascist-like 
movements also tend to present migrants and 
those with different cultural backgrounds as aiming 
to destroy the nation, its values and traditions. The 
idea of a powerful enemy that has to be stopped 
allows the creation of a common goal that is shared 
by those who support the nationalist leaders.
In the case of the Portuguese dictatorship, the main 
enemy was communism.
Soon, all those who disagreed with Salazar were 
labeled as communists and anti-patriotic. The 
dictator himself explained how crucial it was that 
Portugal would defend itself from the pernicious 
ideas that were coming from outside and that 
would endanger the nation. The danger was clearly 
portrayed as standing at the door, just waiting 
to come in. And this led Salazar to conclude 
that the media had to be on a short leash, and 
that journalists needed to be on the front line of 
very important idea, which was that Portugal would 
once more be a great nation if it managed to honor 
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that it has to serve the Polish people.
A report published in 2018 by the Polish Journalist 
Society has also demonstrated how television 
is being used to discredit the opposition and 
disseminate fear against all those that come from 
abroad (and many of you in this room know more 
about this than I do). The obsession with controlling 
the media also extends to the left. In 2016 the 
Greek government led by Alexis Tsipras passed 
legislation aimed at reducing the number
of television licenses which would lead to the 
closure of the largest television operators in the 
country. The process was deemed unconstitutional 
by the Greek high courts.
We have many other examples. Another very 
obvious one would be Viktor Orbán in Hungary- we 
had a very interesting talk yesterday about what
is happening in Hungary, where all sorts
of techniques are being used to gain control over 
the media.
Last November, media owners actually donated 
their news channels, internet news portals, tabloids 
and sports newspapers, also several radio stations, 
numerous magazines and all of Hungary’s national 
newspapers to a newly formed media conglomerate 
named the Central European Press and Media 
Foundation headed by an Orbán supporter. It now 
controls over 400 media outlets and has received 
donations from pro-government businessmen 
who have been able to deduct them as charity 
donations.
The acquisitions by the Central European Press 
and Media Foundation have also been exempted 
from scrutiny of the competition authority and the 
media council after the government declared these 
to be of “strategic national significance.” I think this 
resonates very much with the idea of how populism 
tests the resistance of democratic institutions.
Now I reach my conclusion, in which I would like 
to speak about these troubling parallels between 
populism and authoritarianism. How can
we actually discuss them? Well, with this very brief 
excursion into the Portuguese dictatorship of the 
20th century, I aim to demonstrate that Salazar’s 
view on the role of the media and also
his presentation of an idealized view of history both 
find parallels in contemporary populist discourses.
As advocated by Umberto Eco, fascism does come 
in different shapes and formulas. Salazar was 
never against the elites. On the contrary, he believed 
that the future of his regime depended less on the 
masses and more on the elites, educated in the 
spirit of the true national interest. However, this did 
not prevent him from being presented as the leader 
who embodied the will of the nation.
Despite having a reserved personality, from a very 
early stage Salazar understood how crucial it was 
defending the nation.
I think I will quote Salazar for the last time: 
“Paradoxically as it may seem, in contemporary 
times, censorship constitutes the legitimate 
defense of free, independent states against 
the great disorientation of modern thought, 
international revolution and disorder. I do not fear 
the great journalist as long he is Portuguese and 
demonstrates it.” I don’t have to explain what,
in his mind, it meant to demonstrate that you were
a Portuguese journalist.
Troubling as it might seem, many contemporary 
populist movements do agree with the idea that 
journalism exists to defend the nation and those 
in power. In Turkey, Erdoğan has closed dozens 
of media outlets and jailed dozens of journalists 
in order to eliminate critical voices. Inside the 
European Union, suffocating or persecuting 
the critical press is also on the rise. In Poland 
since 2016 more than 300 journalists have been 
dismissed from the public service broadcaster that 
in the meantime has been transformed into
an official voice of the government, with the excuse 
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the useof an idealized version of the past to create 
a national identity based on exclusion.
The democratic context in which contemporary 
populisms have emerged, and the level
of repression employed against those who do not 
support these regimes of course distance them 
from fascism. However, this should not disable 
us from looking into these political phenomena 
using the lens  proposed by Umberto Eco. And if 
we do so, we will actually conclude that eternal 
fascism is a strong, very strong inspiration for most 
contemporary populist movements.
to control the media agenda, 
presenting his version of the 
facts as the truth that could not 
be disputed.
What is most troubling about 
this is that contemporary 
populists continue to use this 
rhetoric of our truth against their lies to discredit 
their opponents. Along with the control over the 
media, another feature that links contemporary 
populists to eternal fascism is the creation of an 
idealized version of the past to justify nationalistic 
and xenophobic discourses.
The reconstruction of public memory also plays 
a central role in many populist movements. Salazar 
not only promoted the centennial celebrations and 
many other commemorations of the heroic past 
of the Portuguese nation, but he also promoted 
the creation of many new monuments to honor 
the great past of the Portuguese nation. The 
Discoveries monument in Lisbon that many of you 
will probably visit is an emblematic example of 
this, but many others can be found throughout the 
country.
Reconstructing the public memory was central
in the Portuguese dictatorship, as it is today
in many populist regimes. One of the most recent 
examples is also from Hungary, where the statue 
of the Hungarian hero Imre Nagy was removed 
last month from a square near the parliament in 
Budapest. He was prime minister and he was
a symbol of free Hungary and maybe that was the 
reason why the statue had to somehow disappear.
Even though fascisms from the 1920s and the 
1930s were marked by some features that we do 
not find in contemporary populist movements, some 
characteristics that were central to the dictatorships 
of the interwar period do exist today in populism. 
Just a few examples: a savvy use of the media, 
the idea that leaders should communicate with the 
public directly; the exploitation of crisis that creates 
dissatisfaction among large segments of the public; 
an attempt to bypass or at least test the limits of 
democratic institutions; a patriotic discourse; and 
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Today I am going to share on the topic of “populism, 
media, and the dynamics of contentious politics.” 
What I am going to do is to discuss the case of,
or to offer a case study of where I come from, 
namely Hong Kong. I have to say “media and 
populism” is not exactly the topic that I have been 
focusing on in my research. Populism is certainly 
a very important and hot topic in communication 
research over the past five years or so, but as
I will show in a moment, the significance of and the 
amount of research attention paid to the concept 
of populism can vary across contexts. What I will 
be doing is to offer Hong Kong as a case study 
by re-articulating what I have been doing—mainly 
research on media and social movements,
and try to address the question of how we should 
understand the relationship between populism, 
media—especially digital media and social media, 
and the dynamics of contentious politics.
When I started preparing for the talk, I tried to figure 
out how significant the notion of populism is in 
research from different countries. I did a very simple 
search. Table 1 presents figures derived from the 
social science citation index (SSCI). The figures 
in the first column are the total number of articles 
that one can derive from SSCI by using the keyword 
set “populism AND [country name].” For example, 
“populism and Germany” returns 64 articles, 
“populism and France” returns 36, etc. In the subset 
of European countries included in my search, plus 
the US and Canada, there are a total of 531 articles 
containing the keyword populism.
I also want to highlight the figures in the last 
column. For Europe and America, the figure
is 1.51%. It refers to the number of articles about 
“populism and a given country” divided by number 
of articles about “politics and a given country.” 
While the figure of 1.51% seems very small at 
first glance, I think it is actually normal. With the 
vast possibility of political research topics, there 
is no reason why researchers should uniformly 
study populism. But the important point here is to 
compare across regions. In the middle part of Table 
1, we can see the figures about five Latin American 
countries. The total number of articles about 
populism and at least one of the five countries
is 179. Interestingly, the proportion
of populism research to general political research is 
substantially higher (4.09%). Again, the percentage 
itself does not sound large. Nevertheless, it means 
that for every 25 research articles studying politics 
in these five Latin American countries, there is one 
article studying some kind of populism in these 
countries. It seems to suggest populism is a bigger 
phenomenon in Latin American politics.
What about East Asia then? The numbers are much 
smaller. In my search of 12 East Asian countries, 
including the city of Hong Kong, there are only 87 
articles about populism, and the ratio of articles 
on populism to articles on politics is only 0.66%. 
Therefore, the first thing I would note from
a comparative angle is not how populism manifests 
itself varies, but how the prominence of populism 
as a topic in political research varies. There have 
been, of course, quite a few populist leaders in 
East and Southeast Asia in the past two decades. 
One example is Jokowi, the current president of 
Indonesia, who is a very well-known populist figure. 
Another prominent example is Thaksin, who was 
the Thai leader in the mid- to late-2000s. Estrada 
and Duterte, the former and current president
of the Philippines respectively, were also known
for their populist style. In Taiwan, we had Chen Shui-
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rhetoric was also often described as populist.
In other words, there have been a few leaders who 
could be classified as populist. But overall, there 
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No matter what explains the relative lack
of research on populism in East Asia, there are 
certainly media and political phenomena in the 
region with populist flavor. That is, no matter 
whethe the people in the region use the term 
“populism” or not, we can identify and analyze the 
media and political phenomena with populist flavor.
Or, there are phenomena that can be described 
as populist if we understand populism in terms 
of family resemblance. Let me put it this way, 
if we understand populism from an empirical 
perspective, we may identify certain characteristics 
as the characteristics of prototypical populism. 
These characteristics are generally what people are 
referring to when they talk about populism in reality. 
From my understanding of the literature and reading 
of news reports, I think there are at least six key 
characteristics: 1) emphasis on popular sovereignty, 
2) the (social construction of the) idea of a pure, 
homogeneous, and morally good people, 3) the 
Othering of both internal and external enemies, 4) 
attacks on elites and/or the system, 5) mobilization 
by leaders/figures outside the establishment,
and 6) an appeal to emotion over reason. The list is 
not meant to be exhaustive, but they are some
of the most prominent characteristics
of populism. Treating these characteristics like
a checklist, what I mean by populist flavor and 
family resemblance is the idea that a phenomenon 
does not necessarily have to check every single box 
in order to be classified as populism. The idea of 
family resemblance is that when something shares 
some, or most, characteristics with the prototypical 
phenomenon, it can be described as belonging to 
the same “family.” If we take this principle in our 
understanding of populism, then, many phenomena 
in East Asia, even though people may not describe 
them as populism in their discourses, may share 
such key characteristics and can be analyzed
as populism. This is the understanding of populism 
underlying this talk.
As I said, what I am trying to do is to offer a case 
study of Hong Kong. What I will do is to produce an 
account of the characteristics of populisms (the 
plural form is deliberate here), their emergence, 
and the role of media in a contextualized and 
historicized manner. I believe that the “Hong Kong 
story” can shed light on a few things. First, the case 
can illustrate how populisms emerged as part of 
the dynamics of contentious politics in the city in 
the past 15 years, as I will talk about the rise of 
populism in relation to the rise of social protests. 
Second, the case can illustrate how multiple 
populisms emerge in relation or in reaction to each 
other. I will talk about not just one form of populism 
but two emerging, interacting forms of populism. 
What I will analyze is not so much the rise of 
forms of populism as the emergence of a specific 
configuration of populisms. Moreover, the case of 
Hong Kong should contribute to our understanding 
of populism in a so-called hybrid regime. I have to 
admit that I personally do not like the term “hybrid 
regime” very much, because to call something 
hybrid does not say too much about what it actually 
is. In the comparative politics literature in the past 
ten years, there have been a lot of discussions 
about authoritarianisms with adjectives and 
democracies with adjectives (Levitsky & Way, 
2010). When people talk about authoritarian 
countries, there are “competitive authoritarianism,” 
“responsive authoritarianism,” and many other 
variations. Similarly, we have democracies with 
adjectives. These are, broadly speaking, hybrid 
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So, what does it mean to say that Hong Kong
is a hybrid regime? Hong Kong is a small city in the 
southern part of China. It has a population of seven 
million people. China is a huge country with 1.36 
billion citizens. Hong Kong has a “tradition” of civil 
liberties since the 1980s. Democratization began in 
the last decade of the colonial era. Right now, Hong 
Kong is a city with a partly democratically elected 
legislature and a non-elected government, which 
is basically accountable to a highly authoritarian 
state. Structurally speaking, the Hong Kong 
government is not accountable to the public at all. 
However, when Hong Kong was returned to China, 
there was the promise of a high degree
of autonomy and gradual democratization in 
the city. It was the promise that the Chinese 
government put forward in the 1980s and the early 
1990s in order to win the heart of Hong Kong for
a smooth transition.
Conventionally, the most important cleavage 
in Hong Kong politics is that between the “pan-
democrats” and the “pro-establishment” forces. 
The “pan-democrats,” as its name suggests, are 
the people and politicians who call for further 
democratization and urge China to keep its 
promise. They constitute one end of the political 
spectrum in opposition to the “pro-establishment” 
or the “pro-government” forces. When it comes 
to the media, we see a media system structurally 
independent from the government, which is unlike 
the situation in mainland China, where all the media 
organizations are directly under the propaganda 
system at different levels. In Hong Kong, the media 
are at least not part of the government, but they 
are deeply embedded in the dominant political 
economic system. Virtually all media organizations 
in Hong Kong, with a few exceptions, are owned by 
major business people who have intricate interests 
in mainland China. In fact, many media owners 
in Hong Kong are local business people who are 
appointed with political titles in China.
For example, they could be members of the 
National People’s Congress, the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, etc. As a 
consequence of the political economy of the media 
system, a high degree of self-censorship can be 
observed in the mainstream media, even though 
self-censorship is constrained by the news workers’ 
sense of professionalism.
There is no need to go further into the complexities 
of the media system. What I need to emphasize 
here is the tension between the promise
of democratization and the reality of tightening 
control by the Chinese government. While the 
Chinese government promised that Hong Kong 
can democratically elect its leaders at a certain 
point of time, over the years the progress had 
been stagnant. This is because, ultimately, China’s 
policy toward Hong Kong is tied to its policy toward 
Taiwan, its internal policies, and its foreign policies 
at large. Since president Xi Jinping came to power 
in 2012, China has adopted a more proactive, or you 
may say aggressive, foreign policy. Economically, 
it has the one-belt-one-road initiative; politically, it 
becomes much more assertive on a number
of issues, such as the territorial dispute in the South 
China Sea, and its recently worsening relationship 
with the US, etc. Internally, the Chinese government 
started to tighten controls on the civil society and 
the press. There used to be a period of time during 
the Hu Jintao presidency when China had
a relatively higher degree of press freedom and
a nascent civil society. But when Xi came to power, 
everything changed. As Xi tightened control of the 
Chinese society, it is not surprising that control
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Stagnant democratization and inefficient 
governance of the city have led to the growth 
of contentious politics in the city, which in turn 
contribute to the rise of two forms of populism—
“populist localism” since the early 2010s and 
“state-sponsored populism” since the mid 2010s. 
But we need to go a little further back to the early 
2000s in order to provide the background for the 
subsequent rise of populism phenomena. In 2003, 
half a million Hong Kong citizens marched to the 
streets in protest against the enactment of national 
security law. As Joseph Chan and I explicated in a 
booklength study (Lee & Chan, 2011), the protest 
was a critical event in Hong Kong history. It not 
only successfully forced the government to put 
the legislation on hold; it changed the state’s and 
other political actors’ perceptions of reality. Similar 
to other cases of large-scale, successful protests, 
the 2003 July 1 protest kick-started what social 
movement scholars called a “protest cycle.” It led 
to the outburst of social and political energies 
throughout Hong Kong society.
In 2005, as part of the protest cycle, a group of 
activists founded the heritage protection movement 
in Hong Kong and articulated
a discourse of “progressive localism” in their quest 
for democratization of urban development. They 
broadened the idea of democratization from
a narrow focus on the direct election of political 
leaders to democracy in the processes of policy 
making and urban planning. In their articulation 
of progressive localism, this group of activists 
started to put an emphasis on local culture and 
history. They also put forward a criticism toward the 
government’s neoliberal framework
for economic development. The discourse was 
called “progressive localism” because its advocates 
directly employed and emphasized the term “local.” 
In Cantonese, it is called “bun-tou.” However, for this 
group of activists, “local” is not pitted against the 
foreign or the non-local. In fact, given Hong Kong’s 
colonial history and its status as an international 
trade hub, many academics and activists have 
long been treating the “local” of Hong Kong as 
composed of layers of international relations. 
This was the idea of the “local” perpetuated 
by progressive localism. But for the present 
discussion, the most important thing is that, 
regardless of their intention, this group of activists 
of the heritage protection movement successfully 
popularized the term “local” in media discourse. 
And this will have implications on what happened 
subsequently.
More or less during the same period of time, 
increasing social integration between Hong Kong 
and mainland China started to lead to adverse 
impact on citizens’ everyday life. Since the late 
2000s, we saw the influx of Chinese capital 
(one reason why Hong Kong now has the most 
expensive property market in the world), increasing 
number of mainland tourists (for a few years, Hong 
Kong had 50 million visitors per year, which is even 
larger than the number of visitors to the whole
of Japan, and about 80% of the visitors
to Hong Kong are from the mainland). The influx
of money and people had created a lot of problems 
for the everyday life of the citizens in Hong Kong. 
Combining with the increasing political intervention 
by the Chinese central government in local affairs
in Hong Kong, there has been the rising concern
of “mainlandization,” that is, the concern that Hong 
Kong is fast becoming just like mainland China. 
As a response, national identification among local 
young people dropped quickly, especially after year 
2008. Around 2010, a new group
of “confrontational localists” emerged (Lo, 2018), 
and they appropriated the term “bun-tou”
and articulated a new discourse.
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The confrontational localists are the group
of activists that can be considered as having
a strong populist flavor. For example, the poster 
below, which was in fact a full-page newspaper 
advertisement made by the confrontational 
localists, features a “locust,” representing the 
mainland Chinese, and the Lion Rock, a signature 
landmark of Hong Kong. The poster says, “for 
every 18 minutes, Hong Kong spends $1 million for 
nurturing children coming from the mainland.” 
In other words, mainland Chinese are portrayed
as threats to Hong Kong, as “locusts” that swarm 
the city and leave it devastated. More generally, the 
discourses of confrontational localists have several 
key characteristics. First, they treat Hong Kong as a 
separate “nation,” and the character of its people is 
distinctive from that of the “mainlanders.” Second, 
they view the social system itself as fundamentally 
flawed. Third, they call for “valiant contention” in 
protests. They argue that protesters should not put 
too much emphasis on being peaceful; instead, they 
advocate the use of physical force. In contrast to 
progressive localism, the confrontational localists 
can be regarded as having put forward a form
of populist localism. 
Interestingly, the new populist localism is not 
only against the pro-government forces, they are 
actually against the democrats and the progressive 
social movement. The populist localists view 
the progressive social movements as “leftards,” 
which means “retarded leftists.” They argue that 
the progressive social movement activists have a 
blind belief in the values of equality, tolerance, and 
inclusiveness irrespective of the actual situation. 
Moreover, they criticize the democrats for being 
ineffective in dealing with Beijing.
In other words, the populist localists are not only 
against the Chinese state. They are against the 
elite-led politics of compromise and the established 
system of promised incremental democratization. 
They see the system of gradual democratization 
as a failure. The following is a poster which was 
prevalent in the Mong Kok occupied area during 
the Umbrella Movement. The Mong Kok occupation 
had a relatively strong localist presence (Lee & 
Chan, 2018), and the poster urged the occupiers 
to beware of the “leftards” and warned against the 
forms of actions that they saw as meaningless 
(e.g., group discussions, singing songs, taking 
pictures, etc.).
“Populist localism” became even more appealing to 
many young people after the Umbrella Movement 
in 2014. In the Umbrella Movement, a lot of 
participants were very frustrated, as it seemed like 
people had done the last thing that they could do, 
with one million people taking turns to occupy the 
heart of Hong Kong, but the government still didn’t 
make any concession. Therefore, many wondered 




To that question, 
the populist 
localists gave a 
resounding Yes. 




the “failure” of 
peaceful protests. 
For a period of 
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time, the populist localists further radicalized and 
even turned to advocate Hong Kong independence. 
This has of course further heightened the conflict 
between the local society and the Chinese 
government.
At this point, it should be noted that digital and 
social media were definitely part of the dynamics. 
They are contributory conditions
to the development of populist localism. It’s not 
that digital and social media started all of these, 
but obviously their presence contributed to the 
evolution of the dynamics. In the digital media 
arena, there has been the proliferation of online 
alternative media since 2012 and the emergence 
of a distinctive group of localist online media.
These are not just “news sites.” Especially for the 
localists, the most influential and popular sites are 
usually the “satire sites.” Take Cemetery News as an 
example. What it does is to publish fake interviews 
with dead people. Let’s imagine that there is an on-
going social issue, and I would interview Karl Marx 
to see what his take on it is. On any given issue, the 
writer of the Cemetery News would “invite” early 
20th century nationalists, or a 3rd century Chinese 
Emperor, or whoever, to do satirical interviews
on public affairs.
In an article that I published this year on Social 
Movement Studies (Lee, 2018), I presented evidence 
from a survey showing that the experience
of participating in the Umbrella Movement and 
consumption of localist alternative media combined 
to generate more radical views toward movement 
goals—support for Hong Kong independence—and 
movement tactics—support for violent protests. 
That’s why I said that digital and social media are 
contributory conditions that facilitate the growth 
of populist localism.
With all the things that I’ve been talking about—the 
rise of protests and the rise of populist localism 
etc.—how did the government respond? And it is 
related to this question that we can understand the 
rise of what I call “state-sponsored populism.”
In Hong Kong, the public can be roughly divided 
into those who are on the pro-government side, 
those who are in the middle, and those supporting 
the democrats. Normally, in a democratic system, 
we conventionally expect the political parties to 
move toward the median voters. But in the case of 
Hong Kong, which is not a democracy and has an 
overseeing Chinese state, does the government 
have the incentive to appeal to the median voters? 
Or, would the government rather choose to stand as 
close to the Chinese state as possible? Admittedly, 
this is not completely an either-or choice, but
I am sketching the basic situation here. To the 
extent that the government finds the 2nd option 
more attractive (again, ultimately the Hong Kong 
government is accountable not so much to the local 
public than to the Chinese state), how would the 
Hong Kong government handle public opinion?
In short, what the government did after 2012 
was to counter-mobilize their own supporters to 
produce vocal support, despite the risk of creating 
a polarized public. For example, during the Umbrella 
Movement, the Chinese and Hong Kong government 
did not make concessions. They basically adopted 
a policy of attrition, but the pro-establishment 
forces also mobilized counter-protests. There 
were regular confrontations between the Umbrella 
Movement participants and counter-protests
in parts of the occupied areas.
Beyond the Umbrella Movement and as a part of 
the broad strategy of promoting “state-sponsored 
populism,” the pro-government forces have created 
their own digital media outlets, including a lot 
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overwhelmingly the most popular and important 
social media
in Hong Kong). During political controversies, the 
most prominent pro-government social media 
pages often acquired levels of “engagement,” such 
as likes, comments, and shares, that were close 
to or even surpassed the levels of engagement 
acquired by prominent alternative media belonging 
to the progressive social movements. In terms 
of contents and practices, the pro-government 
Facebook pages are first of all highly nationalistic. 
They exhibit a strong confirmation bias, that is, they 
selectively “report” on and share information that 
is favorable to the government, and they heavily 
criticize the opposition.
One may argue that these are just what all partisan 
media do, and in one sense they are. But I would 
argue there is a distinction between the partisan 
legacy media and partisan social media in the Hong 
Kong case. If we compare the pro-government 
legacy media and the pro-government social media 
in Hong Kong, we can actually see some major 
differences. Firstly, it seems that the workers 
for pro-government social media are much less 
constrained by any sense of professionalism.
This is partly because they have never explicitly 
claimed to be journalistic, and partly because the 
writers largely remain anonymous (as opposed 
to the presence of bylines in legacy media). 
The “quasi-anonymous character” of the social 
media pages, together with the phenomenon 
of the blurring of the distinction between public 
and private in the social media arena as well 
as the importance of “engagement” on social 
media, have led to fundamentally different style 
of communication by the pro-government social 
media. They included more emotional language 
and more frequent personal attack, for example. 
And generally speaking, I would argue that there 
is a high degree of what I called “normative 
disinhibition.” Let me use one example to illustrate 
what is meant by normative disinhibition. In 2015, 
a university student committed suicide. It was a 
simple social news story. But on one of the most 
prominent pro-government pages, the “news report” 
emphasized that the student had supported the 
Umbrella Movement, and the report claimed that 
the experience of protest turned the student to “go 
to the extreme.” The claim is not just groundless 
and absurd but also simply indecent. The usual 
social norm of decency would prevent anyone from 
politicizing the tragedy. But apparently, there is a 
much higher degree of normative disinhibition in the 
social media arena, as the pro-government social 
media outlets would make claims that we do not 
really expect any legacy media to make.
There is evidence about the impact of such pro-
-government online media on public opinion. From 
a survey we conducted in 2018, we found that 
the more a citizen saw the contents from pro-
government online media, the more conservative 
the citizen would be. This, of course, could be a 
matter of media effects or selective exposure. But 
more interestingly, the pro-government online media 
can neutralize the impact of alternative online 
media. When one is constantly exposed
to the contents from pro-government online media, 
then whether one sees the contents from the 
alternative media or not does not matter in attitude 
and opinion formations. This can be understood
in terms of “inoculation effects” — the pro-
government inculcate a set of beliefs and ideas 
to the mind of the pro-government citizens. When 
the pro-government citizens encountered contents 
critical toward the government, the inculcated 
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to dismiss the critical contents.
Nevertheless, what is populist about the online 
public opinion produced through the pro-
government outlets? First of all, the discourse 
produced by the pro-government online media 
tends to dehumanize the Other, in this case, the 
democrats. The most conspicuous example is the 
fact that the pro-democracy citizens and public 
figures were consistently labelled the “yellow 
corpses” (in Cantonese, “ribbon” and “corpses” are 
pronounced exactly the same, “yellow corpse
is therefore a derogatory reference to “yellow 
ribbon,” a key symbol of the Umbrella Movement). 
Second, the pro-government outlets also invoked a 
morally good people. In this case, the good people 
are the Chinese, not “Hong Kongers.” Third, the 
pro-government outlets appealed to emotions over 
reason and disregarded the norms of the elite public 
discourse. Interestingly, behind the pro-government 
online media are not the major pro-government 
political parties and figures in Hong Kong. While 
those outlets and their discourses are generally 
supportive toward the government, sometimes 
they also see the Hong Kong government as too 
weak in dealing with the opposition. It is possible 
that, in association with the nationalist discourse 
of supporting China, the outlets may accuse the 
Hong Kong government as too accommodating 
in their dealing with the opposition. In this sense, 
they are also critical to the elites, which potentially 
include the Hong Kong government. These are 
the characteristics which, to me, make it sensible 
to associate the outlets with the label of “state-
sponsored populism.”
Let me present a few final remarks that concludes 
how the political context in Hong Kong has led
to the rise of protests, to populist localism, and, 
as a reaction, to state-sponsored populism. I think 
the case of Hong Kong has shown, first of all, the 
varieties of populisms. This is the point I made at 
the beginning: specific contexts and dynamics can 
generate not so much specific forms of populism 
but specific configurations of populisms. I think
it would be interesting to look at any society with 
this idea in mind to see how different forms
of populism connect and react to each other.
The Hong Kong case is intriguing in the sense 
that, while populism tends to attack the current 
system and establishment, different forms of 
populism in Hong Kong actually construe the 
“current system” in vastly different ways. As I said, 
the traditional understanding of Hong Kong politics 
is organized around the political division between 
the authoritarian state as “the establishment” and 
the democrats as the opposition. But the populist 
localists arguably do not share the same view. 
Instead, they see the system as comprising the 
state and the democrats. The conflicts between the 
state and the democrats are just conflicts within the 
failing system (i.e., the failing politics
of incremental democratization). They believe they 
have to overthrow the entire system, hence they are 
against both the government and the democrats. 
Meanwhile, the state-sponsored populists see the 
system in yet another way. By placing China into the 
sacred position, the state-sponsored populists see 
the local system as failing because, in the boarder 
context of Chinese politics and sovereignty, Hong 
Kong is not fulfilling its obligations. In any case, 
what we see here is that competing populisms can 
be contesting the definition of “the establishment.”.
One more point I want to highlight in the 
development of the populist discourses is also
a process of contesting and negotiating the 
repertoire of social movement discourses. As I 
mentioned, the term “local” was first popularized 
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by the progressive activists, only to be appropriated 
by populist localism in the early 2010s. A similar 
process exists with state-sponsored populism,
as shown in the example of “yellow corpses.”.
Another remark would be about the relationship 
between social media and populism. Some 
researchers have argued that there could be an 
elective affinity between the two (Gerbaudo, 2018). 
There are “lonely individuals” with extreme opinions 
who can nonetheless form an online crowd and 
support each other on social media. There is also 
the collapsing and the blurring of the public-private 
boundary and a stronger degree of normative 
disinhibition in the social media arena. Public 
visibility is less constrained by public norms
on social media.
Social media serve as a contributory condition 
to the rise of populism. It does not kick start 
the dynamics, but when it becomes part of the 
dynamics it contributes to its scale and speed. My 
last point of remarks is that there are undeniably 
political and economic forces at work on social 
media. In the past decade, there have been many 
discussions around the ideas of filter bubbles and 
echo chambers. Most literatures seem to suggest 
that these phenomena are caused by the tendency 
that people like to talk to like-minded others. In a 
sense, this claim suggests that echo chambers 
are formed from the bottom-up. But at least in the 
case of Hong Kong, I would argue that such echo 
chambers are established by political and economic 
forces. Without such political and economic forces 
behind, echo chambers may still exist, but their 
configuration and characteristics may differ.
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(Abbreviated version of the keynote speech “Digital Intimacy 
and its Metadata: Studying Data Publics in Closed Contexts”)
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The video streaming application TikTok has 
taken Turkey by storm, and the hype involves, 
among others, video-making by soldiers fulfilling 
military service. While the footage from the 
barracks is punctuated by nationalist and militarist 
symbols, what prevails is everydayness and silly, 
occasionally carnivalesque performances in front 
of an intimately present camera. Does such video 
production lend voice and creative expression
to conscripted youth? What kind of togetherness 
is showing itself here? Does the affective intimacy 
merely reproduce a nationalist body politic and its 
exclusions? Or, if it appears rather nationalist now, 
can it become something else, nonetheless? And, if 
social-media platforms play a role in facilitating and 
organizing such communication, how does it relate 
to state power and macropolitics?
In this talk, I look at digital intimacy discursively, 
aesthetically, and infrastructurally in order to think 
about the possibilities and excesses of digitally 
mediated populism. I am especially interested
in how digital intimacy reconfigures—or displaces—
populism, which works through the affective and 
intimate mediations of a popular body. To this end, 
I explore the intersection of what José van Dijck 
(2013) has distinguished as the connectedness 
of human relations at the front-end of social 
media and the connectivity of data infrastructures 
and algorithmic processing at the back-end. 
Connectedness covers the lateral exchanges
of intimacy animating front-end publics. Deploying 
reiterative memes and hashtags, users indicate 
their participation in such publics and extend 
connectedness among a “like-minded” crowd, 
or to sound less Cartesian a “like-vibed” crowd. 
Connectivity involves the affordances of back-
end infrastructures and computational “gazes” 
of trackers, platform algorithms, and, possibly, 
surveillance technology. My overall objective is to 
think through the relation between the micropolitics 
of affect, digital infrastructure, and state power. 
Many, especially journalists, have already written 
about authoritarian populism and the “strong 
leader,” but the challenge I set for myself is to focus 
as little as possible on the figure of the leader and 
instead highlight the agency of the crowd as well
as of mediating infrastructures. These are 
INTRODUCTION
commonly reduced to respectively “dupes” and 
“tools” of the strong leader. I will start with a review 
of narratives of the crowd and intimacy. The further 
discussion draws on examples of digital intimacy 
from Turkey. These examples involve social-media 
campaigns taking place in the context
of the referendum in 2017 that consolidated regime 
change; the mobilization for a military operation
in the Syrian city of Afrin in January-March 2018; 
and the economic crisis that started to deepen in 
the same year.
NARRATIVES OF THE INTIMATE CROWD
The first narrative I want to discuss involves the 
liberal fear of the “irrational” crowd. Drawing on 
Le Bon and Freud, the narrative of the irrational 
crowd revolves around the lack of individuality and 
therewith rationality: “any congregation of individu-
als will serve only to weaken the rationality of each 
of its constituent members, who will find themsel-
ves easily swayed either by random suggestions or 
by charismatic leadership” (Gilbert 2014, 52). The 
irrational crowd is assembled only thanks to the 
image of its charismatic symbolic leader, who is 
the meta-individual, the super-ego, with whom the 
members of the crowd identify (Gilbert 2014).
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The second narrative involves the intimate crowd as 
counterpublic. Challenging the exclusions
of the liberal public sphere, feminism and sexuality 
studies have been spearheading the celebration of 
public manifestations of intimacy and affect. They 
draw the attention to counterpublics that mobilize 
more intimate styles of communication, forming 
contestations of the Habermassian exclusive 
public sphere with its constitutional outsides. I 
am referring here to the work by Nancy Fraser and 
Michael Warner and their uptake
in media studies. This work also builds on Lauren 
Berlant’s thesis (1998) on intimacy as a pre-stage 
of publicness, where the formation of subjectivity 
takes place before it enters the public sphere (i.e., 
reading at home). In order to go beyond “proper,” 
recognized intimacies that keep in place dominant 
institutions and ideologies from which ‘others’ 
are excluded, Berlant hails more transgressive 
and “unconstrained,” minor (in Deleuzian sense) 
intimacies.
The third narrative involves the affective crowd as 
democratic expression. Henry Jenkins has used 
the idea of “voting naked” for a democratic culture 
that does not impose thresholds for participation 
and welcomes vernacular expression. Writing 
about “connective logics,” Bennet and Segerberg’s 
(2012) widely cited article holds that participation 
revolves around personally expressive content that 
is “shared with, and recognized by, others who,
in turn, repeat these networked sharing activities.” 
As Shiftman (2014) has argued, memes exemplify 
imitation but also adaptation and deviation, which 
differentiates them from virals. A post-liberal 
take on affect runs through the radical theory by 
Hardt and Negri on the multitude, which became 
a common reference around the years of the Arab 
Spring, Gezi, Umbrella, and Occupy uprisings. 
This type of work rejects the notion of the atomistic 
individualistic subject and it has been influenced by 
a line of cultural theory, including Spinoza, Tarde, 
Simondon, and Deleuze and Guattari. Simondon’s 
idea is that a pre-individual reality connects us all, 
prior to our status as individuals, and this reality 
can be “individualized.” The pre-individual is a 
reservoir of potential—a “general field of relations 
and potentialities” (Gilbert 2014, 111)—from which 
collective individuation can emerge. The latter 
process does not involve separate “individuals” now 
forming a group, but a psychosocial transindividual 
being. In Hardt and Negri (2005), the transindividual 
involves a radical potential for transgressive 
commonality and love by the “multitude,” which 
as a collectivity does not pose an identity on its 
constituents.
However, in the years following the aforementioned 
uprisings, with the outpouring of intimacy
on digital networks, we see a revived discourse 
of the irrational crowd in rejections of populism 
as well as a return of the defense of normativity, 
especially in response to fake news. And then 
there is the fear of authoritarian leaders, to which 
mediated affect is key, especially hatred, anger, 
supremacism, racism, and sexism. Critical scholars 
who rejected rationality and standards of civility in 
public life as exclusive, dominant norms are now at 
pains to argue that “this” (fake news, hatred, loss of 
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Simultaneously, digital intimacy literature has 
had to deal with the fact that the current social-
media environment does not just invade privacy 
but governmentalizes intimacy. Intimacy online 
comes together with its datafication, and, 
therewith, its governance, its grammatization, 
and its exploitation. Where does this leave our 
discussion of digital intimacy and the crowd? 
Post-liberal theories imply that affect and desire 
do not originate from the individual as subject 
(pace Freud and Lacan), but from lateral relations 
of imitation among proximate bodies. Even without 
appealing to Simondon’s ontological philosophy, 
crowds seem more lateral and decentralized. But 
also, intimacy seems always already social due 
to digital infrastructure’s mediating relations. This 
complicates existing narratives, both of the “active,” 
emancipatory crowd of uprisings and
of the “passive” crowd that is a tool of the populist 
leader. If affect/intimacy is not individual but always 
already social, the crowd is not ‘scary”
for lacking individuality. Surely, a crowd can be 
scary. But how does it come to be so? And how do 
we distinguish between different formations
of crowds, of populisms?
CONNECTEDNESS AND INTIMACY
I want to take the example of manifestations
of digital intimacy in the context of regime change 
away from parliamentary democracy toward The 
Executive Presidency in Turkey. During this time, 
social-media users shot intimate confessional 
videos, reminiscent of a challenge meme. These 
videos are typically shot in personal settings,
in close-up frames, and they come across as the 
first self-recorded videos shared by these users. 
After declaring their support for regime change, the 
users then hail a personal contact, inviting them 
to make their own video. These performances cite 
an intimacy with the leader and among a national 
or socio-spiritual body often sealed with tropes 
of the family: the nation as intimate family and 
its leader as simultaneously “one of us” and the 
“true/authentic us.” However, rather than taking for 
granted the Leviathan identity and consolidation 
of “the people” only thanks to their individual 
identification with a representative “leader,”
we could try to understand the role of contagion 
and imitation in a more horizontal fashion. 
Populism thrives on bottom-up processes and the 
lateral relations among the imitating and inventing 
crowds: the crowd is not sheepish or entirely 
homogeneous; imitation or repetition comes with 
difference. Interestingly, in the above performances 
support for the national leader Erdoğan
is exchanged for support for Turkey, and, more so, 
for city districts and hometowns that these people 
identify with, and eventually for relatives and loved 
ones. Hence, the articulation of local to national 
scales of belonging is in question. 
Such slippages do not mean that the intimate 
crowd is not populist, or that “leaders” do not exist. 
Instead, macropolitics is composedof micropolitics. 
Yet tapping and controlling the lateral relations and 
affective energies of the imitating, inventing crowds 
is not easy. For one, there are slippages in which 
the intimate becomes the private or personal in yet 
other senses. Take the scribbling on the Howitzer 
shells deployed by the Turkish military to target the 
Syrian city of Afrin in 2018. These shells themselves 
have somehow emerged as fetish objects because 
they are produced “100 percent locally and 
nationally.” Yet the messages on the shells include 
personal business promotions, greetings to friends 
or to the local mayor (always good to have personal 
connections...), and, in other instances, celebrations 
of preferred soccer teams. 
Moreover, while the “closed context” is commonly 
understood in terms of censorship and the 
prohibition to speak, we should not overlook the 
pressure to speak, but to speak in a certain way 
on certain terms, and digital intimacy can be 
surprisingly prevalent next to censorship. Often 
54
Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
confessional culture in the closed context involves 
the display of the inner self in order to show
to oneself (one’s neighbor and the government) 
that one is fully aligned with the populist body. 
This is not just an expression of the public self, but 
the display of one’s “entire” soul so that nothing 
remains unknown. Yet in this process, intimacy 
turns into a performance of a recognizable 
repertoire of stylized acts. As such, intimacy also 
becomes a formula lending a mask: it can be 
copied (and this is literally what happens in digital 
ecologies of copy/paste). Hence, there is no end
to suspicion, panic and mistrust.
Last, a transindividual body once in place can 
be repurposed and new campaigns do build on 
previously rendered affective connectedness.
In response to the economic crisis and increasing 
costs, there currently is an electricity bill campaign, 
in which self-identified government supporters 
vent anger about the steep rise in prices. Affiliated 
videos are intimate displays because they take 
place in the privacy of the living room, show 
everyday life and emotion, and the personal details 
often disclosed to guarantee these are “real people” 
like you and me, not trolls or paid actors. Here 
people who are rather sure of themselves that they 
count as the people who belong and are entitled, 
vent their anger and frustration, even going as far 
as cursing President Erdoğan.
CONNECTIVITY AND POPULISM
At the backend of computing, data bodies 
exist in the infrastructural and computational 
“gazes” of sniffers, trackers, platform algorithms, 
and, possibly, surveillance technology such as 
Deep Packet Inspection. How do we relate the 
infrastructural back-end to questions of populism 
and state power?
Key is to realize the state is not simply successfully 
availing itself of the resources of digital data and 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). For instance, the Turkish 
state’s desire for control over the national “data 
body politic” is clear and the argument that data 
fall under national sovereignty underlies proposed 
initiatives such as assigning an email address
to each citizen by birth, developing a local search 
engine replacing Google called e-Çelebi (after the 
17th-century Ottoman travel writer), and a more 
recent attempt to create a national alternative
to Whatsapp, named in reference to the national 
telecom institution of the past “ptt messenger.” 
These services are about techno-nationalist pride 
but also about ownership of data. The opening
of the Turkcell Data Storage Center was touted
to be an important step towards storing digital data 
in Turkey (a Turkcell representative said that 99 
percent currently is stored abroad). The minister 
in charge of communication emphasized the 
importance of Turkey becoming a country that can 
store its own data and that Turkey should become
a data center market.
However, in practice Turkey lacks sovereignty 
over citizens’ digital data as well as the capacity 
to process it, in the way China or USA have. Like 
most others, it is a “have-not” state for data 
and AI. By consequence, next to alleged use of 
surveillance technology, there is extensive reliance 
on crowdsourcing for data, again deploying and 
exploiting the lateral relations of the crowd, with the 
goal to eliminate or incapacitate supposed threats. 
But one consequence of peer surveillance initiatives 
has been that the police force is overwhelmed 
by irrelevant information provided by overeager 
informant citizens or citizens motivated by private 
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Big data approaches to governing data bodies 
seem to be in an initial phase only. However, a 
state relying on big data tools might find itself 
on slippery grounds, as it draws on technologies 
initially developed for marketing. For instance, the 
affordances of technologies in micro-targeting 
and neuromarketing may interfere with the nature 
of state politics and statecraft. In Weapons of 
Math Destruction, O’Neill describes the longer 
history of microtargeting (starting with direct mail). 
Such fragmentation and multiplicity of the public 
hardly translates into coherency of the message 
from the populist leader that consolidates the 
body politic (Andrejevic 2013; Maly 2018; Baldwin 
Philippi 2018). Whereas both Democrat and Trump 
campaigns have turned to such means, my point 
is: let’s not forget that technological adaptation 
generates transgressions and contradictions; our 
human and social complexities are not reducibl
to the patterns that network science proudly 
presents (though the failure to be accurate might 
not be less scary); and the concrete futures
of digital intimacy and algorithmic populism
are undecided.
CONCLUSION
On the one hand, twenty something years after 
the defense of intimacy and affect in the public 
sphere, intimacy appears displayed, shared, 
and rendered governable through technological 
mediation. Yet the idea of our transindividual 
connectedness allows us to challenge the narrative 
of the crowd being “scary” and dangerous due 
to loss of individuality and rationality; as well as 
the narrative of a homogeneous, sheepish crowd 
following top-down authoritarianism. Rather than 
the loss of “rational” individuality, the question 
is in what ways and to what extent affect and 
intimacy are (technologically) captured, exploited, 
and articulated into projects of authoritarianism 
and othering. How does affect translate into other 
scales and forms of power, such as the box office? 
And what are the inherent weaknesses, where 
affective vectors can constitute a “line of flight,” 
resulting in new bonds and solidarities? Can the 
micropolitics of affect also become more than or 
less than an aggregation represented in supposedly 
“immediate” fashion by the sovereign leader?
Let us reconsider intimate publics in terms
of inclusivity. Gilbert (2014) argues that “What 
distinguishes a democratic politics from any 
other is the fact that it does not try to regulate the 
inherent complexity of human relations” (129), 
which Arendt calls boundless action and refers to  
as infinite relationality. Rather than making social 
relations simpler, it “strives to give expression
to their full complexity and the creative possibilities 
which this entails” (130). Building on this, I want
to propose that what makes the crowd dangerous
is not its connectedness undermining liberal, 
“rational” subjectivity but its disconnections and 
erasures. Digital media play a role in creating 
and sustaining such disconnections through re-
articulations of public/private spheres, censorship, 
as well as algorithmic filtering. Discussing the 
affective registers of networks, Wendy Chun 
(2018) turns to homophily (love of the same) 
to explore algorithmic pattern discrimination 
by recommendation algorithms, which leads to 
phenomena such as echo chambers and filter 
bubbles: “Homophily (love as love of the same) 
fuels pattern discrimination. The fact that networks 
perpetuate segregation should surprise no one 
because […] segregation in the form of homophily 
lies at their conceptual core” (62). From this 
perspective, the populist crowd is not excessively 
connected (i.e., undermining individualism), but 
rather not connected enough (i.e., homophilic
in Chun’s sense)!
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I want to look at the relationship between media 
coverage, anger and populist politics by focusing
on the case of Donald Trump. The reason I’m 
focusing on Donald Trump is because I’ve been 
working on questions around emotions, media and 
politics for a very long time. People started asking 
me a few years back to say things about Donald 
Trump and that is why I started to think about 
him. It’s not because I think that Donald Trumpis 
necessarily the only populist or the most important 
populist, but all the same I’m going to suggest 
today that there are some distinctive features of 
the discourse of emotion or the emotional politics 
of Donald Trump which tie into broader patterns of 
thinking about the role of emotion in populism.
I want to begin by briefly situating this in the context 
of the role of emotion in political life, which is my 
larger project. Then I want to focus specifically on 
the role of anger in political life and what I see as 
the distinctive nature of mediated anger or anger 
circulating through mediated discourses. This then 
allows me to further develop ideas around the 
emotional politics of Donald Trump as representing 
a distinct formation, although it’s one that’s related 
to strategies of other populist politicians.
Specifically, I want to develop the idea that Donald 
Trump embodies what I call an angry populism. 
I want to look at how that might represent a shift 
in what historian William Reddy has talked about 
as the “emotional regime.” I want to examine this 
particularly with reference to one example that I’ve 
looked at, which is the coverage of Donald Trump’s 
inauguration as compared to Barack Obama’s first 
inauguration.
I will first briefly discuss the context of my larger 
project of exploring the role of emotion in mediated 
politics. That’s the focus of my book, Emotions, 
Media and Politics, and other publications. In my 
book and in other publications that I have worked 
on over the past decade or so, I have developed the 
argument that it’s important and timely
to understand how emotion can be both
a constructive and a destructive force in political 
life more broadly. Also, more importantly, that 
it’s an inescapable one. And we’ve already heard 
discussion of emotion in many of the presentations 
at this conference so far. For example, Ruth Wodak 
made the point that the appeals to fear, to hope 
and to shame are essential to forms of populist 
discourse. One of the arguments that I’ve made, and 
other scholars like Sarah Ahmed have made, is that 
we need to make a distinction between the range 
of different emotions that are articulated by groups 
and individuals and that circulate in the public 
sphere, as well as the resulting responses that they 
elicit.
In other words, I see emotion as both a force and
a resource for political life, for better and for worse. 
There’s always been a key structural tension in the 
history of political thought and particularly liberal 
democratic thought between, on the one hand, the 
need to involve citizens as rational and constructive 
participants in the political process and then,
on the other hand, the need to control what is 
widely seen as irrational passions and the anger of 
“the common people.”
One of the arguments I’ve made in my work
is that fear of emotion in public life is often 
actually a fear of anger because angry people are 
by default understood as potentially aggressive 
and therefore potentially dangerous. At the same 
time, sociologists, social movement scholars, 
psychologists, and political scientists are in broad 
agreement that political participation is in fact 
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As Drew Westen has argued, looking
at neuropsychology, we have to look at the political 
brain as an emotional brain. Likewise, social 
movement scholars have ascertained that people 
participate in politics because they care or they feel 
passionately about an issue. Conversely we can 
also say that the choice of inaction --of not taking 
part-- also comes about as a result of affective 
responses.
In this sense, political participation appears to be 
driven in large part by impulses that run counter 
to the ideal of liberal democracy, the notion that 
citizens should be dispassionate, disembodied, 
unemotional and rational. Instead of being driven 
purely by rationality, the consensus seems to be 
that rationality is important to political decision 
making, but equally, that citizens who participate 
appear to be fueled by passion and by emotions 
that range from love to hatred and anger.
My book also has chapters that look at other 
emotions. But I think that anger is a particularly 
interesting political emotion and I’m going to briefly 
talk about why I think it’s so important to look
at anger. I should note that when I talk about 
anger in this way I don’t mean to say that we can 
necessarily isolate it from other emotions--either 
as they circulate in our individual bodies or as 
they circulate in public discourse. There is a range 
of emotions in play and in a way it’s an artificial 
distinction to look at just one in isolation.
Nonetheless, that’s exactly what I’m going to
do for the purposes of my talk. If we look at anger 
specifically, it tends to be recognized in social 
theory as a reaction to injustice and inherently 
relational. For example, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
defined anger as “an impulse, accompanied by 
pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous 
light directed without justification towards what 
concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s 
friends.”
It’s long been recognized that although anger is in 
the first instance an individual emotion, it comes
to matter politically when it’s articulated by 
collectives towards a shared objective
of addressing an injustice. So it’s potentially
a collective and therefore political emotion. But at 
the same time political thinking continues
to be fueled by the idea that anger is normatively 
unjustifiable. So Martha Nussbaum, the famous 
philosopher of emotion, wrote a book in 2016 called 
Anger and Forgiveness, in which she argued that 
basically anger is a really bad thing. She suggested 
that “anger is not only not necessary for the 
pursuit of justice, but also a large impediment to 
the generosity and empathy that help to construct 
a future of justice.” In trying to engage with 
Nussbaum’s argument as part of writing about 
mediated anger more broadly, I have suggested that 
anger, as it circulates through the media (this you 
can also say about other emotions that circulate 
in the media), is a distinctive emotion from the 
kind of anger that circulates in individual bodies 
and makes people, for example, aggressive and 
resentful towards others, which is a kind of anger 
that Nussbaum talks about.
I carried out a study a few years ago about anger in 
routine coverage of protest and developed
a typology of mediated anger. I argued, in an article 
in the International Journal of Communication, 
that mediated anger is distinctive because it’s 
performative, it’s discursively constructed through 
the speech of actors and it’s usually collective 
and political. I should say that in developing this 
argument and other arguments, I’ve been heavily 
influenced by the work of sociologists of emotion 
who view emotion as partly socially constructed 
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By describing mediated anger in this way, I mean 
that mediated anger is performative because it’s 
based on the performance of anger in the public 
sphere. If you think about people being angry
in the media, whether it’s Donald Trump or 
protesters against him, this kind of performance
is often strategic but it’s inherently ideological 
as well. It’s discursively constructed insofar
as it’s crafted through narratives and interpretations 
and it shapes the conditions of possibility for 
shared action because it facilitates the sharing 
of particular legitimate ways of talking about our 
feelings in public.
Finally, this performance is collective and 
potentially political because it’s based on the 
articulation of shared grievances usually towards 
particular political ends. In other words, when 
we talk about mediated emotions we talk about 
something that is potentially political, performative 
and constructive, so it’s different from emotions 
that we feel in our own bodies. With that in mind, I 
now want to takea look at the distinctive anger of 
Donald Trump as a marker of an emerging form of 
angry populism which represents a shift in what
we might call the emotional regime.
When I talk about the notion of an emotional 
regime I’m drawing from the work of the historian 
of emotion William Reddy. He talks about an 
emotional regime as a “set of normative emotions, 
and the official rituals, practices and emotives 
(emotion words) that express and inculcate them 
are the necessary underpinning of any stable 
political regime.”.
I argue that we see journalism as a central venue 
for enacting and sustaining the emotional regime. I 
further develop the case that the emotional regime 
that we’re seeing in the contemporary era in the 
context of looking at Donald Trump
is one of angry populism. Angry populism, as it’s 
embodied by Trump, is based on a rhetoric which 
seeks broad appeal through the deliberate and 
strategic expression of anger. When it’s adopted 
as an interpreted framework in media coverage 
it suggests that the anger of Trump, but also the 
anger of his supporters and his opponents, is both 
salient and relevant to political life.
This is something that fits into the context
of the significant electoral and political advances 
of populist politicians that we’ve already talked 
about for the last few days. If we look at right wing 
populisms in particular, observers have pointed out 
that they operate through emotional appeals often 
associated with anti-immigration and xenophobia, 
widely seen as appealing to groups that feel angry 
and disenchanted with conventional politics.
I’m going to show you this because it’s my favorite 
image ever. I should tell you all that I have a Putin 
calendar for 2019, which I opened in 2018 because 
I couldn’t wait. Vladimir Putin, as many of you 
know, poses every year for the Vladimir Putin 
calendar, which presents him more as a superhero, 
sex symbol or movie star than as a conventional 
politician. He goes fishing without his shirt on,
he hugs puppies, he does amazing workouts in the 
gym and he also thoughtfully sniffs what I think is a 
flower but what might just be a twig.
The reason why I wanted to mention Putin here 
was mainly to show off that picture, but also to say 
that he is someone who has garnered significant 
public support in Russia by constantly reinforcing 
distinctions between the Russian people and pretty 
much everyone else.
“I argue that we 
see journalism as 
a central venue 
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I don’t want to rehearse in detail definitions
of populism, but I want to talk about these 
definitions in the context of emotion in particular. 
We’ve discussed how populism tends to be 
premised on the mobilization of the people around 
an opposition of shared enemies. It depends on the 
cultivation of exclusionary solidarities that target 
resentment toward the most vulnerable members
of society, including immigrants and ethnic and 
sexual minorities.
The appeal of Trump and other right-wing 
populists tends to be organized around a particular 
negative affective constellation. That represents 
a coalescence of longer standing practices and 
trends and shares many features with other forms 
of contemporary populism. Trump’s appeal also 
appears to be distinctive -- and distinctively angry 
-- premised on the discursive construction of shared 
grievances.
This is something that observers have pointed out 
in analyzing the rise of Trump. Trump’s electoral 
victory has been widely connected to broader 
patterns of economic anger. For instance, the 
prominent economist Ann Pettifor is one of many 
observers to link the election result to the economic 
consequences of globalization. Political scientists 
Fred Inglehart and Pippa Norris talked about it in 
terms of a cultural backlash that was a reaction by 
once predominant sectors of the population
to progressive value change.
These observations tend to share, however varied 
their explanations are of the rise of Trump,
the idea that Trump’s rise can be explained in part 
by a kind of reactionary anger against disenchanted 
electorates. As others have observed this could 
also be linked to a broader age of anger, to use 
the phrase coined by Pankaj Mishra. Anger as a 
political and constructed emotion appears to be a 
resource for populist politics in general and
for Trump in particular.
This could be seen to suggest a shift in the 
prevailing emotional regime. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the recent past has seen 
an emphasis on emotional regimes primarily 
associated with hope. This is something that was 
very much a theme in Barack Obama’s presidency, 
as exemplified in the iconic “Hope” poster. Prior 
to him Bill Clinton billed himself as “the man from 
Hope.” This was in part because he was actually 
from Hope - Hope, Arkansas. I remember his 
presidential campaign film where he talked about 
how this was a wonderful small town where nobody 
locked their doors at night and everyone went to the 
parade on Main Street. So he used this hometown 
of Hope as way of embodying a particular political 
emotional regime.
In my own longstanding research looking at the 
use of emotions in award-winning journalistic 
storytelling, what’s very clear is that negative 
emotions tend to predominate in journalism. But 
actually, the most frequent positive emotion is that 
of hope. Hope, often against very dire predictions, 
is what tends to predominate in public discourse. 
By contrast, Trump’s injunction to Make America 
Great Again, a slogan that does embody hope 
for the future and the possibility of change, has 
consistently been accompanied by angry rants 
about the present resonating with disaffected 
voters.
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I would suggest that there is a shift to an emotional 
regime that tends to focus on anger. Before doing 
that I want to give a little caveat on the emotional 
politics of Donald Trump. I don’t want to make the 
argument that this is the only form
of unconventional emotional expression associated 
with Trump. Trump is in fact widely characterized 
with reference to his poor management of emotion 
and he is frequently compared to a toddler. So the 
word tantrum comes up very frequently in media 
coverage of Donald Trump.
In fact, Trump’s outbursts and gaffes have been 
really too numerous to count. He has shown what 
sociologists of emotion would characterize as 
blatant disregard for emotion rules that might 
have terminated any other candidate at any 
other time. There is this kind of performance of 
outrageousness, which does seem to resonate with 
voters. Trump sailed onwards constantly emoting 
in these socially inappropriate ways, as in this very 
high profile incident where he made fun of the 
disabled reporter Serge Kowalski.
This kind of behavior would have terminated any 
other candidate at any other time. Here I’m thinking 
of one person in particular -- the sad case of 
Howard Dean. How many people remember Howard 
Dean? Dean was a primary candidate for the 
Democratic Party in the 2004 presidential election. 
He finished in third place in the Iowa Caucus and 
he gave a speech to his supporters after. At the end 
of his speech he did this little weird high-pitched 
red-faced scream. It was this one momentary 
lapse on his part, which ended his candidacy 
because observers noted that it made him look very 
unpresidential, precisely because it demonstrated a 
lack of control of his emotions.
All I’m saying is that Trump would have totally 
gotten away with doing that. Of course, Trump’s 
blustering performance cannot simply be 
understood at constructed through the discourses 
of mainstream media, but rather as emerging within 
a hybrid media system. Trump, like other populist 
politicians, has been highly successful at mobilizing 
support through Twitter.
His tweets have, in turn, attracted extensive media 
coverage and allowed him also to bypass a lot 
of the kind of scrutiny that tends to accompany 
coverage in the mainstream media. Obviously the 
increasing prominence of social media shapes 
not just the content of mainstream media but also 
some extent their emotional style. According to a 
number of observers, the affordances of Twitter 
facilitate a discursive climate, which is more 
extreme, more divisive and more polarized. Trump 
appears to be a beneficiary of the shift by crafting 
these very highly emotionally charged messages 
on Twitter in a way that then spills over into 
mainstream media.
Anger is the one emotion which has been used 
most frequently to describe both the rhetoric of 
Donald Trump and his appeal to disenchanted 
citizens, whether through his incessant Tweeting or 
through his behavior on the campaign trail or in the 
White House.
One of the things that I’ve looked at in my research 
is how often different emotion words are being 
used in media coverage of Trump, and I have found 
that anger is far more common than others like 
irrationality, unpredictability, unpredictable and so 
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of talking about Donald Trump. According to a 
Gallup poll that was carried out in November 
2017, the word incompetent was in fact the most 
common descriptor, with four percent
of respondents answering with it. Other words 
included strong, idiot, egotistical, ignorant, great, 
racist, asshole and narcissistic.
The philosopher Aaron James, who holds a PhD 
from Harvard and is a professor at the University 
of California at Irvine, is a leading light in the 
burgeoning field of “Asshole Studies,” because 
there is, indeed, such a thing. Aaron James recently 
released a new book which suggests that Trump 
can, in fact, best be explained on the basis of the 
framework of Asshole Studies. In the blurb for this 
book, he stated the importance of Asshole Studies 
for making sense of Trump. I want to read that blurb 
to you and see whether you find it convincing.
“That Donald Trump is an asshole is a fact widely 
agreed upon, even by his supporters who actually 
like that about him. But his startling political rise 
makes a question of just what sort of asshole he is 
and how his asshole-dom may help to explain his 
success one of not just a philosophical interest but 
of almost existential urgency.”
Dr. James makes this compelling case here for 
studying Trump through the lens of Asshole 
Studies, but I have nonetheless stuck to my guns 
and have kept with looking at expressions of anger 
in media coverage. This is an example that I use
in my book also in a brief piece in Media, Culture 
and Society. I studied the shifting emotional 
regimes by looking at expressions of anger in post-
election and inauguration coverage of Obama’s first 
election and inauguration in 2009, comparing that 
to Trump’s election and inauguration in 2017.
In taking this approach, I’m following the lead
of journalism historians who have looked at 
changes in the coverage of recurring events over 
time. This includes Michael Schudson’s work on the 
President’s State of the Union Address,and Bonnie 
Brennen’s work on coverage of Thanksgiving.
The purpose of my analysis, however, is not to 
offer a detailed historical explanation of emotional 
regimes, but rather to provide a snapshot of a 
particular critical moment of change represented 
by the election of Trump. This kind of analysis can 
point us toward shifts in the relative prominence of 
particular emotions in discourse and highlight what 
this tells us about horizons for public debate
and for political change.
The inauguration is an interesting event to study 
because it frames the presidency by providing an 
interpretive context for understanding key debates 
about the president, and therefore provides a sense 
of the emotional regime that he or she embodies. 
If we look at the longer period between the election 
and the inauguration, that period is quite critical
in both establishing and contesting the reputation, 
vision and public image of a new president.
At the same time, inaugurations seek to cement a 
dominant narrative around the president. Scholars 
and historians who have studied inaugurations 
suggest that they could be seen as rituals that build 
consensus around the spectacle of affirming the 
new president and the shared values represented 
by them. They often represent these moments 
when the nation has been constructed as coming 
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This makes the study of anger all the more 
interesting in the context of inauguration coverage, 
because if anger is viewed as an uncontrollable, 
dangerous negative emotion, it’s anathema to the 
ideological consensus of the inauguration ritual 
where we might expect it to be largely suppressed 
or invisible.
We expect it to be a time when everyone comes 
together, waves a flag and everyone is happy 
about the new president. I studied the occurrence 
of the phrases “anger” and “angry” in the period 
between Trump’s election in November 2016 and 
the day following the inauguration in January 
2017, contrasting it with the same period following 
Obama’s first election.
There were many more stories that mentioned 
anger in the context of Trump than for Obama.
I looked at US newspapers and newswires. I then 
did a smaller qualitative and basic content analysis 
of a sample of the day following the inauguration 
for each of the two Presidents. I should say that 
here I’m only focusing on how the word “anger” 
came up in this coverage---- I’m not looking at 
related words like indignation, fury or frustration. 
I’m making this decision to maintain a clear focus 
on what I explicitly identified as public articulations 
of anger as a central political emotion.
I’m particularly interested in looking at who
is represented as being angry and what are they 
angry about. What does this anger tell us about the 
mediated construction of political debate as well? 
First of all, we look at the question of who
is actually angry in inauguration coverage. If we 
look at the Trump case we’ve got a very small 
number of different types of actors that dominate 
what we might call the subject of anger.
This is completely different from what the picture 
looked like for Obama’s first inauguration. In the 
case of Obama’s first inauguration you have
a widely distributed form of anger in terms of who’s 
actually angry. There were Kenyan diplomats who 
were angry, there were people angry about queuing 
for the inauguration, people angry about the 
appointment of the Attorney General, people angry 
about racists. All sorts of different types of actors 
who were angry.
In the case of Trump, his opponents actually 
represented the majority of those who were 
represented as angry in the stories. In manyof the 
stories on the Trump inauguration the anger
of these protesters was described as energizing 
a new social movement and it was frequently 
legitimized with reference to the substance of their 
grievances. This also challenges conventional 
understandings of how anger tends to be 
constructed in protest coverage. In this case, 
people who are angry about Donald Trump are 
actually represented as having legitimate political 
opinions that needed to be heard in the public 
sphere.
Trump supporters, however, were also described
as being angry, accounting for 13.3% of the 
subjects of anger. The anger of his supporters, 
which usually had to do with the Washington 
establishment as well as with a decline in economic 
opportunities, was used as a way of explaining 
their voting decisions. In other words, when Trump 
supporters were described as being angry, it was 
used as a way of explaining why they actually voted 
for Donald Trump.
If we look at what people are actually angry about, 
when anger was referenced in the coverage
of Obama’s inauguration this was almost never 
directed at Obama himself. Instead, the most 
frequent target of anger had to do with the 
historical experience of racism amongst African-
Americans. The election of Obama was seen as an 
opportunity to actually overcome discrimination. By 
contrast, the anger expressed in coverage
of Trump’s inauguration overwhelmingly targeted 
Trump himself. This was true for more than half
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of all references to anger in the sample and 
was based on extensive coverage of protestors 
gathering for the inauguration itself as well as for 
the women’s marches on the day following the 
inauguration.
What is most striking about the construction
of anger in stories about Trump’s inauguration is 
the fact that a very high number of references to 
anger-- 20% of the-- didn’t identify a target. Usually 
when you see media coverage of anger, there’s a 
clear target for this anger. People are represented 
as being angry about something in particular. There 
is a kind of political aim of the anger. They want 
to achieve something by being angry in public. So 
anger requires a target for it to matter politically. 
This is something that I’ve done quite a lot of work 
on with my colleague Mervi Pantti over the years 
and appears to be consistent over time.
By contrast, in stories about Trump’s inauguration, 
anger appeared to become newsworthy in its 
own right. And in the vast majority of cases this 
unspecified anger, this target-less anger was 
that of Trump himself. This is important because 
describing anger as having a target both explains 
the anger and contributes to legitimizing it.
By contrast, the unspecified anger of Trump and 
his supporters suggests that they’re angry for no 
particular reason or cause. The image that emerges 
from the media coverage is that anger is essential 
to their identity and their worldview. They are angry 
people.
This essentializing of anger is quite central to 
understanding the place of angry populism as the 
emotional regime of the Trump era. It suggests 
that a particular brand of exclusionary populism 
cultivated by Trump depends upon the performance 
of anger as a way of dramatizing grievances.
In fact, analysts suggested that Trump appealed
to voters in large part because he saw the strategic 
utility of a new and angrier form of public discourse.
CNN noted this in its inauguration update: “Donald 
J Trump identified, long before anyone else did, the 
anger and desire for change that millions
of Americans craved. He addressed that in frank, 
blunt terms that deeply resonated with millions 
who were fed up with Washington’s political class 
and felt left behind in the globalizing economy.” 
This kind of widespread emphasis on Trump’s 
performance of anger and his appeal to an 
aggrieved public through this anger, alongside the 
interest in the anger of protest and opponents, has 
had a significant consequence in terms of shaping 
public debate over his presidency.
It suggests that there is salience to this angry 
populism, implying that anger is a viable interpretive 
framework for understanding political discourse 
in this performance alongside understanding the 
motivations of political actors. More than that, 
it seems that Trump’s populism works precisely 
because of the anger it expresses.
Anger is foundational to his appeal and to his 
political projects, but it’s also what we might call
an umbrella emotion, one that covers a wide variety 
of grievances and disaffections. I’ve done another 
study that looked at the coverage of anger in the 
100 days following his inauguration. I found that 
mainstream media coverage has continued to 
interpret his policy decisions through the lens of his 
anger. For example, a Washington Post editorial on 
February 3, 2017, noted: “Donald Trump’s election 
was propelled by the wave of anti-globalization 
anger that is sweeping the United States and other 
Western advanced economies. Trump has echoed 
that anger in his rhetoric. And now he is responding 
to that anger with policy.”
This has been a theme throughout his presidency. 
It’s been used to describe everything from his trade 
wars, how he was angry and unglued when he 
started a trade war, to the constant firing rounds 
in the White House and beyond, and even to his 
response to the continued investigations into 
Russian interference in the US elections.
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Trump’s anger has become a dominant framework 
for understanding his presidency and understanding 
his brand of populism. I also want to note that these 
ways of talking create a climate that appears
to open up for criminal action against those who 
have been marked out as outside the “we” group 
that’s included in the people as imagined by 
populists.
For example, the FBI reported that 2016 
represented a five year high in reported hate 
crimes, and the statistical analysis website Statista 
reporting a significant surge immediately following 
the presidential election.
I should note that we’ve seen very similar patterns 
in the U.K. after the EU referendum, where the 
Leave Campaign heavily relied on negative anti-
immigration rhetoric and the fear and anger 
associated with migration. This kind of emotional 
regime of angry populism is worrying not just 
because of the anger it embodies but also because 
the emotional climate it creates and the actions 
that that facilitates.
This is not to suggest that there’s a straightforward 
causal relationship between media discourses and 
racist hate crime, but rather that they form part 
of a climate that contributes to facilitating a view 
that these kinds of actions are acceptable.
I want to conclude, then, by briefly talking about 
some implications of this. First of all, I’ve argued 
that emotion has been historically denigrated in 
political thought and, as a result of that, in media 
and communication research. But, as media 
scholars, interested in politics and in populist 
politics in particular, we should take emotion 
seriously as an important political force for better 
and for worse.
I’ve tried to do this by looking at mediated anger
in political life as a distinctive formation. I’ve 
proposed that we need to take a careful look at 
the role of such anger as a mobilizing emotion 
in contributing to explaining the rise of Donald 
Trump. I’ve also tried to demonstrate a shift in the 
emotional regime represented by media discourse 
as following Trump’s inauguration, comparing it
to coverage of Obama’s first swearing in.
In particular, I have suggested that we’ve seen 
this shift towards an emotional regime of angry 
populism which renders anger a viable framework 
for interpreting political life and suggests that
its performance is essential to the brand of 
populism represented by Trump.
I would also argue that there are a lot of 
complexities associated with the mediated 
construction of anger as a political emotion. It’s not 
just a tool of political opportunists like Trump.
The anger of Trump supporters as well as 
protesters against him tends to be given voice and 
perceived as both legitimate and pertinent.
Even if anger has long been denounced as
a negative and dangerous emotion, it’s also 
important to consider the ways in which protestors 
against Trump view it as positive and mobilizing. 
Indeed, one of the most recent studies I’ve done 
looked at how Twitter discussion which dealt with 
the family separation policy actually mobilized an 
emotional community based on the anger of people 
who were protesting against the policy. I would also 
say that this alone doesn’t offer a way out 
of angry populism. It is also important to look
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What do the two people that we see here [Geert 
Wilders and Marine Le Pen] have in common, apart 
from having really expensively styled hair? They 
have both lost elections. They are both right-wing 
populists that were defeated by appeals
for more inclusive societies and against the forms 
of xenophobic populism that they represent. Geert 
Wilders, well known for his anti-Islam stance, lost 
the Dutch general election in 2017 even though 
polls predicted that his party would finish first. 
Marine Le Pen lost the French elections
to Emmanuel Macron, though it hasn’t gone too 
well for Macron since then. Analysts suggest that 
one of the reasons Macron managed to defeat Le 
Pen was that he appealed successfully against 
the strident right-wing views she represented and 
for a more pro-European France. These examples 
remind us that collective and political emotions 
are dynamic and ever-changing and perhaps none 
more so than anger. It also shows that emotional 
regimes can always be contested no matter how 
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With the US government shutdown and Brexit 
happening where I live now, to come to Lisbon 
and to be part of this group and to experience 
these talks and intellectual conversations has 
been an incredible gift. So thank you for that. I 
am going to present today from my book, but 
also some new ideas that I’ve been thinking 
about, and I also really appreciate the fact that 
this winter school on populism has given me 
an opportunity to think through some of the 
differences and similarities between what I call 
the popular and populism.
As I was telling Nelson Ribeiro and Barbie Zelizer 
yesterday, it’s very interesting to me to be thinking 
about populism. Lots of people have gone over 
definitions of populism here, so I’m not going to 
rehearse those in this talk. But about five years ago, 
when I started thinking about popular feminism and 
what it meant and what the popular as a terrain of 
intellectual inquiry means, I gave a paper at another 
conference on populism. And in that conference I 
argued that what we need to think about how we 
need to push “popular” forward towards populism, 
because it was before we started sort of equating 
populism with the extreme right. And so populism 
for me at that time was much more about a left kind 
of progressive movement. And I was thinking about 
how to push my thinking towards that direction.
Now, five years later I’m thinking, “Well, I’m just 
going to hold on to the popular for a while.” So 
again, lots of people have rehearsed this definition. 
I’ve really learned from a lot of different people here 
about what populism is. I’m just going
to take as a kind of broad given that a definition
of populism is about a struggle or challenge 
between a group that is identified as the elite 
and a group that is identified as the people. But 
I also think that populism—and many of us have 
talked about this, this week—is crucially about 
demagoguery. It is crucially about its own elite 
who stokes fears and passions in the people. And 
so I think that when we think about populism and 
the way I’m thinking about popular misogyny as a 
populism, I’m thinking through what that means to 
have figures that stoke fear and resentment.
Peter Baker last week in the Guardian had a long 
article about definitions of populism. And one of the 
things that he said is that the word evokes the long-
simmering resentments of the everyman brought to 
a boil by charismatic politicians, hawking,
and impossible promises. So what I want to do 
in this talk is talk about that, how populism is 
also fueled by a strong sense of victimhood and 
recuperation. As Baker continues, “A populous 
‘people’ can define itself by an ethnic identity it feels 
is under threat, but just as easily by a shared sense 
of being victims of economic exploitation. What 
matters is that it blames a perceived class
of corrupt elites; in the case of rightwing populisms, 
it may also heap scorn on some underclass, 
whether immigrants or racial minorities, whom 
the elites are accused of favouring with special 
treatment as part of their plot to keep power away 
from ‘real people.’”
This for me forms a lot of the logic of what I’m 
going to talk about in terms of popular misogyny, 
that it’s about a boiling resentment, about a 
feeling that women in particular received special 
treatment that has taken away from men, and 
it’s about victimhood. So I’m going to talk about 
this in the context of my recent book as Barbie 
said, Empowered. I’m going to argue here that 
popular misogyny can be seen as a kind of 
populism because it mobilizes a particular kind of 
networked movement. And it is about the shared 
sense of being victims of special treatment, about 
recuperation and restoration of patriarchy.
So I’m going to start off with two moments about 
one year apart. The first moment is one that 
everyone, I’m sure in this room and elsewhere, 
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knows quite well. It ignited in October 2017, and 
around then this article set it off from the New 
York Times. #MeToo began to circulate in digital 
and social media. The Times published this 
article detailing multiple accusations of sexual 
harassment against Hollywood producer Harvey 
Weinstein. The Weinstein case mobilized hundreds 
of other stories about harassment in everyday life, 
which were manifest in the multimedia movement 
of #MeToo. As many have pointed out, the phrase 
#MeToo was actually created in 2007 by an African-
American activist, Tarana Burke, a survivor of sexual 
assault and someone who created a movement, 
in particular, to help with connecting with other 
victims, especially women of color.
The fact that Burke, the originator of #MeToo, 
was largely eclipsed by the high-profile, mostly 
white, female celebrities who came forward in 
the Weinstein scandal is not insignificant. Time 
Magazine’s person of the year in 2017 was named 
the silence breakers, women who have come 
forward to expose sexual harassers and predators. 
Yet Burke who created the movement was inside 
the pages, not featured on the cover. Although, as 
you will see, Taylor Swift is featured on the cover, 
who needless to say has an ambivalent relationship 
to feminism. The mainstream media has covered 
these #MeToo stories expansively, which is an 
important move, but the stories are often about 
the powerful men who are accused or the celebrity 
women who accused them.
In other words, while the public awareness
of #MeToo has helped to reveal how widespread 
and normative sexual harassment is across all 
industries, it’s also focused on very visible public 
figures. And I say this not to dismiss the accusation 
of those figures in any way, but I do want to point 
out that while #MeToo existed in the early 2000s 
as a mechanism for building intersectional feminist 
community, it becomes highly visible only under the 
mediated logics of a new kind of popular feminism. 
The #MeToo movement that is expressed on these 
media platforms are those [stories] that easily lend 
themselves to commodification and simplification, 
those industries that provide platforms of visibility, 
things like entertainment and the news media, that 
are already designed and scripted for any mode of 
spectacular spotlight.
So this happens in October 2017; roughly about 
a year later, we start to see another story that 
surfaces and begins to supplant the #MeToo 
stories in terms of visibility in the mainstream 
media.
These are stories of white male victimhood that 
circulate on the same media platforms as those 
that are about #MeToo. And I’m arguing here that 
these two moments are not unrelated, that there are 
connections with the media visibility of #MeToo and 
the visibility of what I’m thinking of as a different 
inflection of #MeToo. In my mind, it’s always said 
as a whine or a snark, maybe even mocking, maybe 
cruelly, in either Trump’s or Brett Kavanaugh’s voice, 
like a child who isn’t getting enough attention rather 
than a mode of solidarity: “What about MeToo?” 
Despite the fact that misogyny has long existed as 
a norm and policy, in culture, economics, and the 
political realm, in the current moment there is an 
overt claim that masculinity and, more generally, 
patriarchy are under threat.
Popular misogyny is often expressed as a need to 
take something back, such as patriarchy, from the 
greedy hands of feminists and women.
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of the extreme right and right-wing 
populism across the globe. And while 
the racist ideologies of the extreme 
right have been correctly identified as 
white nationalism, and a lot of people 
talked about and have been talking 
about this at this conference, the 
extreme right has also always run on 
an overtly misogynistic agenda.
As reporter Matthew Lyons points out, 
harassing and defaming women isn’t 
just a tactic; it also serves the alt-
right’s broader agenda and long-term 
vision for society. A key logic
of right populism is recuperation. 
Men’s rights organizations in digital 
culture and . . . I don’t know if we 
can still say “in real life” ’cause 
that doesn’t really make any sense 
anymore, but not digital culture. The 
men’s rights organizations are filled 
with proclamations about how women 
and feminists have not only destroyed 
society, but perhaps even more 
importantly, have emasculated it.
So I’m thinking about how and 
in what ways—this is my book—
the rise of popular feminism has 
encouraged both a response and an 
intensification of popular misogyny. 
So I want to argue that you can’t 
think about popular feminism without 
also thinking about, it’s always the 
response that always comes through 
misogyny. And I think that there are 
some themes here that are picked up 
that characterize popular feminism, 
things like shame, confidence, 
competence, and rage, that are also 
taken up by popular misogyny.
So the meaning of them is distorted in 
that taking up and deflects attention 
away from women and towards men 
and then is targeted actively against 
women.
So in some ways we can think about 
popular feminism and popular 
misogyny as competing movements 
or competing populisms, but in other 
ways I want to suggest that they are 
always engaged in an antagonistic relationship with each other 
that depends on its core constitutive. Each of these themes that I 
see—and these are just a few of them that I see—that are engaged 
in this relationship between feminism and misogyny are also 
dependent on a logic that revolves around the twinned discourses 
of injury and capacity. By this I mean that both popular feminism 
and popular misogyny tap into a neoliberal notion of individual 
capacity for work, for confidence, for economic success, but that 
also they both position injury-the capacity that overcomes-- as 
something that is core to its politics. So for women it’s injury of 
sexism. For men, it’s the injury of feminism and also the injury of 
multiculturalism, the other. And these are seen as key obstacles 
for realizing this capacity.
So expressions of popular misogyny often rely on the idea that 
men have been injured by women. Men are seen to be denied 
rights because women have gained them. Men are no longer 
confident because women are more confident. Men have lost 
jobs and power because women have entered into previously 
male-dominated realms regardless of how slowly. Men’s rights 
organizations and other forms of popular misogyny dedicate 
themselves to restoring the capacity of men, the restoration and 
recuperation of a traditional heteronormative masculinity and 
of patriarchy itself. This often is seen as a backlash to popular 
feminism. And surely it is a kind of backlash. It does lash back at 
feminism. But I also think it’s more than that, because backlash 
implies a linear direction. Something that goes in one direction. I 
think popular networked misogyny lashes in all directions, finding 
expression in obvious and in not so obvious ways.
So here victimhood is appropriated not by those who have 
historically suffered, but by those
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rerouted in this relationship, and it works to retrench 
patriarchal gender relations rather than challenge 
them. Victimhood, within this relationship, within 
this dynamic, becomes disarticulated from those 
who suffer and is reallocated to the privileged, 
establishing a symbolic redistribution which then 
appropriates the moral meaning of victimhood 
or vulnerability itself. So these interconnected 
narratives of injury frame this talk, and I’m going 
to come back to them in the second part. But first 
I want to offer us some definitions about some of 
the concepts that I’m using here and what I mean 
specifically by popular feminism and popular 
misogyny.
It’s pretty clear that in North America and Western 
Europe, we are living in a moment in which 
feminism has become sort of incredibly popular. It 
feels like everywhere you turn there’s an expression 
of feminism. It’s on a T-shirt, it’s on the coffee mugs 
that I drink coffee out of every morning, that say 
things like “superwoman” or “I drink male tears”
or something. (Just kidding, I don’t have that one. 
But it actually does exist.) They’re in movies, they’re 
in anthems, in inspirational Instagram posts, in 
awards, acceptance speeches, and lapel pins that 
you wear. Feminism, for me, is popular in at least 
three senses. I know there are many different 
definitions of the popular. For me, these three 
characterize both popular feminism and popular 
misogyny.
One is that feminism manifests in discourses 
and practices that are circulated in popular and 
commercial media with digital spaces like blogs, 
Instagram, and Twitter, as well as broadcast media. 
Two, the “popular” of popular feminism signifies the 
condition of being liked or admired by like-minded 
people and groups. So the popular of popular 
feminism is also about popularity, which means 
that some feminisms are pushed to the shadows 
whereas others are made luminous.
And three, for me, the popular is as cultural theorist 
Stuart Hall said famously long ago, a terrain
of struggle, a space where competing demands
for power battle it out. So this means that there are 
many different feminisms that circulate in popular 
culture in the current moment. And some of them, 
again, become more visible than others.
Popular feminism is networked across all media 
platforms, some connecting with synergy, others 
struggling for priority and visibility. Popular 
feminism has, in many ways, allowed us to imagine 
a culture where feminism and its every form 
doesn’t have to be defended. It’s accessible, it’s 
even admiring. In many ways, this is an incredibly 
bolstering moment for me and is exhilarating 
in many ways. Despite that, despite that all this 
feminism everywhere is bolstering, it’s also given 
me pause to think about the social and economic 
conditions that define and describe popular 
feminism, because as I will argue, those social and 
economic conditions limit what feminism can be.
I think it’s important to critically analyze popular 
feminism. And I guide my analysis with some 
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feminist? What are the goals of popular feminism?” 
And again, there are different versions of feminism, 
but here I’m going to be talking about these 
sets of conditions including the media and the 
entertainment industries that comprise a highly 
visible form of popular feminism. So, in part, what 
I mean is that popular feminism refers to practices 
and conditions that are accessible to a broad 
public. From organizing marches to #activism
to commodities, it’s popular, in part, because of 
the media forums on which it circulates. Feminist 
messages of gender and equality, body positivity, 
equal pay for equal work, the normalization of 
sexual harassment, self-confidence, these circulate 
and achieve visibility on multiple media platforms 
and industries.
And here these are just a very few samplings
of some of the different forms of popular feminism 
websites. Emma Watson who has a UN campaign 
called HeForShe, Taylor Swift, again, with her 
ambivalence—I had to add her back on because 
apparently she’s a feminist again, jewelry websites, 
how to build your online feminist hustle. I should 
read that every night just to make sure I know 
how to build my hustle! The Women’s March, 
the corporate campaigns, and so on. And the 
architecture of many of these popular media 
platforms is, of course, capitalist and corporate. 
That means that the social and economic 
conditions for popular feminism are, in part, about 
those technologies and about their underpinning 
logics. So while I’m not collapsing media platforms 
with entertainment industries, I am suggesting that 
they have a shared supporting logic.
So, for example, as we have seen historically, these 
are specific messages of feminism that are often 
incorporated into advertising and marketing, and 
contemporary popular feminism is no different, 
with campaigns from Dove, to Chevy, to Verizon, 
which churn out these emotional ad campaigns 
that then harness feminism as a selling point, as a 
way to sell products. There’s a whole industry and 
the “love your body” discourse, especially online 
and in beauty apps, which implore women to be 
confident and to love themselves, and most of all to 
be entrepreneurial and self-optimizing.
I will say that part of the research in this book, i was 
trying to figure out as a user, how do you access all 
this popular feminism? 
So this website, feminist hustle offered a course 
and sells feminists self-love, which I took for $100 
and I have a certificate. So anytime I feel shitty, I 
just bring out my wallet with my certificate and just 
show it to people because that works.
So there’s all sorts of different ways that popular 
feminism is expressed. There are hundreds of 
organizations, the corporate and nonprofit, that 
are dedicated to teaching girls and women to code 
and to enter the technology industries. Learning to 
code has become a hot new industry in itself. Social 
media, as we all know, has exploded with feminist 
campaigns from YesAllWomen, to NotOkay,
to of course #MeToo. Blogs and websites such 
as Black Girl, Dangerous, Feministing, Feminist 
Current, Crunk Feminist Collective, Jezebel, all 
filled with passionate defenses and celebrations of 
feminism and exhortations towards feminist and 
anti-racist activism. And we also have—certainly 
not least for this particular era of consumerism that 
we’re in a sartorial feminist ideology at sea, and 
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This empowers women.
Crop top is available at H&M, if you want it. 
Designer, Christian Dior in the 2017, 2018 runway 
fashion show at Fashion Week created a $710 
T-shirt that proclaimed we should all be feminists, 
especially those who can afford a $710 T-shirt. 
There are other ones that are more modestly priced 
like the Prabal Gurung $195 T-shirt that says, “This 
is what a feminist looks like.” So again, all this 
feminism has been bolstering in many ways, but 
it’s also given me pause to think about not only 
the social and economic conditions that define 
and describe it, but also about the relationship 
between popular feminism and popular misogyny. 
So for me, it’s made sense to think of these varied 
manifestations of popular feminism
and the relationship with popular misogyny within
a framework of visibility.
And it’s within this framework that I think that 
feminism becomes particularly tangible. So this is 
sort of a basic dictionary definition of visibility.
The state of being able to see or be seen, the 
degree to which something has attracted general 
attention or prominence, right? Visibility is 
important for any kind of political vision to be 
seen. But I also think that we need to think about 
the mechanisms of visibility. How is a vision of 
feminism seen? Through what channels? And what 
I see with much of popular feminism is that the 
media economy, where it circulates as the most 
central, often ends up shaping and constraining 
the vision of feminist politics. That means that we 
need to think about what kind of attention we pay 
to popular feminism, what version is seen, what 
version becomes prominent. So while the rising 
visibility of a safely affirmative feminism is again
in many ways a real progress, it also often eclipses 
a feminist critique of structure.
The mainstreaming of feminism often constricts 
its circulation as if seeing or purchasing feminism 
and contributing to its visibility is the same thing 
as changing patriarchal structures. So I’m thinking 
of these logics as a set of social and economic 
conditions for popular feminism, but I also think, 
in particular, in light of this conference that the 
implication of this logic is important to think about 
social movements and populism in general. These 
conditions have been called platform capitalism, 
they’ve been called other kinds of things, which 
implies the emptying and flattening out of the 
content on meaning, emphasizing instead the 
endless traffic and circulation of this content. 
And we talked a little bit about this already this 
morning.
Media and entertainment platforms are 
conditioning the contents, so business models 
often end up conditioning the kinds of expressions 
that we see. As we know, there’s a contemporary 
obsession with metrics and numbers, likes 
and followers, and given the predominance of 
digital media platforms that are predicated on 
the accumulation of these numbers, where their 
business depends on them, then to make oneself 
visible or to express oneself as visible is also 
dependent on an accumulation of numbers. This 
is what José van Dijck has called the popularity 
principle, where despite differences among media 
platforms, they’re invested, as he says, “on the 
same values or principles, popularity, hierarchical 
ranking, quick growth, large traffic volumes, fast 
turnovers and personalized recommendations.”
For me, these conditions comprise what I call
an economy of visibility. An economy which 
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of feminism. Feminists, media scholars, critical 
race scholars, media scholars, in general, cultural 
studies folks, communication scholars have long 
been invested in studying the politics of visibility. 
And for me the politics of visibility usually describes 
the process of making visible a political category 
such as gender, or race, or class that is and has 
been historically marginalized in the media, in the 
law, and policy and so on. This process involves 
what is simultaneously a category, visibility, and
a qualifier, politics, that then together can hopefully 
articulate a political identity.
Here, the goal is that the coupling of the qualifier 
and visibility can be productive of something, such 
as social change or social justice, that exceeds the 
visibility itself, and so that that is where the vision of 
politics is. Politics then becomes a descriptor of the 
practices of visibility. This is often the core logic, 
whether or not it’s practiced, of many populisms, 
right? That visibility can amplify the politics, 
visibility is the root to the politics. So the politics of 
visibility have long been important and continue to 
be for the marginalized. To demand visibility is to 
demand to be seen, to matter, to count, to recognize 
oneself in dominant culture and insistence of 
marginalized and disenfranchised communities, 
women, racial minorities, non-heteronormative 
communities, refugees, immigrants, the working 
classthe insistence on being seen has been crucial 
to an understanding and an expansion of rights for 
these communities.
Now, of course not all politics of visibility, as we 
know, painfully and tragically, result in social 
change. But the point here is that visibility
is understood as leading to something, right?
As part of a political struggle, as a route to a 
vision. In the current media environment, however, 
while the politics of visibility are still important 
and they are still politically efficacious, I think that 
economies of visibility increasingly structure, not 
just our mediascapes, but also our cultural and 
economic practices in our daily lives.
In the contemporary media and digital moment, 
media outlets and systems can easily absorb 
the visualization of basically any experience. So 
economies of visibility fundamentally shift politics 
of visibility so that visibility becomes the end rather 
than a means to an end. Getting seen can become 
all there is. In this way, some political visions have 
transformed their very logics from the inside out,
so that the visibility of these visions is what matters 
rather than the structural ground on and through 
which they are constructed.
So, for example, wearing a T-shirt that says “this is 
what a feminist looks like” transmutes the potential 
logic of what it means to be a feminist, as a 
political subjectivity invested in challenging gender 
inequities into what a feminist looks like. Her visual 
or his visual representation. Visibility
is best structured to stop functioning as a qualifier 
to politics. The T-shirt is the politics. The politics 
are contained within the visibility, so visual 
representation becomes the beginning and the end 
of political action. I should say as a caveat, I’m not 
arguing that we shouldn’t all be wearing this T-shirt, 
right? I have this T-shirt. You can well imagine I have 
lots of feminist T-shirts. It’s not that the wearing 
of the T-shirt is what I’m struggling with. It’s that 
wearing the T-shirt becomes the end in itself, but it 
doesn’t then carry on to thinking about how
to critique and challenge structure. And Herman 
Gray has talked about this in a beautiful way, where 
he argues that the identification and announcement 
of one’s visibility is both the radical move and the 
end in itself. 
Economies of visibility then do not describe 
a political process, but rather assume that 
visibility itself has been absorbed into politics. 
The absorption is the political. And the available 






Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
current moment are usually those that are dominant 
centers of power. Media companies, corporations, 
the technology industries. In this sense, visibility 
often becomes synonymous with trending, whether 
in the mainstream news media or on social media. 
And to trend is a different process of visibility 
than to agitate to be seen in order to be granted 
basic rights. Trending is about recognition and 
about making oneself available for normalization. 
As [Herman] Gray has argued, the visibility that 
fuels trending is a demand to be recognized in an 
attention economy. Indeed, the fact that Merriam- 
Webster chose “feminism” in 2016 as the word of 
the year is great in many ways. But how Merriam-
Webster makes that choice—does anyone know?
It’s number of clicks. Number of clicks on the word, 
right? So it doesn’t necessarily imply a support 
of feminism. I mean, it looks at different ways in 
which it is expressed, but plenty of people are using 
feminism, and the word feminism, and the concept 
of feminism, in ways that actually benefit misogyny 
rather than feminism itself. So it’s this kind
of visibility that I’m asking us to be cautious of.
Okay, popular misogyny. Within this context
of visibility, it’s also clear that feminism isn’t the 
only popular phenomenon that we need to contend 
with in the current moment. Every time
I began to investigate a popular feminist practice 
or expression, there was always an accompanying 
hostile rejoinder or challenge, regardless of the 
mediated space in which it occurred, whether that 
was social media, the legal realm, or corporate 
culture. For every Tumblr page that is dedicated to 
female body positivity, there were fat shaming and 
body shaming comments. For every confidence 
organization for girls, there was yet another men’s 
rights organization claiming that men are the real 
victims.
Misogyny is popular in the contemporary moment 
for the same reason feminism has become popular: 
It is expressed and practiced on multiple media 
platforms, it attracts other like-minded groups and 
individuals, and it manifests in a terrain of struggle 
with competing demands for power.
So for me, popular misogyny, in some ways, follows 
a conventional definition of misogyny, a hatred of 
women. But I also want to make a more nuanced 
case here that it is the instrumentalization of 
women as objects, where women are a means to 
an end, a systematic devaluing and dehumanizing 
of women that takes place in a network and on a 
network. It should go without saying that I’m not 
equating masculinity with misogyny. Not all men 
are misogynists, and misogyny isn’t just about men. 
Many women also practice misogyny.
To give you a little sense of what’s up here, this is 
a campaign that was created by an Indian online 
magazine in response to a UN women’s campaign. 
This is, of course, Jordan Peterson. It’s a little hard 
to see these. This is Elliot Rodger. This is Anita 
Sarkeesian, who is a feminist commentator who 
has a series on YouTube. She was part of this 
intense misogynistic effort called Gamergate. She 
had a show about female representation and video 
games, and gamers responded with death threats 
and rape threats. She had to cancel a presentation 
because they called in a terrorist threat. And then 
someone just made up a game that’s called Beat 
Up Anita Sarkeesian. All you have to do is press the 
space button and her face just gets more bloody.
This is the Red Pill, which is a misogynist section on 
Reddit. Because I’m British now, I had to put
in something about Love Island, right? Alex 
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in just a minute. So those are just a few examples
of the ways in which misogyny, like popular 
feminism, is networked, an interconnection of 
nodes and all forms of media and everyday 
practice. It’s also mobilized as a populous 
movement. So in the contemporary digital 
moment in this economy of visibility, misogyny 
itself is constantly moving from one node to 
another, emerging in different spaces with varied 
manifestations.
To confront popular misogyny means to confront 
the notion that patriarchy itself needs to be 
assessed differently than it ever has been before.
It is not just a discrete group of organizations,
or roles, or spaces, or practices, but it is a 
networked populism with interconnecting nodes. 
It finds expression and nodes ranging from social 
media to global meetups, to fashion, to neo-
masculine boot camps. Through this dynamics, 
misogyny is reimagined, takes on new forms, and 
has a variety of effects. And this is, of course, 
we all know, how networks work. They allow for 
different spaces of expressions simultaneously, 
and they function through rapid and asynchronous 
communication. As Manuel Castells has described, 
they decentralize power even as they remain loyal 
to hegemonic institutions.
We see this network at work in many different 
ways, some more visible than others. We see it in 
the election of an unapologetic misogynist as the 
president of the United States, and federal policy 
deliberations on health care and different countries 
that include only male representatives, and the 
continued disparity in wages between women and 
men in all industries across different countries, not 
to mention wage disparities between white people 
and people of color. We see it in the election of 
Bolsonaro in Brazil. We see it in the attack
on gender ideology in Hungary. We see it in the 
Brexit decision in the UK.
The digital context for a contemporary economy 
of visibility not only provides the context for 
popular feminism, in other words, but it’s also one 
that enables and validates what Jack Bratich has 
called affective divergence—cultures of judgment, 
aggression and violence. As Bratich argues, “We’re 
in the midst of a media-fueled popularization of 
bullies, a convergence of micro-violence perhaps 
comprising a cultural will to humiliation.” And 
in this way popular misogyny opens up spaces 
and opportunities for a more systematic attack 
on women and women’s rights. It is the context 
of a popularization of bullies, a convergence of 
micro-violence, that coalesces in this kind of 
neutralization of antagonism. And this cultural will 
to humiliation is what makes contemporary popular 
misogyny a shifted set of discourses and practices 
from previous historical moments.
Popular misogyny is a constellation of
a popularization of bullies, present not only online, 
but offline as well. So that’s the wider context
for a networked popular misogyny. It operates as a 
way to consolidate a cultural will to humiliation that 
holds as a promise the restoration of male privilege, 
prerogative, and rightful ownership of economic, 
cultural, and political spaces. This will
to humiliation, in other words, it’s about the 
restoration of male confidence. So now I want to 
turn to just briefly talk a little bit about that theme as 
a way to dig deeper into this logic of both feminism 
and misogyny. I think it’s worth spending
a few moments thinking about what confidence 
even means in this context and acknowledge some 
of the different manifestations of it. This is again 
a dictionary definition. Confidence is the feeling or 
belief that one can have faith in or rely on someone 
or something or the telling of private matters or 
secrets. Taking someone into your confidence.
Within popular feminism, confidence, specifically 
self-confidence, is seen as an individual act. 
One that women just need to adopt by telling 
themselves—ourselves—“They are beautiful. They 
are smart enough to code. They’re worthwhile.” 
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And this is important. I mean, how can you argue 
with that? We should all tell ourselves that we are 
worthwhile, right? But it also refocuses the reasons 
for why women aren’t confident in the first place 
back to women themselves, rather than, I don’t 
know, patriarchy or a context that tells you that 
you shouldn’t be confident in the first place. And 
these are, again, different kind of expressions of 
confidence coming forward as one.
This is Kim Kardashian, the confidence issue, Smart 
Woman’s Guide to Self-Belief. I choose beautiful 
wearing . . . confidence wear like makeup. My 
argument here is that, not that these
are unimportant, but that they put it back on 
women themselves. I need to look in the mirror 
every day and say, “You are confident, Sarah. You 
are beautiful. You can do this. You are worthwhile.” 
And if I don’t feel that way, then it’s nobody’s fault 
by my own, right? And that’s the trick here, is that 
it is not about structure that would encourage me 
to feel differently in the first place. In that sense, I 
think that we need to think about another root of the 
word “confidence” and talk about
the confidence game and the con artist. Con artist 
in contrast to confidence is someone who is adept 
at manipulating the truth, manipulating certainty.
A confidence game is one where a person swindles 
or robs a person after gaining their confidence.
Confidence in this moment is positioned as
a commodity, and like all commodities, it receives 
its value from scarcity. Within popular feminism and 
popular misogyny, both men and women are seen 
to lack confidence. The lack of confidence that men 
(often white, cis-gendered, heterosexual men) feel 
in themselves is frequently blamed
on an “overconfidence” in women. As Sarah Ahmed 
has pointed out, this overconfidence is apparently 
enabled by popular feminism and then is in turn a 
confidence that is accessed primarily by white, cis-
gendered, heterosexual women. So confidence here 
is positioned as a zero sum game. If women have 
it, that ownership somehow comes at the expense 
of men, and the goal is to take it back from women, 
right? So it’s this kind of way in which you can see 
that confidence is something that can be taken 
away from men if women have it.
Has anyone seen this new ad, this Gillette ad?
Yeah.
The razor ad that is . . . yeah. So it’s getting a ton of 
attention. It’s an ad that calls out toxic masculinity. 
It basically says we should teach men and boys 
to be more decent, right? It also uses feminism. 
There’s a shot of #MeToo. There’s a shot of the 
Women’s March, and the backlash has been swift 
and vicious, with people boycotting the company, 
memes being created—the number of likes versus 
dislikes, if you want to go back to those metrics,
is really disproportionate. I mean, the huge 
discrepancy between those who actually like the ad 
and those who don’t. And one of the reasons why I 
think that it’s caused such an uproar is because of 
not this idea that you should be teaching your sons 
to be good humans if you’re a man, but rather the 
presence of feminism.
That what’s happening as feminism is taking 
something away and that something is confidence, 
male confidence, self-assurance, self-esteem.
And so you can see these are different kinds of blog 
posts and messages about the taking away of male 
confidence. Okay. So a few months ago, a man 
shot and killed two women, and injured three other 
women, a man at a yoga studio in Tallahassee, 
Florida, in the United States. According to the 
reports, the man identified as an incel, a member
in an online community of men united by their 
inability to convince women to have sex with them. 
Incel stands for involuntarily celibate. The shooter 
was also a self-proclaimed misogynist. He actually 
said he wanted something called misogynism
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to take over. A little late for that, I think.
Over the summer again, in the United States, there 
was yet another school mass shooting. And like 
so many other shootings in the United States, the 
student who shot and killed 10 people apparently 
did so because the girl he liked rejected him and 
embarrassed him in front of his classmates. In a 
news story, after that shooting, which was at Santa 
Fe High School, in Texas, the shooter’s father said 
to the news that his son was the real victim here 
because he was embarrassed by this girl who didn’t 
like him. A few weeks before that, in April, last April 
in Toronto, a man named Alek Minassian killed 10 
people and injured 16. Prior to doing so, he wrote 
on Facebook, “The incel rebellion has already 
begun.” Minassian went on his rampage, apparently 
because he identified as an incel.
Minassian as well as many others have held 
up Elliot Rodger as an example, who killed six 
people and wounded 14 others in Santa Barbara, 
California, in 2014. Rodger justified his actions in 







he said they were a retaliation against women as 
a group for refusing to provide him with the sex 
he felt he was owed. There’ve been at least five 
mass killings in the last two years that have been 
explicitly claimed by incels. So while we can’t 
conflate incels with someone like Brett Kavanaugh, 
they are both enabled by a sense of the loss of 
white heterosexual male confidence that similarly 
revolves around women and what women are 
apparently taking away from men.
If anyone saw the Supreme Court hearings, Brett 
Kavanaugh was a Supreme Court nominee, has 
since been confirmed and was accused by Christine 
Blasey Ford of sexually assaulting her in high 
school. And during those hearings, Kavanaugh 
cried. He screamed. He claimed the mantle of a 
victim. Senator Lindsey Graham during that same 
hearing too had an outburst as well and said that 
Christine Blasey Ford was ruining Kavanaugh’s life. 
Brett Kavanaugh, who then later was confirmed as 
a Supreme Court justice. The sexual rejection by 
women, the #MeToo movement, the disruption of 
jobs and status by global economic recession and a 
subsequent loss of employment for many men are 
seen as injuries to men and they are, right? But they 
are caused most often by women as well as others 
like people of color, immigrants, refugees, and so 
on.
So to come back to the point with which I began 
this talk, white male victimhood is rerouted and 
appropriated from those who have historically 
suffered to those in positions of patriarchal power. 
Those who often have inflicted the suffering in 
the first place. Here we can see empowerment 
as a discursive response to victimhood. The 
empowering discourse of popular feminism is both 
symbolically and concretely redistributed, and the 
moral meaning of vulnerability and victimhood itself 
is appropriated. This redistribution takes place in 
part within an economy of visibility where what 
is invisible is often more important than what is 
visible.
And this is how the mirroring of popular feminism 
and popular misogyny works. But it is a fun house 
mirror when that distorts and transmutes the tropes 
of injury and capacity. So for popular feminism, 
these twinned discourses of injury capacity that 
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form its core logic. I’m arguing here 
that the injury itself is structural. It 
is centuries of patriarchy, of sexism, 
of racism, of gendered violence 
and control and discipline. But the 
capacity to overcome that structural 
injury is individual. Just be confident, 
work on your power poses, come 
forward, right? Tell yourself you can 
do it. So the capacity to overcome 
structural injury is individual. In this 
fun house mirror dynamic and for 
popular misogyny, the injury itself is 
individual. There is no structural injury 
that cuts across for white men in the 
way that sexism does. The structure 
is patriarchy and white supremacy.
It’s privileging a particular 
demographic. So the injury
is individual. It is Kevin Spacey,
an individual who was accused.
It is Louis C K, it is Harvey Weinstein, 
right? It is Brett Kavanaugh. The injury 
is individual, but the capacity—and 
that’s why I think this is dangerous, 
and this is where populism comes 
in. The capacity to overcome those 
individual industry injuries
by individual men is structural. There 
are presidents, and heads of state, 
and the Supreme Court, there is what 
I’ve called the comeback economy 
where you just wait after sexually 
harassing someone for a small time 
for people to forget in this economy 
of visibility and then you have
a comeback. We see this in manifest 
in extreme movements around the 
world. So the economy of visibility 
and the affordances of technology 
contribute to a misogyny that is both 
networked and popular.
And a focus on these particular facets 
as the problem of misogyny blinds 
us, I think a bit, to the larger problem 
of misogyny itself. When we seek to 
understand popular misogyny and see 
it as a manifestation of digital culture, 
as online comments, as haters 
going to hate—we can then just write it off as merely a negative 
effect of technology. Instead, I want to argue that we need to 
see it for what it is, a manifestation of a crisis in neoliberalism, 
a consolidation of its failed logic to fulfill its promises. 
Neoliberalism and popular misogyny are deeply interconnected 
despite a general mediated discourse that positions popular 
misogyny as an outlier, a deviation from the culturally acceptable 
norms of traditional masculinity. The crisis of neoliberalism, 
however, produces not only via ideology, but also produces 
violence. And it is a structuring force that is both popular and 
networked. It also produces a populism that finds coherence 
and a shared sense of victimhood. The goal of this populism, I 
think, is recuperation and restoration of dominant masculinity, of 
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Today’s populism is an entity born of late modernity. 
Proliferating in a way that the New York Times’ 
correspondent Roger Cohen calls an insult
to “the differences through which democracy 
thrives,” populism posits that “the liberal democratic 
rules-based consensus prevailing since...
the Cold War” doesn’t work. And it doesn’t work 
“for the simple reason that it has not delivered…
economically, socially or culturally.”
What this means is that today’s populism 
by definition (as much as we can define it)
is an entity responding to a plan gone wrong,
to unrealized rhetoric. This linkage between what 
is and is not readily manifest, what is known and 
experienced and what is imagined and unmarked 
lies at the core of why journalism in an era
of populism, and particularly authoritarian 
populism, needs to change.
I’ll make my argument by building three points
for discussion:
1 | Contemporary 
populism and its 
reliance on the media 
took shape in response 
to the Cold War
2 | Contemporary 
journalism remains 
steeped in the same 
Cold War mindset 
that populism was 
responding to
A few caveats on what I’m about to say: I am 
speaking only about US populism and its autocratic 
version, and only contemporary US populism
as it emerged in the post WWII era and is sustained 
today. That’s not to suggest that there might not 
be parallels with journalisms elsewhere or at other 
times, only that I can’t vouch for them. 
INTRODUCTION HOW CONTEMPORARY 
POPULISM CAME TO BE
I’ll start with a well-known quote from the American 
critic Christopher Lasch, who maintained in the 
early 1990s that populism is “the authentic voice
of democracy.”
At the time, Lasch’s sentiments about the distrust 
in democracy’s institutions, elites and traditions 
challenged a longstanding liberal disregard
for populism as a nostalgic, backward yearning 
for a simpler life. A remnant of 1950s and 60s 
modernization theory which developed on the back 
of Cold War sentiments, thinkers like Hofstadter, 
Lipset and Bell had given populism little attention 
because it upset the clean dichotomy between 
capitalism and communism that fueled Cold War 
ideology.
But as the Cold War faded, populism invited more 
nuanced discussion that continues today, one 
that links it to backsliding in democratic regimes. 
Urbinati, for instance, writes that “populism takes 
advantage of government by opinion and makes
it the expression of an opinion that belongs only
to one public,” while Muller speaks about 
democracy’s “shadows,” Bobbio of broken promises 
and Arditi of internal peripheries. All wrestle with 
what that connection between populism
and democracy means. 
3 | Journalism thus 
ends up a priori 
unresponsive, if not 
oblivious, to populist 
convention, even when 
it has an authoritarian 
bent. Journalism 
thereby legitimates 
populist skepticism and 
critique through its very 
activity of newsmaking. 
Specifically, journalism’s 
Cold War mindset has 
made the autocratic 
dimensions of 
populism difficult, if not 
impossible, for the US 
media to act upon.
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Few scholars, however, have gotten far
in elucidating what contemporary populism is, other 
than to say that it has no consensual essence.
As Roger Cohen continued to argue, “in nearly every 
case, there is a better, more precise way to describe 
a current political phenomenon than the word 
“populist.”
This, of course, is what Cas Mudde calls a “thin 
ideology,” one that borrows from thicker ideologies 
to make sense. So I’d like to tackle the oblique 
character of the tie between populism
and democracy by addressing how contemporary 
populism and authoritarianism evolved together, 
and what that did to one of democracy’s stalwart 
supports—journalism.
Here I’m drawing largely from Federico Finchelstein, 
who argues that democracy and contemporary 
populism became linked when fascism turned 
untenable after WWII. As fascism came
to be regarded as antithetical to post-war recovery, 
populism absorbed many of its features. What 
ensued was an authoritarian form of democracy, 
which depended on a charismatic leader, anti-
pluralist view of popular representation, anti-elitism 
and institutionalism, and an apocalyptic view of the 
future. This positioned populism as a counter point 
to the Enlightenment and to liberalism
and as an underside to Cold War thinking.
The odd blend that resulted is what we call today 
illiberal democracy, autocratic democracy or soft 
authoritarianism (though some differences remain), 
and it transformed the failed state of prefascist 
populist movements into the real thing. According 
to Finchelstein: “Before fascism, populism had 
been an authoritarian political style for opposition 
movements. After fascism, the political field
was clear and populism became complete, a fully 
fledged authoritarian political paradigm—namely, an 
influential way of dominating the state
in the absence of fascist powers.”
This makes the Cold War a formative backdrop 
against which contemporary authoritarian populism 
has flourished, seeking a middle ground between 
the Cold War’s offering of liberal-democratic forms 
of capitalism, on the one hand, and Soviet style 
communism, on the other. What Finchelstein 
labeled a desire to “escape the newly established 
bipolar world” is what made populism soar from 
the Cold War era till today. It is also what made it so 
amorphous and internally contradictory,
an ideological pendulum that incessantly swings 
between left and right, letting it then create
a middle space between democratic capitalism 
and communism and more recently what helps it to 
thrive amidst the inconsistencies of neoliberalism. 
Contemporary populism pulls together aspects 
of both representative democracy (electoral 
convention, the rule of law, checks and balances) 
and autocratic rule (unity before pluralism
or diversity, denunciation of elites and institutions,
an unmediated link with the public). In between—
and this is key-- lots of traits tend to work
for both sides: a charismatic leader, an appeal 
to ‘the people,” an emphasis on celebrity culture, 
slogans and sensation, tensions with independent 
media, a folkloric political style, popular political 
engagement, strong degrees of nationalism.
This formation now prevails in many places as an 
authoritarian answer to the limitations of formal 
democracy, taking the form of what Mudde calls 
“an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic 
liberalism.” In this light emerged two of the most 
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and Occupy. Neither evolved into a regime but both 
laid the ground for Trump’s ascent.
This evolution is centrally important for the news. 
Not only is populism conscious of and systematic 
about its corruption of the institutional foundations 
of democracy, but its core introduction of autocratic 
mechanisms into democratic settings impacts 
all proximate institutions, including journalism. 
And this is despite, or perhaps because of, these 
institutions’ inability to shed themselves
of a mindset ill-equipped to recognize, much less 
contest, what is happening.
Journalism is relevant here because populism, 
authoritarian or not, simultaneously despises 
and feeds on the media. On one hand, populism 
has contempt for any intermediate institutions 
separating leaders from “the people.” In Muller’s 
words, populists “always want to cut out
the middleman…, to be done with journalists,”
and they aim to both delegitimate independent 
media through punitive measures and transform 
state media into governmental mouthpieces.
This means that making the media into an enemy
of the people is not a shocking happenstance,
as most US journalists have told it in the age
of Trump, but one of the most predictable 
outcomes of a populist regime.
On the other hand, populism needs the media. 
Gianpietro Mazzoleni and his colleagues speak
of “mediated populism,” where populist sentiment 
must build on media dynamics to survive, while 
Ruth Wodak talks of “performance strategies” made 
possible by modern media democracies. We know 
that populism projects uniformity
that is widely disseminated by the media, that there 
is often marked investment in sensationalism
and emotions, that populist leaders tend
to be skilled media manipulators who drive 
messages of fear, anger, resentment
and frustration. By often unmindfully feeding 
populism the nutrients it needs to grow—allowing 
its distorted, exaggerated or false information 
to propel a reactive news cycle, accommodating 
its moralizing sentiments, providing a stage for 
its rhetoric, parroting the simplicity of its logic —
journalism is thus complicit with populism’s rise, 
even when it sees it as problematic. What Thomas 
Frank in 2017 described as “a parade of the aghast,” 
where “all the skills of the journalist are reduced
to a performance of perturbation and disgust” 
doesn’t do much to combat populism or explain 
how it works. Instead, the media get coopted into 
the cycle, where just about everything they
do further entrenches populism’s hold.
Because our knowledge of populism and the 
media remains uneven, we haven’t laid as much 
responsibility on the media as is perhaps deserved. 
Most academic discussions tend to argue either 
that pronouncedly partisan media (from left 
and right) knowingly advance populism or that 
tabloid media unknowingly foster its entrenchment 
via their favored forms of relay. Meanwhile,
the elite, mainstream or legacy media are thought 
less impacted by populist sentiment because their 
striving for fair and unbiased reporting makes them, 
in Mazzolenni et al’s words, “less ready to echo 
populist claims.” This means that the platforms, 
entities and organizations closest to the core
of democratic aspiration which supposedly provide 
resistance to authoritarian creep are left outside
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That neglect is a problem. Not only does it inject
a greater presumption of binaries than
is actually the case, missing the ongoing
and often unrecognizable blending of democratic 
and autocratic, old and new, punitive
and celebratory, legacy and digital, but it enables 
the notion that populism is somehow stifled by the 
occupational orientation among elite or mainstream 
journalists, buoying the assumption that legacy 
journalistic response can right the wrongs inflicted 
by populism. This helps explain why current 
authoritarian populism is not well understood by 
most US journalists, who continue to act as if pure 
forms of government, media and publics are the 
main given in their political surround.
But what if the same play to binaries and the 
same occupational mindset among legacy, elite 
and mainstream journalists is exacerbating the 
problem?
This possibility deserves more attention. For it’s 
these journalists who continue to set the tone 
about US populism, even though they are not doing 
enough to notice, explain or contest its emergence.
HOW JOURNALISM BECAME ENTRENCHED IN A 
COLD WAR MINDSET
There are many interconnected reasons
for journalism’s failure to understand current 
authoritarian populism, but I want to focus
on one: a Cold War mindset that was set in place
in the early years of the war—1947-1952—and under 
which US journalists continue to operate today.
I’d like to take a step back and talk a bit about how 
this Cold War mindset-- which I’m writing a book 
about-- took hold and why it persists.
When the Cold War was said to have ended in 1989, 
the mindset driving American institutions for almost 
five decades did not disappear. Instead, it went 
underground, continuing to ensure that Americans 
viewed otherwise incomprehensible events
and issues through an ideological frame left over 
from the Cold War.
Cold War mindedness was born in a perfect 
storm. Politically the US had left WWII not only 
relatively unscathed but filled with an American 
exceptionalism that aggressively pushed
its version of democracy everywhere. Corporatism 
and consumer capitalism met fast-paced 
technological change, and the rise of TV and local 
radio, driven by a focus on advertising, privileged
a singular voice and complicated the ability 
to speak independently. Socially, conformity, 
homogeneity and restraint prevailed—in family life, 
gender roles, popular culture, government structure, 
and acquiescent and hostile politics.
Against this backdrop, a culture developed across 
most US institutions that was elitist, symbioti
and myopic. This culture was associated with 
militarism, secrecy, image management
and fear as a mode of control, and it gave different 
institutions different ways of falling in line behind 
what quickly became a uniform narrative
for an American population fielding large degrees
of uncertainty.
For journalists, becoming Cold War navigators 
involved developing practices of care -- conventions 
that could facilitate simultaneous support
of Cold War objectives while upholding or minimally 
disrupting occupational identity and professional 
aspiration. This untenable relationship between 
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practicing craft independently versus living
in a Cold War reality—meant that already
in 1948 when the trade journal Editor and Publisher 
observed that “American newspapermen
are Americans first, newspapermen second,”
there weren’t many who disagreed.
The news thus rode on compliance, deception, 
stereotypy, black-and-white thinking, polarization, 
demonization, deindividualization, guilt projection, 
distrust and simplification, all used to manage
the image of the US and serve as a breeding ground 
for Cold War thinking. News relays became briefer, 
simpler, less nuanced, more conflict oriented
and more formulaic, as deep background, historical 
context, varieties of communism or democracy 
and national histories all disappeared or receded 
from the record. Sourcing practices collapsed the 
distance with officials, making journalists eager 
spokespeople for those in power. Tactics that 
allowed reporters to fade into the crowd were the 
rule: deference and moderation (and the false 
equivalences they fostered), euphemism
and understatement, qualified observations of what 
they saw. Most of all, an allegiance to news from 
nowhere: the idea that journalists could
and should fall in line behind impartiality
and balance, objectivity and neutrality. Journalistic 
perspectives on the world thus became thin 
and predictable, exacerbated at times by loyalty 
oaths, special favors in exchange for sympathetic 
coverage, subtle censorship and red line edits
on news copy.
Dichotomous thinking was central here, where it 
helped shape the patterns of enemy formation 
key to the ideological conflict: an Us versus Them 
that Kenneth Boulding called “the last stronghold 
of unsophistication.” Constructing an enemy 
meant looking with disdain at the other side. 
Enemy formation required clarity and simplicity to 
be understood, anxiety to invite clear perceptions 
of threat and a sense of imminence to foster 
aggressive behavior.
Dichotomies offered a way to put whole 
populations, regimes, policies and objectives
in oppositional categories to each other.
This helped reduce complex and often 
indecipherable realities into a manageable either/
or polarity separating friend and foe. We know that 
Cold War enmity built on longstanding tensions 
between the two emerging superpowers--Russia 
and America—but the mirror image of the two 
and the impassable divide between them became 
a model for contemplating difference. Such 
dichotomies were spun via affective convention 
that left little room for alternative interpretation. 
Although Tocqueville had been among the first
to predict hostility between the East and West
and foresaw already in the late 1800s a race 
between democracy and authoritarianism,
the enmity he predicted made even better sense 
during the Cold War. In Ulrich Beck’s view,
it turned “established values upside down” with “the 
otherwise forbidden” newly encouraged.  Intolerable 
behavior suddenly became okay, as enmity turned 
into an incubator for all sorts of projections 
common to populist formations: among them, 
ethnic prejudice, political intolerance, religious 
fundamentalism.
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ICON
This clear separation between good and bad 
produced a detailed repository of dichotomous 
values: good/evil, right/wrong, moral/immoral,
and over time more specific differences: 
progressive/backward, democratic/communist, 
incorrupt/corrupt, free/oppressed, peaceloving/
aggressive, moderate/extreme. Both groups were 
portrayed in simplistic, uniform and internally 
consistent ways: Each saw the other
as an untrustworthy aggressor, the other’s 
government as exploitative, the other’s public as
ill served.
By the same token, sameness and conformity 
became a code of honor, with consensus politics 
and culture deemed necessary to uphold what “us” 
meant. Dissident, alien and non-uniform elements 
in American life were systematically excluded from 
public view, and neutrality disappeared, as did all 
the blended or hybrid forms that went with it. Those 
who dared to question were penalized, jobs lost, 
lives ruined.
Yet most journalists hopped on board, convinced
in one view that “rooting for ‘our side’ [was]
a legitimate news practice” and recognizing that 
banding behind dichotomous thinking, deference 
and moderation, objectivity and impartiality was 
their saving grace. It wasn’t just a question
of helping the Cold War effort but, as we see here, 
of driving its dissemination. To seek the truth 
became wrapped up in defending national security.  
Without journalists’ complicity, there would have 
been no Cold War.
What resulted—what I call a deep memory of Cold 
War mindedness—prevailed as a way of easing 
occupational dissonance, offering journalists a way 
to predicate their professionalism on a heartfelt 
opposition to communism. Though this mindset
raised challenges for free-minded journalists, piggy-
backing on it assuaged their discomfort
at becoming Cold War navigators. They thus 
repaired to Cold War mindedness to make sense
of the times, doing so without confronting lingering 
ideological inconsistencies or noticing how the very 
tenets of liberal democracy were crumbling at their 
feet. 
WHY JOURNALISTS FAIL TO RECOGNIZE 
POPULISM
So what does journalism’s reliance on the Cold War 
mindset have to do with contemporary populism
in the US?
Enter Donald Trump.
There is little doubt that 
Trump replicates the profile 
of a charismatic populist 
leader so necessary 
to populist formations 
(remember that charismatic doesn’t mean you love 
the  leader, only that he or she draws you to them).  
What observers are still on the fence about is the 
degree to which the Trump regime is authoritarian. 
To be fair, this echoes much existing knowledge 
of authoritarianism, which tends to focus more 
on a priori authoritarian systems or authoritarian 
personalities, but less on the practices by which 
democracies turn autocratic.
Nonetheless, from the beginning Trump’s candidacy 
prompted analogies with Hitler and Mussolini.
The parallel, however, never really went further
than that. And it’s via this “treatment lite”
of authoritarianism – what the Guardian called 
“more metaphor than mood”-- that I believe
the mainstream media’s coverage of Trump
can most productively be evaluated.
I say this because everything about the Cold War 
mindset helps explain why US legacy journalists fail 
to address the authoritarian nature of contemporary 
US populism. It is no accident that the moment 
at which contemporary authoritarian populism 
began to rise coincides with the moment that US 
journalism, if not journalisms elsewhere, began
to stagnate.
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A few words first about US populist sentiment 
today. We know that authoritarian populist leaders 
use the same institutions that exist in democratic 
regimes for anti-democratic purposes—via what one 
legal scholar described as “cloak[ing] repressive 
measures under the mask of law, imbu[ing] them 
with the veneer of legitimacy, and render[ing] 
authoritarian practices more difficult to detect
and eliminate.” Such regimes rely on unseen 
devices—measures, effects and platforms
that ensure that autocratic populist rule slips 
undetected through the weakest links in otherwise 
supposedly democratic environments. Rarely 
visible and almost always subtle, then, authoritarian 
populist rule gets its way by forcing action
from the public eye—via acts of coercion, censure, 
exclusion, insult, manipulation, closure, repudiation, 
intimidation and disregard.
The authoritarian populism of the Trump regime 
is alarming, because, as is becoming increasingly 
clear, most Americans don’t even recognize it.
To borrow from a recent Vox summation
of the prevalent understanding of authoritarianism 
(in this case, in Malaysia), Americans tend to have
a far more brutish, less nuanced understanding
 of what authoritarian rule looks like. For most, it is 
both fantastical and cartoonish, replete with thugs 
and dictators, hardship, uber-controlled activity and 
the punitive murder or disappearance of opponents. 
Such an image is drawn from mythmaking
and a kind of imaginary othering “in which
the opposite of democracy is the absence of 
everything that characterizes the one democracy 
that one knows.” 
All of this is also drawn from the media.
So with that thought, I want to bring together
the three interlocking pieces of Cold War 
mindedness that I’ve been discussing – 
dichotomous thinking, an orientation to deference 
and a repair to news from nowhere – and show how 
they converge in US coverage of Trump. What I’m 
focusing on are the mainstream, elite and legacy 
media, because even in this digital age, I contend 
that they bear much responsibility for the current 
state of coverage.
Dichotomous thinking, first. Dichotomies make
it hard to recognize authoritarian populism
for what it is, as its blended nature is unfamiliar
to journalists. With dichotomies long used
to separate praiseworthy democracy from 
problem-ridden authoritarianism, their blending 
disrupts journalism’s default evaluative skills. 
When coupled with the fact that journalists make 
news judgements all the time in challenging 
circumstances, dichotomization becomes difficult 
to shed because of its simplicity, availability, 
familiarity and entrenched nature.
Dichotomization shapes just about everything
in the news: military conflict, security, politics, 
culture, education, the law and social welfare. 
Though the terrain changes, clear separations 
between left/right, secular/religious, strong/weak, 
insider/outsider, global/nationalist, moderate/
radical, modern/fundamentalist, democratic/
authoritarian – and the underlying moral judgment 
of right/wrong -- remain the default setting for how 
the media explain the world, even when they’re
no longer the case. And we all know what that
does to the institutions at stake.
89
Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
In the age of Trump, journalists’ 
embrace of dichotomies may 
seem odd, because they drive 
his belittlement of the media. Via 
power dynamics dependent on 
neutralizing existing institutions, 
he defends what he calls the 
people’s true identity by detailing 
how elites and institutions have 
wronged them. Hence, the media 
are “the enemy of the people,” 
journalism a “failing institution,” 
and news that critiques him all 
“fake.” Scrutiny, to paraphrase 
political scientist Kirk Hawkins, 
has been recoded as opposition.
Yet a reliance on dichotomous thinking
has significantly impacted coverage. On one hand,
it’s fostered an inability for journalists to see what 
they’re looking at. As Trump began flattening 
nuance into a statement of friendship or hostility 
while undoing the ordinary connectors between 
media and government (briefings, pools, 
conferences), Reuters issued a missive to its US-
based reporters, telling them that they knew how
to cover the administration because they had 
covered it everywhere else in the world where 
autocratic governments prevailed—Thailand, Syria, 
Malaysia and China, among others. That was
in January of 2017. Since then, movement
on this fundamental question—is the Trump regime 
authoritarian, and more important, what
do journalists do about it?—hasn’t gotten far.
On the other hand, as Trump ups the ante---moving 
from ridiculing all media to singling out particular 
news outlets or reporters—we’ve seen not solidarity 
but journalists acting like they’re under siege, 
tackling just about everything on Trump that’s 
thrown their way, without ranking, reflection
or pause. The Detroit News observed that “We are 
not only giving him more scrutiny — rightly so — but 
we are making more mistakes in our haste
to discredit him.” It’s hard to be a safeguard against 
autocratic tendencies when one doesn’t have the 
mindset to see things in shades of grey. 
So that neither response incorporates nuance 
into the binary separating democracy from 
authoritarianism. 
Dichotomous thinking also affects what journalists 
deem important. To put it bluntly, legacy journalism 
focuses so intently on its back and forth volleys 
with Trump that it hasn’t done a good job
of covering anything else. As US writer Corey Robin 
noted in The Guardian, the media “focus more
on the rhetoric of an abusive man than
the infrastructure of an oppressive state, more
on the erosion of norms than the material 
instruments of repression.” And that’s to say nothing 
of other stories that have disappeared altogether– 
like Yemen or climate change. 
All of this suggests that though we have different 
players and a terrain of a different symbolic 
order, all the traits I mentioned earlier that go into 
dichotomies continue to render one side good, 
the other evil. No nuanced contextual or structural 
explanations, no grey areas. What we see instead, 
just like during the Cold War, is a focus on an 
enhanced good side winning against a demonized 
other, without recognizing that neither good nor bad 
bears much resemblance to reality.
A second issue is the deference and moderation of 
US journalists that make it difficult to process any 
recognition of authoritarianism should
it occur. Taking shape in practices like euphemism, 
understatement and qualified observation, 
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deference and moderation protect journalists 
from feeling that they’ve gone over the line into 
unprofessional behavior. So when Trump belittles
a reporter at a press conference, the response
is not to ask the question a different way, but simply 
to stop asking.
We need only think about CNN reporter Jim Acosta 
being castigated by Trump at a press conference
in November, after persisting aggressively
at posing his question. Predictably, Trump 
responded by denying him further access to White 
House briefings. Less predictably, but more tellingly 
given the argument here, many mainstream outlets 
responded by critiquing not only Trump but also
the reporter, calling his behavior “rude 
grandstanding” and “unprofessional.”
The nod to deference, coming at the expense
of solidarity, finds its way too in the still-persistent 
reluctance that mainstream US journalism displays 
regarding the fact of Trump’s lying. Though
the number of lies Trump has told in public now 
stands at 8k (a figure which I’m sure needs 
updating), his lies still become directly reported 
headlines. To be fair, the media are wrestling with 
responses – counting lies, finding patterns in the 
lies. But this is deeply reactive and not enough. 
Esquire went on record last week calling on the 
media to do better at “calling out Trump’s shit,” 
saying “In the light of a brand new year, I have one 
simple wish: Big news organizations need to do
a better job treating the President like the liar that 
he is.”
Not all of this has gone unnoticed. This past 
October, Common Dreams called on journalists
to “stop stifling their outrage” toward Trump. 
Labelling deference a “grave disservice to their 
audiences and to country,” Dan Froomkin argued 
that a lack of outrage is eroding democratic 
institutions, sending “the message that what
is going on is within the realm of the normal, when 
it is not.” It was not a surprise, he concluded, that 
Trump “had played the mainstream media for fools. 
He knew political journalists would be paralyzed 
into stenography by their phobia of appearing 
politically biased. He knew — he still knows — that 
every time he makes a preposterous statement, 
they’ll give him a megaphone, rather than a dunce 
cap.”
All of this shows that deference and moderation
are not well-suited to handling current 
circumstances. When one part of an institutional 
environment behaves tyrannically, moderation
and deference only exacerbate its power.
This brings us to news from nowhere, a third 
dimension of the Cold War mindset that reflects 
journalists’ core adherence to objectivity, balance, 
impartiality and neutrality. This repeatedly invoked 
stance pushes perspective to the side of the picture 
and justifies for journalists the decision to withhold 
recognition of authoritarianism. As mainstream 
journalists take refuge in news from nowhere,
we get lengthy discussions of rhetorical devices 
like false equivalences or vulgar language but very 
little address to the more substantive issues behind 
them—like cronyism, pandering, impunity, power-
sharing, corruption, institutional complicity.
Not only does this show how difficult it is for 
journalists to part with default values and the 
tools by which they’re realized, but it suggests 
little change moving forward. As the Washington 
Post’s Margaret Sullivan noted, the “traditions of 
newsgathering and presentation run deep. Most 
journalists — among them the very best — believe 
that if they keep presenting the facts
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As is clear with this nod to Sullivan, calls
to journalism to up its game rang clear already from 
the beginning in the mainstream media. In July
of 2016, right after Trump received the GOP 
nomination, the Washington Post queried 
“whether it was time to revisit journalism’s ethical 
responsibilities.” The following month New York 
Times columnist Jim Rutenberg wrote a column 
titled: “Trump is Testing the Norms of Objectivity
in Journalism,” where he argued: “if you’re
a working journalist and you believe Donald Trump 
is a demagogue, you have to throw out the textbook 
that American journalism has been using for the 
better part of the past half-century, if not longer.”
That was then.  Such calls have continued over 
the long haul of Trump’s presidency but other than 
singular mainstream journalists who keep on the 
mark—Margaret Sullivan is at the top of the list—
such commentary now comes mostly from non-
mainstream media critics.
And they’ve been vocal. Jay Rosen famously called 
on news organizations to stop attending White 
House briefings and to send in the interns instead. 
George Lakoff suggested that reporters begin
to use “truth sandwiches: reality, Trump spin, 
reality.”  The Wrap contemplated what would 
happen if journalists turned voluntarily into 
activists. The Nation criticized the mainstream 
media for their bias, insularity, groupthink, and 
condescension. In August of 2018, multiple 
news organizations—mainstream and not—
simultaneously published editorials contesting 
Trump’s repeated moniker of the media as enemy 
of the people. But isolated responses like these 
don’t last in any meaningful fashion. Journalists 
have become more skeptical. But not enough,
not all the time, and not with productive effect.
It should be clear why all of this is problematic.
As the terrific Mann and Ornstein book It’s Even 
Worse Than It Looks said, a balanced treatment
of an unbalanced phenomenon distorts reality.
The stakes right now are higher than ever.
CONCLUSION
So to conclude. It is easy to say that journalists 
need to find a different stance, a position that
is less defensive, reactive, deferent, dichotomized, 
objective and impartial—in short, a position that’s 
less Cold War-ish. But what we haven’t figured out 
is why it is taking journalists so long to change. 
You’re looking here at a clip from the McCarthy 
Hearings of 1954, one of the lowest points
in American press history. I’ve argued that one 
reason journalists remain so resistant to change
is because an unmarked mind-set that entrenches 
and naturalizes a non-critical and compliant 
response to authoritarian power dynamics keeps 
them unable to recognize or contest contemporary 
authoritarian trends. As Vox founder Ezra Klein 
recently noted, journalists are “being used
to fracture American democracy, and I don’t think 
we know how to stop it.”
The incremental nature of change applies
to authoritarianism itself. Where scholars are pretty 
much agreed is that if authoritarianism were
to come to a country as diverse and complex
as the US, it will be slow, legal and gradual.
There won’t be one cataclysmic moment when
we can say it arrived.
This offers journalists an opportunity—
to understand now more fully how authoritarianism 
is invading the institutional landscape. As The 
Nation’s Michael Massing noted, “Trump is both
the product and the servant of an entrenched 
system—one that news organizations generally 
shrink from challenging.”
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And “Why is that?”, he asked. “Because 
writing about the way things really work would 
endanger journalists’ access to sources? 
Because it would provoke an outcry from 
powerful people? Because it wouldn’t produce 
enough traffic? Or is it a result of the “Trump 
effect”?”
The probability that it is all of the above should 
remind us how entrenched institutional mindsets 
can be. And how destructive their impact. Why 
do the top journalism watchdogs—CNN’s Reliable 
Sources, the Poynter Institute or the Columbia 
Journalism Review, for instance—“rarely go after the 
elite press”? While the New York Times adopted
a new slogan that heralds the day differently—“The 
Truth Demands Our Attention”—at the same time
it eliminated its public editor position. There are too 
many examples like these. 
New York Times
This opportunity for journalists to pay more 
attention involves going beyond institutional culture, 
particularly to the political impulses
not yet covered enough by mainstream media.
As Jay Rosen noted, the core of Trump supporters 
disbelieve the mainstream media “because they’ve 
been instructed to do that” by a well-developed 
conservative movement that triangulates across 
Trump, activists, trolls and right wing news outlets. 
The result, he says, is that for one third of the 
population, “Trump is the major source of news 
about Trump. Which means that for this portion
of the American public, an authoritarian news 
system is already up and running.” 
Here you may have noticed, we have two liberal 
critics making the very points that Trump has been 
using to attack the media. I mention this because
it shows how little we understand of the ways
in which Trump manipulates the deep structure
of elite US news to his own advantage. With
so much of today’s populism reacting to unrealized 
rhetoric, critical oversight of what’s gone wrong
is way overdue. 
And yet, the opportunity for change may be closing. 
For the perfect storm that engendered Cold War 
thinking is still with us. And the particulars
of that storm continue to motivate and shape what 
mainstream journalism does today, regardless of its 
topic of coverage.  
Populist passions erupt when something is not 
quite right with democratic function. The need
for a critical journalistic voice grows with 
populism’s entrenchment. Though many argue that 
the current media moment leaves leaders more 
exposed and less able to maneouever in secrecy 
than ever before, that presumes that there is a 
journalism out there, waiting on the sidelines,
one that knows how to capitalize on the opportunity 
created for intervention.
US legacy journalists are not yet that journalism. 
They do not yet recognize that an opportunity to act 
exists, that it will be short-lived and that they have 
to change to make it happen.
In November of 2018, Newsday published a piece 
titled “Who Will We Be When the Trump Era Ends?” 
It’s a question we might ask ourselves about
the media moving forward.
* The author is grateful to the ACLS for funding a 2018-2019 fellowship 
on the project How the Cold War Drives the News, that formed the 
backdrop for part of this publication. She is also grateful to the 
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I’m going to talk about “Ideas for Comparative 
Studies of Populism, Media and Communication.” 
A quick warning: We should leave optimism 
for a better moment. It’s not the theme of the 
presentation, but it runs through everything that I 
want to say.
Inevitably, we run into the problem that populism 
remains frustratingly ambiguous and we will never 
settle that conceptual definition. People have been 
wrestling with what populism is for a long time 
and I don’t see how that debate can be settled. So 
we’re better off moving beyond that and being very 
clear in the way we understand populism rather 
than trying to come up with a consensus, especially 
because the concept is so widely used across a 
variety of disciplines and in popular commentary. 
Therefore I don’t foresee that that could be settled.
What do we need? We need much of what has 
been presented in this conference: a variety of 
case studies in different settings that help us 
have a comparative approach that is rigorous and 
clear about the relationship between media and 
populism--the two key words of this conference.
In the past, my work was on populism in Latin 
America. I published a book in 2014 and I thought 
that I was done with populism. It [the book] was 
about media and left-wing populism in Latin 
America. Of course, I never thought that I was going 
to use ideas that I thought were only relevant to 
the Latin American context trying to understand a 
global phenomenon. But here we are.
I will be clear in the way that I understand populism. 
To me, one way of understanding populism is that 
it’s a binary view of politics—the “us” versus “them” 
that many of you already talked about. But that to 
me is more of a rhetorical device rather than the 
way that populism practices politics. We should not 
confuse the populist discourse with what actually 
happens in reality.
Real politics, at least in the cases that I know better, 
is different from this grand notion that everything is 
about the “people” versus the “elites” or “us” versus 
“them.” The interesting thing about this binary 
view of politics is not who the actors are, because 
populist leaders always adapt to whatever the 
particular interests are. [The interesting thing] is a 
question that politics is all about conflict. Politics is 
the skill of distinguishing friend from enemy. I’m not 
the one who says this; this was said by the master 
jurist of the Nazi regime, Carl Schmitt, who was very 
influential in celebratory ideas of populism. In the 
sense that Schmitt said, “A collectivity is a political 
body only to the degree that it has enemies. If a 
part of the population declares that it’s no longer 
enemies, then it joins their side and aids them.”
Politics is all about permanent conflict. And 
populism subscribes to the notion that in 
democracy, consensus is contrary to political 
interest. That’s why populism needs to demonize 
the other-- whoever the other is depending on 
specific political junctures. The other cannot be 
recognized as an actor with equal political rights. 
The other needs to be stigmatized.
To me, what is unique about populism is the 
idea driven by this question of anti-consensus 
politics. Consensus assumes that you recognize 
the other as an opponent rather than as an enemy. 
This is why many political scientists believe that 
populism is always on the edge of democracy. 
It’s not necessarily authoritarian—it can evolve 
into authoritarianism, but is on the edge of 
democracy because it doesn’t recognize one of the 
fundamental notions of democracy: diversity of 
opinions, diversity of interest and the diversity of 
conditions.
This is why populism easily, in the philosophical 
sense, becomes antiliberal democracy. That is 
why it has no patience for a critical journalism, a 
OPPONENT ENEMY
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critical media or a critical opposition. This leads to 
populism basically having no need for what we call 
the public sphere or the communication commons. 
If we look at theories of the public sphere, more 
often liberal persuasion or progressive persuasion 
is characterized by facticity, by reason, by tolerance, 
by diversity, all kinds of arguments that actually 
don’t fit the populist view of the political world.
Basically everything that most of us in this room 
defended or promoted for the last 20, 30 years is 
exactly the opposite of what populism stands for. 
[That is] Because the theory of the public sphere 
assumes that the difference is intrinsic to public 
life as opposed to something that needs to be 
eliminated. In that way, there are actually some 
celebratory notions of populism that believe that 
politics à la Schmitt is all about conflict--intrinsic 
conflict that will never be settled. Something that we 
need to discuss further is that in this way populism 
diverges from neoliberalism. That something that 
many of the presentations made me think about 
trying to understand the continuities and the breaks 
between neoliberalism and populism.
What do we need given this populist view of public 
life and the media? There are two big questions. 
One is of the causes of populism, which pretty 
much every presentation here talked about. The 
other question is the alternatives—how to get out of 
populism, how to overcome some of the problems 
of populism.
I have some ideas of how to go about doing this. 
I don’t think I have the answers… it’s more the 
questions that I have. I know it sounds like a cop-
out but actually it is true. First question: the issue of 
the causes, what drives populism? Can we or should 
we as communication media scholars propose 
a streamlined parsimonious explanation for 
populism? Why populism now? Populism in many 
ways is not unique as to this particular moment.
How is populism connected to ongoing 
developments in public communication and 
the media? Of course, populism is not only the 
outgrowth of what has been happening in public 
communication. There are all kinds of economic, 
political and social forces as well as arguments 
explaining this populist moment in different parts 
around the world. From neoliberalism to economic 
transformations to globalization to migration, 
I acknowledge that. The question is within the 
debate trying to explain, why populism now? 
What is our original contribution to that debate as 
communication media scholars?
There is one line of argument that says there 
is something about media performance that 
facilitates, promotes and supports populism. 
Let’s go into this question. I think this is probably 
the reason why I thought that Barbie Zelizer’s 
presentation was excellent because it helped us 
figure out what is wrong with journalism in ways 
that one could understand. It was in some ways 
what, even willingly, journalism contributes to 
populism.
The critique of journalistic objectivity, the 
critique of the “both sides” of journalism. The 
critique of journalism driven by entertainment, by 
commercialism. The fact that journalism is focused 
on elites—on big primary definers. The personalism. 
All that has been said for a long time in some ways, 
how is that conducive?
There are certain ways that journalism does its 
job that basically tills the ground for populism. I 
want to say yes, that is right. But is that a sufficient 
condition? Because what we have around the world 
is populism in very different media systems and 
different political regimes. It’s hard to say that one 
kind of commercially driven, elite-driven, objectivity-
bounded journalism only leads to the phenomenon 
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We can say it might be this kind of journalism 
in addition to something else. Or let me ask the 
question: If we didn’t have this kind of journalism, 
would populism emerge anyway? I know it’s 
difficult to investigate, but it’s a way of testing our 
proposition that there is something in the way that 
commercial elites center entertainment-driven 
journalism that contributes to populism.
This is why we need comparative studies—when 
we look at journalism with populism in places 
where journalism works differently, places where 
the media system is not the same, to determine 
this. But it’s also true that in pretty much all the 
cases that I know about journalism, populism was 
supported by a sympathetic media, bipartisan 
media and by a mainstream media that actually 
helped to normalize certain ideas that once upon 
a time were more on the margins of society and 
suddenly populism becomes something that is in 
the mainstream.
Even though I agree with that, I think there is 
something deeper going on. It’s not just about 
specific kinds of journalistic performance or 
specific media systems. The populist movement in 
the last decade or so coincides with unprecedented 
changes in public communication. Let’s call it high-
choice media environments. I’m not crazy about 
that concept, but I think that it is widely used to 
describe the new realities of public communication.
Where is the elective affinity between the rise of 
populism and what has been going on in public 
communication around the world? Some people 
are already trying to find a commonality or some 
affinity. And some people will mention the work 
by Paolo Gerbaudo about the affinity between 
social media and populism, which I think is an 
interesting argument to be tested. It’s a very 
appealing argument because one could say that 
probably there is no coincidence between both 
developments.
It’s funny that I’m old enough to remember when 
social media was hailed as something that would 
save democracy and all kinds of good things only 
ten years ago, and now everybody including the New 
York Times and Washington Post are blaming social 
media for everything that is going on. Not only 
populism but everything that is going wrong; social 
media is in some ways an easy target.
In the part of the world that I come from, people 
have been using that argument to say social media 
and populism go together, most recently in the case 
of Brazil and the way that the Bolsonaro campaign 
used certain social media platforms during the 
campaign. But to me the argument is deeper. It’s not 
just about social media as a set of platforms or set 
of companies, but is basically about new forms of 
disinformation.
We’re talking about something bigger than social 
media affinity with populism [We’re talking about] a 
situation that in my mind can be described as post-
truth politics. Post-truth in the sense that there is no 
communication commons anymore. There are no 
common ways of understanding the nuts and bolts 
of what the politics of truth-telling demands, which 
is facticity and certain methods of apprehending 
reality.
When there is no commonality around these ideas 
(the way that we define what is real and what is 
not, what is a fact and what is not), then virtually 
anything goes. That is the situation of post-
truth politics. Not because there is no truth; it is 
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Basically populism says the old line, “would you 
believe me, or your lying eyes?” It’s the position of 
the narrative of the storyteller over facts. Let me 
commit the sin of modernism for a few minutes 
here: something that we can document, something 
that we can test, something that we can prove, 
something that I just think that’s the way it is.
When we have the breakdown of a seeming 
consensus—we can call it an elite consensus—to 
produce assessments of reality through news, 
through media, through all kinds of mediated 
content because they are no longer shared norms of 
how knowledge is produced, then that paves a way 
for populism. I’m not making a direct concession, 
but in some ways it makes sense because it syncs 
with the way populism thinks about reality and 
about politics: the blurring of boundaries between 
what is knowledge and what is reality or what is 
news and what is not.
The problem is that much of our views about 
democratic communication are premised on the 
notion that facts at the end succeed. That reason at 
the end triumphs. That if there’s something that we 
can associate with ways of documenting reality, it’s 
that it’s true and cannot be denied. That is grounded 
in core principles of science. And what populism 
shows is that this principle of liberalism—but I 
will say certain kinds of progressivism as well—
the notion that citizens are capable of revisiting 
changes the conception of reality according to 
evidence, according to rationality, according to 
debate. This is what populism challenges.
In our literature, we have many more solid 
arguments to explain why people believe things 
that fit what many of you already talked about, 
motivated reasoning, partisan reasoning , etc., 
rather than this idea of changing your mind in the 
light of facts. Why do I mention this? Because this 
is a core principle of democratic communication 
in very different interpretations. If this suffers, the 
entire edifice of the public sphere suffers as well. 




because there is no truth as a communal collective 
endeavor. The breakdown of the public commons 
or whatever was left of that actually enhances this 
situation.
This leads to new forms of disinformation and 
misinformation. The breakdown of whatever 
was left of this notion of the public commons 
is the erasure of the borderline between culture 
and empirical reality. Probably you’ve heard this 
expression already; it is not mine. The erasure 
of the borderline between culture and empirical 
reality. Who said that? [Theodor] Adorno in the 
context of totalitarianism. Totalitarianism grows 
out of the blurring or the erasure of anything that is 
about culture or ways of knowing reality and what 
empirical reality is.
Unfortunately, this is the situation we are in, if we 
were ever out of it. That is a big assumption.
Populism loves narratives, because narratives 
are a way of overcoming facts because facts 
are inconvenient. That’s why populism sticks to 
narratives. It sticks to the narratives of “us” versus 
“them.” We would be doing a disservice to “us” 
if we believe of the populist narrative that it is 
only “us” versus “them.” Because that’s extremely 
flexible, depending on what the leader decides to do 
according to very concrete political interests.
98
Media and Populism, 1st Lisbon Winter School for the Study of Communication
Especially when we’re dealing with chaotic high-
choice media environments, which is not the 
situation of most lab experiments in which you 
see people in front of a documentary or piece of 
news that try to elicit sympathy with “the other.” 
How do we do that in a context in which it is very 
difficult to figure out how people traverse these very 
complicated multilayer media environments?
When you read a hyper-rationalistic model of 
the public sphere, you might as well be reading 
fabulous fiction. Because it’s not a roadmap. It’s 
a normative argument whether understanding 
or figuring out how to get that kind of reasoned 
debate. The question is, if it is about emotional 
politics—something that is long overdue and we’re  
understanding the prospects for anything that we 
can call democratic communication based in the 
principles of tolerance understanding, diversity, 
facticity—the question is the following: Why does 
populism seem to monopolize anger? Why does 
anger become populism? Especially the right-wing 
kind.
What other emotions find weight in populism? 
That’s a conversation that we had after Karin’s 
presentation. Is it really anger or is it more like 
hatred or contempt—the complete flat-out rejection 
of the other as opposed to only anger? It seems 
to me that populism condenses different kinds of 
emotions that become articulated in these political 
projects. Furthermore, it’s about our anxieties—
about fear, it’s about the lack of compassion, the 
lack of sympathy—that is what is at the core of 
populism rather than only as Karin correctly argued, 
anger.
How can we build any form of democratic 
communication when these emotions either are 
so strong or are so easily wiped out? I’m not sure 
what needs to be done. The flip side of this is that 
we also don’t know much, or at least we have very 
limited evidence, on how to promote the kind of 
emotions that populism negates, emotions such 
as empathy or understanding or tolerance or 
acceptance of diversity.
We have small-scale studies and experiments on 
how this is done rather than thinking about this on 
a large scale through a variety of media content, 
news or fiction. There is much more that needs 
to be done because it can show a way out of this 
situation. To me populism is a reminder that we 
need to move the analysis of emotion and media to 
the center of the analysis and to understand better, 
beyond very specific case studies, the possibility 
for what we can call pro-public, other-oriented 
emotions.
YES!
Related to this, another problem that populism 
shows and another limitation of the public sphere 
model is the fact that we have a hyper-rationalistic 
model of citizenship. And that’s why the role of 
emotional politics is central to our understanding, 
particularly the current situation. Karin Wahl-
Jorgensen’s presentation was great because it said 
what we need to pay attention to, right? I will build 
off that and say, yes.
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In spite of the limitations, in spite of the dream 
of human rights seven years later, we have to 
understand new conditions for public expression 
that are very different and much more complex than 
what liberal thinkers thought for the last 150 years 
about what more speech would lead to.
It is no coincidence that the right-wing populism 
most of us have been talking about here syncs so 
well with anti-immigration movements, anti-minority 
movements, anti-women’s rights movements, anti-
science movements, homophobia and the anti-
PC discourse--which is seen as the regulation of 
speech. Suddenly right-wing populism has hijacked 
the notion of free speech and sees that any form 
of regulation either by law or by social norms is 
contrary to public speech, including social media 
companies that regulate speech in many different 
ways. To understand the cause, we need to ground 
populism in these new conditions for public 
communication and for public speech.
Let me quickly move on to the other big question. 
What to do about it? What are the options? How 
do we get out of here? Are we forever condemned 
to do this? In many ways, to be honest with you, I 
don’t think that we really know how that is possible. 
I don’t think we have a solid body of evidence to 
make a categorical argument that certain kind of 
communicative actions at scale, not in specific 
case studies,  will lead to these kind of virtues or 
democratic communication that many of us have 
argued for a long time. Or that those virtues for 
communication will address the communication 
dystopias that are articulated around populism.
Can journalism change? That was Barbie’s question, 
and I had it here before. It’s exactly that. Can 
journalism change? Can journalism help not only 
Are you sad yet? It gets worse because now we’re 
saying “good-bye” to the pyramidal model of gate-
keeping. Now we have something that has been 
described in multiple ways, multi-level gate-keeping. 
We have more opportunities for public expression, 
right? In principle, without the limitations and the 
problems that many of you discussed. There are 
more opportunities for public expression if you 
follow the liberal canon. The mythical idea of a 
marketplace of ideas that will lead to virtuous 
outcomes. From John Stuart Mill to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and everybody in the liberal framework who 
believed in the marketplace of ideas and believed 
that good things will come out of that, that it would 
be the backbone of liberal democracy.
What we have is better conditions for hate speech-
-different forms of hate speech (racism, misogyny, 
homophobia, the list goes on and on and on). What 
do we do with that? How do we rethink the question 
of public expression in light of the fact that more 
expression deals with the kind of communication 
envisioned by many theories of the public sphere, 
whether from a moral persuasion or more 
progressive and even radical persuasion?
I’m saying this because right-wing populism in 
particular embodies this movement—this breaking 
down or removal of certain barriers for public 
expression. In what way? All these forms of hate 
speech are reactionary. They are conservative in 
the sense that many people, political philosophers, 
define what conservativism is about. It’s a reaction 
against a person. It’s trying to take things back to 
what they were. And to me, right-wing populism 
represents exactly a reaction against rights-
based politics. These forms of racism, misogyny, 
homophobia are a reaction against the gradual, 
limited yet relevant advances in rights-based 
politics in different parts of the world.
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How to fight hate speech? Zooming out beyond 
journalism. How do you do that? We’re in the middle 
of that debate. The traditional options are limited 
at best if you’re thinking about options such as 
regulation (I’m not going to get into that, I know it’s 
a huge issue), or education or persuasion. Those 
are the three sorts of ways we think about how to 
combat hate speech without falling into violating 
essential aspects of free speech.
The same thing goes for fighting disinformation. 
We’re also in the middle of that debate. We talk 
about media literacies here or other different kinds 
of literacies. The presentation about information 
literacy to me was very interesting because it’s 
exactly that---What can we learn from this body 
of evidence about information literacy? Can 
media literacy be applied—I’m sorry, not in third 
grade--- but in society at large? I know we have to 
start somewhere, we start with young citizens, I 
understand that. But the house is burning. Right?
As communication scholars, we should be able 
to answer this. Every time that I’m talking to non-
communications scholars about this, journalists 
and those from other fields, the question is how do 
we get out of here? What does communications 
research say about how to promote the kind of 
virtues and democratic values that populism flatly 
rejects?
It seems to me that we understand the problem 
better than the alternative. I know that I’m 
exaggerating a bit here, but it seems that we have 
a better grasp on what is driving populism, or the 
force of populism, rather than understanding the 
alternatives. And this is what I think should be on 
our to-do-list.
I think that we should understand the alternatives 
too, because really society at large doesn’t have 
a good clue about what could be done. We 
understand, in some ways, what is driving populism, 
and increasingly I think we have more like a fine-
grained view of this, and this is why the comparative 
status of populism makes sense. But we also 
need to understand what cases can overcome the 





to undermine the causes driving populism, but 
envision a kind of communication that contradicts 
these forces that are driving journalism? On its 
best day, journalism does fact-checking. This is 
the weapon that we have, the tool that we have, is 
to fact-check those populists or autocrats and say, 
“You are wrong. That is not right.” It seems very 
limited, right? Even if it worked---and the evidence 
I know is very ambivalent about this. Really? In 
journalism as a whole, the best we can do is to fact-
check someone who has said 8,000 thousand lies in 
two years? Is that the best that journalism can do?
Or is it because journalism is so, as Barbie said, 
so locked in its own conviction about what it does 
that it cannot do anything better or differently than 
that? Can journalism promote the kind of emotional 
politics that will counter the negative emotional 
politics that are driving populism?
Perhaps. Can it do it as a whole? It’s much more 
difficult precisely because we’re talking about 
journalism now at a time of different forms of 
journalism.
What if journalism dials back hate? The kind of 
press that actually constantly, every single day, is 
fueling hate, different type of hate politics? That 
could help. How can they be convinced to do that? 
Persuaded to do that? Honestly, I don’t know.
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I didn’t want to leave you all sad and depressed, 
because in some ways what we need to do 
as socially responsible scholars is to not only 
take a perspective or a sense of historical 
dimension, but also try to figure out what 
sort of steps societies can take to beat these 
forces. On the one hand, I would like to end 
with two quotes. One is Kafka’s famous quote, 
“There is hope but not for us.”
At the same time there is this one that I like from  
James Joyce’s Ulysses who says, “We were always 
loyal to lost causes, the professor said.”
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